

## **CSOs and the IDPS- POLICY BRIEF 6.**

### **A COMPARATIVE READING OF THE DILI DECLARATION, MONROVIA ROADMAP, NEW DEAL AND BUSAN OUTCOME DOCUMENT.**

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This Briefing Paper is based on a comparative reading of the three formal 'Declarations' produced by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in 2009-2011. It also takes a quick look at how conflict and fragility and civil society are referred to in the 'Outcome Document' of the 4<sup>th</sup> High Level Forum in Busan. It concludes that while the documents sometimes build on each other and/or reinforce certain messages, there also are significant complementarities. No one document should be taken as the exclusive reference.

#### **I. THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING DECLARATIONS.**

The International Dialogue (IDPS) has produced three formal 'Declarations'<sup>i</sup>, respectively

- The 'Dili Declaration' of April 2010, with an important 'Statement by the g7+' in annex<sup>ii</sup>;
- The 'Monrovia Roadmap' of July 2011, with the Monrovia Objectives for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in annex;
- The 'New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States' of December 2012, for which broad formal endorsement is now sought.

The successive 'declarations' build on but do not fully substitute for each other, and it would be incorrect therefore to focus on the 'New Deal' only. So what is specific and what is complementary in the respective Declarations?

##### **1. The Dili Declaration.**

This first Declaration already framed the need to more effectively address conflict and fragility in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It also sets out as central aspiration the '*development of capable, accountable states that respond to the expectations and needs of their population*', and it explicitly recognizes 'the centrality of state-society relations' in this regard.

It provided **a first articulation of 'Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG)'**, which with slight modifications will be well retained except for one that will fade more into the background i.e. '*foster regional stability and co-operation*'. It also identified a number of **challenges** to achieving these goals, some of which continue to get attention in the further IDPS process, while a few will fade e.g. *lack of context and conflict analysis; too much focus on a country's capital city and certain regions leaving pockets of exclusion; engagement of only a few central state actors in the executive; insufficient attention to the participation of women in peacebuilding and statebuilding.*

It then set out an 'action plan' for work within the framework of the IDPS, and identified four focus areas which would become thematic 'working groups': political dialogue; planning processes; aid instruments; and capacity development.

Very important however is also the 'Statement by the g7+' in annex. This actually articulates **commitments from national governments of 'fragile states' towards their population.** It

recognizes “*the need for good governance that empowers the people through open and transparent public administration and financial management, political representation and leadership*”. It marks infrastructure development as a priority for economic expansion, and confirms that “*education, health, water and sanitation, gender equality and job creation are fundamental to human and social development*” and that services and programmes must reach the most remote and inaccessible areas. It talks about ‘social inclusion’ and a ‘common national identity’. It acknowledges the need for ‘*reconciliation, social inclusion, dialogue, the institution of the rule of law, and for an honest examination of the root causes of conflict and our national mentality.*” Security and stability are seen as fundamental, but it is understood that this requires “*the integration of all groups in society which should engage in a process of self-examination leading to a common purpose.*” The Statement then affirms that “*fragile nations must develop and communicate their own planning, programmes, models and strategies of development through strong leadership*”, and that “*ownership comes with a responsibility to define our needs and be accountable for delivery.*”

## **2. The Monrovia Roadmap.**

The Monrovia Roadmap fundamentally presents the consensual agreement *around five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Objectives*<sup>iii</sup>: legitimate politics<sup>iv</sup>; security; justice; economic foundations; revenues and services. Attainment of these five objectives is held to be necessary to reduce and prevent conflict and human suffering and to reach the MDGs in situations of conflict and fragility. The ‘Objectives’ are seen to have practical relevance not only at the country level, but also at the international level, where they can provide a common framework to measure progress, but also be used to direct the limited assistance resources among the different countries that need support.

It signals that further work is needed in the IDPS to come to **agreed ‘commitments’** between the development partners, and already announces the intent to have some countries pilot new ways of working in fragile states, once such agreement has been reached. It also announces that the IDPS will do more work to define **agreed ‘indicators’** to demonstrate progress against the objectives, at the global and at the country level. There is a clear sense from the document that the IDPS will continue to be an important platform and forum also after the 4<sup>th</sup> High Level meeting in Busan.

