


CSOS and the IDPS- POLICY BRIEF 2.

THE ACTORS, DYNAMICS AND KEY PRODUCTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE FOR PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING.

An Update- August 2011.

I. Who are the Key Actors in the IDPS?



The main actor-groups in the IDPS are

- ▶ The representatives from bilateral or multilateral aid providers, called here 'the donors'.
- ▶ The g7+ **made up of fragile and post conflict states.**ⁱ The g7+ now consist of 17 states including Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Republic of South Sudan, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste;
- ▶ The IDPS secretariat, based within the OECD offices in Paris;
- ▶ The co-chairs of the overall IDPS, representing Donors (under the INCAF) and g7+ representatives: At the beginning of the process, these were DRC and France; subsequently Timor Leste and the UK. The UK is now replaced by the Netherlands.
- ▶ Civil society: There is a Civil Society Advisory Group and Interpeace hosts the global platform for civil society input into the IDPS.
- ▶ An 'advisory group', of experienced individuals.
- ▶ A 'Steering Committee' made up of a smaller group of the most active members in the IDPS, including the co-chairs, and certain very engaged countries, among them Liberia, Afghanistan, Timor Leste and the DRC.

- ▶ Consultants: each of the 4 thematic working groups had one or more consultants to develop discussion papers with tentative recommendations. These have become less present and important after the Monrovia meeting in June 2011. The g7+ also uses some consultants to get the additional insights and knowledge to sharpen the articulation of their own positions.

II. What Factors shape the Dynamics in and of the IDPS process?

Different people will perceive different dynamics depending on where they sit, and/or may assess the importance of certain factors differently. However some of the observable factors that influence the IDPS process are:

a. A primarily state-centric dialogue: It seems fair to say that, though civil society is welcomed, fundamentally the dialogue is between the state-actors that provide aid and receive it, more commonly now referred to as the 'development partners'. Both co-chairs of the overall dialogue are state actors, and the input of CSOs is seen more as 'advisory' to the process. The dialogue also tends to be 'state centric' in another way, i.e. the conversations are more about strengthening the state than about peacebuilding.

b. A focus on post-conflict situations: There is relatively little attention in the dialogue for the trajectories that take a state and society into violent political conflict, for what happens to the 'state' when it is engaged as a party in such conflict, or for 'post-conflict' situations where levels of violence remain very high.

c. The lens of aid money: The IDPS has been constructed within the broader international policy dialogue on aid effectiveness (see Policy Brief 1). That means that the IDPS process is for the most part about the role of AID in 'peacebuilding and statebuilding'. Such perspective is valid, but also limiting: Violence, conflict and fragility are caused by factors other than aid money; neither can sustainable peace be achieved by aid money as such. The monetary perspective may also suggest that greater 'transparency' about aid flows will lead to more effective peacebuilding and statebuilding. That is not necessarily the case. Greater transparency may lead to greater efficiency, but not necessarily to greater effectiveness which depends on other factors.

d. Participant profile: The framing of a dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding through the lens of 'aid' and 'aid effectiveness', meant that many -though not all- of the g7+ participants in the Working Group discussions come from ministries that deal with 'aid', such as a Ministry of Planning, Finance, Economic Development.

This further contributes to the relatively narrow focus that characterizes the dialogue, with greater emphasis placed on the technical aspects of managing aid flows in fragile states and situations. Critical areas such as e.g. broad societal capacities for constructive conflict management or policy capacities in the non-state sector or citizen roles and engagement for sustainable peace tend to be relatively neglected.

e. Participant turnover: Continuity of engagement in the process is important, not only for the conversations to build on each other, but also to develop relationships and build up the knowledge that strengthens the process. This has been at times a challenge as many donors and states did not maintain consistent participation of selected individuals. Instead there were different representatives at many meetings.

f. Time pressure: The Busan event in late 2011 sets a deadline which shapes the timeframe within the IDPS. As a result, the spring of 2011 has been overloaded with key events in rapid succession: Kinshasa in April, Freetown in May, Monrovia in June. Every time there were draft documents to be produced, circulated, read and responded to at fairly short notice. This may have made it difficult for all g7+ governments; donors; civil society to consult broadly within their own circles, and with their wider 'constituencies' (parliament, people, and networks). It also meant limited time to discuss and build consensus among the participants in the IDPS.

g. Two conversational dynamics: The IDPS provides a welcome opportunity for peer-to-peer exchanges which has resulted in it becoming a valuable learning community. The leadership of the process has also been strong, leading to a focus on 'key messages' on aid effectiveness in fragile and violent situations that will be presented at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid and Development Effectiveness later this year (See Policy Brief 1).