Three errors have to be avoided when referring to or working with the Monrovia Roadmap:

- Referring only to the ‘headline titles’ of the objectives without paying attention to the explanatory paragraphs that appear in the Annex to the Monrovia Roadmap. These paragraphs render more precise the desired interpretation of the broad ‘headline titles’ and are therefore highly relevant;
- Focusing mostly on the relatively ‘conventional’ areas of peacebuilding and statebuilding i.e. security, justice, economic foundations, revenues and services. The most ‘innovative, and critically important area of attention is that of **‘political dialogue/legitimate politics’**. Many peacebuilders and statebuilders have tended to shy away from this for a variety of reasons, not in the least because its dynamics are less amenable to ‘control’ and to ‘results-oriented management’.
- Overlooking the **‘Cross-cutting issues’** mentioned in the Annex which also need to be taken into account. These are: strengthening state-society relations; addressing stress factors that drive conflict; the importance of building confidence and trust; building legitimate institutions; addressing gender, youth and vulnerable groups, and the regional and global context.

### **3. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.**

This Declaration now articulates the agreed '**commitments**' by the 'development partners' i.e. the aid providing and aid recipient countries - particularly their **governments** as the IDPS is held to be an inter-state process. The 'commitments' are seen to be sufficiently innovative to amount to a 'New Deal', which implies significant changes in how external assistance actors engage in fragile and conflict affected countries.

The 'Statement by the g7+' in the Dili Declaration could be taken to be an expression of the commitments (and perhaps also a 'New Deal?') of national governments in fragile and conflict-affected states towards their populations; the 'New Deal' declaration concerns clearly the relationship between the governments of aid-providing and aid-recipient countries. The two therefore can be taken as very complementary.

The New Deal confirms the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) as articulated in the Monrovia Roadmap, and now also signals that these will need full consideration in the discussions to articulate a **post-MDG development framework** beyond 2015. It then organizes the 'commitments' under two acronym headings: FOCUS and TRUST.

**FOCUS** refers to new ways of engaging to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility. Key components of this are

- A periodic 'fragility assessment', a diagnostic tool which is still to be developed;
- One national vision and one plan;
- A 'compact' to implement that one vision and one plan – the definition of 'compact' is still to be agreed upon, after which policy guidance on its use can be developed and perhaps peer review mechanisms elaborated;
- Use of the PSGs to monitor country-level progress;
- Support for credible and inclusive processes of political dialogue, and the building of the capacity of government and civil society leaders and institutions to lead peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts.

**TRUST** covers a series of commitments for results. Key components of this are:

- Transparency, which will also require more support to domestic oversight mechanisms, including national parliaments;
- Risk sharing rather than risk-aversion, with joint risk-assessment and risk-management;
- Use and strengthening of country systems (i.e. public sector systems)
- Strengthening of capacities, with a greater proportion of available funding allocated to this;
- Timely and more predictable aid, including simplified financial management and procurement procedures to improve the speed and flexibility of aid delivery, and greater predictability of aid.

The New Deal Declaration reaffirms the intention of several -now named- fragile countries to pilot its implementation with their donor partners that are also willing. Reporting mechanisms on progress at the country and at the global level still need to be agreed on.

#### **4. Evolution but also Complementarities.**

This summary cross-reading of the three Declarations shows some of the evolution and progress made during these first two years of the IDPS, but also that complementarities exist between the three Declarations: The Dili Declaration Annex articulates commitments of fragile state governments to their populations, the Monrovia Roadmap Annex explains the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals but also the Cross-cutting Issues, while the New Deal document concentrates on commitments to improve the relationship between internal and external assistance actors, and the effectiveness of the efforts undertaken. It would therefore be **an error** in future **to only look at the 'New Deal'** and to disregard the Dili Declaration and the Monrovia Roadmap and their respective and very important annexes. The Declarations also signal that important work remains to be done, so that the IDPS has to continue.

#### **II. THE OUTCOME DOCUMENT OF THE 4<sup>TH</sup> HIGH LEVEL FORUM IN BUSAN.**

The Busan Outcome Document is relatively long and covers varied ground. It reaffirms past commitments made under e.g. the Paris Principles (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the need to maintain and increase the efforts to live up to them. But it also opens up new agendas and dynamics by talking about the change from 'aid effectiveness' to 'development effectiveness', and by acknowledging that the reality of 'North-South co-operation' as we have known it over the past 40 years or so, has changed. There are now many new 'development actors' and therefore many new actual or potential development co-operation relations. At the same time the underlying paradigm of the Outcome Document is still that of the MDGs with a focus on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality (p.3) through a more robust and resilient global economy (p.1). Its 'focus on results' (p.3) doesn't mention reduction of violence and violent conflict.