As a learning community, the conversation is expanding; as a policy advocacy exercise on the other hand, the conversation needs to be reduced to focus on a few key messages. These two different conversational dynamics are not always easy to reconcile. A clearer management of the two conversational dynamics could make the overall IDPS process more effective. Along those lines it would also be helpful if the IDPS would not only consider a 'Busan statement' as major outcome, but also some 'knowledge products' that come from the learning community.

The donors already have a fairly effective learning & policy community within the framework of the Development Assistance Committee and its various thematic networks. The IDPS is providing the g7+ a platform and incentive to also evolve into a policy community that seeks to speak with one, strong voice at the 4th HLF in Busan, and beyond.

In the course of the Dialogue the need to discuss and develop perspectives and positions between the meetings became also ever more obvious, given the limited time at the actual meeting events. That is not equally easy for everyone, but became mitigated by having pre-meetings the day before the actual official events.

h. Broader knowledge of the policy references: Given that the IDPS is inserted into a wider policy dialogue on aid effectiveness, and has set for itself (so far) as primary objective the articulation of some key messages to HLF4, participants in the IDPS need to develop a broader understanding of that wider policy dialogue, and key references in it (e.g. the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Principles, the Accra Agenda for Action – see Policy Brief 1). That is a task in itself.

i. The knowledge base: Ideally, a policy- but also practice oriented dialogue about peacebuilding and statebuilding would inform itself with the tremendous richness of practical experiences, and also rely on much substantive policy work that has been done on the most relevant themes. That has happened to some degree but not as much as might have been desirable.

The discussion documents with draft recommendations for the four thematic working groups were inevitably influenced by the knowledge and perspectives of the consultants, and what these could produce within the time allocated. They carried out the consultations they could, but despite a lot of work, could not fully capture the realities and rich experiences of the G7+ states. None of them consulted pro-actively with or through the civil society platform. They received case examples from various sources, mostly of initiatives and approaches at state level. Some of the civil society input papers brought extensive case examples from initiatives and approaches in fragile situations that are not led by state actors. The final versions of the output documents of the four Working Groups to varying degree incorporate civil society inputs and cases. By the time of the Monrovia meeting, in June 2011, one other important reference document had entered the reflection i.e. the World Development Report 2011, which focuses precisely on 'Conflict, Security and Development'.

Other highly relevant work doesn't seem to have been drawn upon as much as might have been possible.ⁱⁱ

This is not intended to be an unfair criticism of the IDPS, which is –within a limited time– trying to be a platform for multiple purposes. One of these purposes is trust-building and constructive dialogue among aid providers and aid receivers in fragile situations. That requires a space and atmosphere that is not necessarily best served by a heavy input of 'knowledge'. Yet that knowledge and evidence base becomes more important when the IDPS goes into policy work.

Notwithstanding the significant challenges, the IDPS so far can already count major achievements. It certainly appears as the most significant multi-stakeholder process today for international policy discussion on peacebuilding and statebuilding. In doing so, it has provided a platform and momentum for so-called 'fragile states' to come together, and develop a common position and voice. It has also provided an opportunity for civil society organisations to listen in to the dialogue between states and to collaborate constructively with state actors on this theme of great importance to people in many countries. It has stimulated an informal learning community, that –rightfully so– allows in the first place the participants to exchange experiences before crowding it out with too much 'knowledge'. In the Dili Declaration, there is a strong expression of commitments notably by the governments of 'fragile states', who acknowledge their great responsibility and want more means to assume it. The Monrovia Declaration has spelled out important peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives, which provide important public goods in themselves and without which sustained progress towards the eradication of poverty in these countries is not realistic. More work will be done over the coming months.

III. What are the Main Written Products of the IDSPs so far?

1. **Reports of multi-stakeholder consultation processes**, in different countries (Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste)ⁱⁱⁱ

2. **Dili Declaration**^{iv}

3. **Monrovia Roadmap**^v

4. **Final reports of the four thematic working groups:** “Policy dialogue”; “External assistance to capacity development”; “Planning”; “Aid instruments”.^{vi}

5. **Civil Society input papers:**

a. Dili meeting April 2010

‘Voices of Civil Society Organisations On Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’^{vii}

‘Voix des Organisations de la Société Civile Concernant la Consolidation de la Paix et le Renforcement de l’Etat’^{viii}

b. Paris meeting December 2010

‘Building Peace through Inter-Party Political Dialogue and Strengthening the Democratic State: The Ghana experience’ (E. Bombande) (only in English)^{ix}

c. Kinshasa Working Groups meeting April 2011

‘Aid Instruments’ (only in English)^x

‘External Assistance to Capacity Development’ (only in English)^{xi}

d. Freetown Working Groups meeting May 2011

‘CSO Input to Working Group Meeting on Political Dialogue’ (only in English)^{xii}

e. Monrovia meeting June 2011

‘Civil Society Input to Monrovia Meeting’^{xiii}

‘Contribution de la Société Civile pour la Réunion de Monrovia’^{xiv}

ⁱ For a short brief on the g7+ see

http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_46108466_1_1_1_1,00.html

ⁱⁱ Examples would be the Global Report of the first Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey (2010)

(For the country and global reports, in English and French versions, see

http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3746,en_21571361_42277499_42283205_1_1_1_1,00.html#Global_Report);

and work done within the framework of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) such as the Policy Guidance on “Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility” (2011) (Obtainable in English and French at: http://www.oecd.org/document/53/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_46623180_1_1_1_1,00.html);

“The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations” (2010) (Obtainable in English and French at:

http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_44782932_1_1_1_1,00.html) and

“Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts” (2010?) Obtainable at:

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/17/47672264.pdf>.

Other important references include the products of the 2010 high level event in Bogota on “South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development” or the 2011 “Cairo Consensus on Capacity Development

http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/20110511/Call_to_Action.pdf

There is also very relevant work on the use of ‘country systems’ e.g. “What are the benefits of using country systems? (<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/40/46314845.pdf>) and insights gained from evaluating budget support (see e.g. the UK National Audit Office report

http://www.nao.org.uk/whats_new/0708/07086.aspx?alreadysearchfor=yes) and work undertaken by the DAC

Network on Development Evaluation (Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support, available at

http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3746,en_21571361_34047972_36556979_1_1_1_1,00.html)

Drawing more on this wider body of knowledge would provide not only more refined and nuanced frameworks of reference, but also a stronger evidence base for sensitive issues like aid going to national budgets and through national country systems in conflict-affected and fragile states.

ⁱⁱⁱ The full country reports (in English or French) and a separate executive summary (in the alternative language) are available at : http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_21571361_43407692_45136914_1_1_1_1,00.html

^{iv} Dili Declaration in English : <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/30/44927821.pdf>), and in French

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/22/45066696.pdf>

^v The Roadmap in English : <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/24/48345560.pdf>; feuille de route de Monrovia en français: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/7/48346026.pdf>

^{vi} These papers can be found in English and French versions at

http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_47879501_1_1_1_1,00.html.

^{vii} Find the document at/le document se retrouve à www.interpeace.org;

^{viii} Find the document at/le document se retrouve à www.interpeace.org;

^{ix} Available at: http://beta.peaceportal.org/full-content/-/asset_publisher/f82C/content/building-peace-through-inter-party-political-dialogue-and-strengthening-the-democratic-state-the-ghana-experience/?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fbeta.peaceportal.org%2Fhome%3Bjsessionid%3D1C2C0EF02A469A8941FD48B16B6B8F25%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_Fd5N%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_count%3D1

^x Find the document at/le document se retrouve à www.interpeace.org;

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