The Outcome Document in paragraph 26 refers explicitly to the New Deal, with its Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals and its proposed commitments summarized under the acronyms of FOCUS and TRUST. But it also situates the goal of 'resilience' against a spectrum of possible 'shocks' wider than violence and conflict, and that include health pandemics, climate change, economic downturns, food and fuel price crises and natural disasters (paragraph 4).

In general the Outcome Document supports the broad thrust towards country-led and country-level results frameworks and platforms (para 18), and the preferred use of country-systems for development co-operation in support of activities managed by the public sector. Risks need to be managed jointly rather than avoided (para 18). Where use of country-systems is not deemed possible, the providers of development-cooperation will state the reasons for non-use and discuss with government what would be required to enable full use of the country systems (para 19).

#### **III. CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIETY.**

Non-state actors are repeatedly referred to in the three IDPS declarations, in different ways: 'citizens', 'civil society', 'women', 'youth', 'children', 'marginalised groups', 'excluded groups', 'vulnerable groups', 'minorities', 'refugees' or in general as 'people', 'the public' or 'all groups in society'.

Both the Dili Declaration and the Monrovia Roadmap Annex very clearly emphasise the "centrality of state-society relations", and the importance of building trust between the state and its institutions and 'citizens' or 'people'.<sup>v</sup> In the 'New Deal' (p. 3) this question of trust is even expanded: "*An essential*

*pre-condition for progress in all of the New Deal's commitments is to foster confidence between people, communities, the state and international partners."*

There are four critical considerations here:

- Civil society and 'society' at large: A distinction is rightfully made between 'civil society' and 'society' at large (the people, the public, citizens). There is no assumption that 'civil society' can or will effectively 'represent' the population at large<sup>vi</sup> in discussions about aid allocations, aid effectiveness, pathways out of fragility and progress towards achieving the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. Just like the state institutions, civil society needs to establish and demonstrate its effective and legitimate connection to and for society at large;
- The agency of 'society' and 'civil society': A key issue in the practical implementation of these various commitments, of governments to their populations, and of international assistance actors to the stakeholders in the receiving society, will be to what degree the public and civil society are seen as legitimate 'actors' or rather passive 'recipients' and 'evaluators' of the actions of the state? Often used words are 'inclusion', 'consultation', 'participation' and on one occasion 'empowerment' (of women, youth and marginalized groups, in the New Deal p.1). It is also stated that one national vision and plan "*will be country owned and -led, developed in consultation with civil society*" (New Deal p.2), and that a country-level '*compact will be drawn upon a broad range of views from multiple stakeholders and the public, and be reviewed annually through a multi-stakeholder review.*" (New Deal p.2). The New Deal also repeats two points already made in the Monrovia Annex i.e. "*We recognize that an engaged public and civil society, which constructively monitor decision-making, is important to ensure accountability*" , and the intention to "*understand the views of people on results achieved*" and then adds: "*We will solicit citizen's views to assess the transparency of domestic resources and aid.*" (New Deal p.3). The first challenge will be to ensure that this promised 'consultation' and 'participation' etc. is real and not tokenistic and meaningless, and that 'all stakeholders' or 'multi-stakeholder' processes involve non-state actors effectively. The second challenge will be for these non-state actors to show themselves not only critical and negative, but also able to work constructively with the state to resolve problems and make sustained improvements.
- Capacities of non-state actors: If constructive 'state-society' relations are central to the questions of 'resilience' to 'shocks' in general and to violence and fragility in particular, then capacities need to be strengthened not only in the state but also in wider society. The Monrovia Roadmap and the New Deal again contain some references to this. The first one refers to the building of capacities for reconciliation and conflict resolution '*at all levels*' (Annex p.1), the second to building "*critical capacities of institutions of the state and civil society in a balanced manner*" (p.3) and to building "*the capacity of government and civil society leaders and institutions to lead peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts*" (idem p.3).
- The practical interpretation of 'national': The desire of the executive branch of a central-government to 'lead' national efforts and to exercise its authority in doing so, is understandable and legitimate. Yet at the same time it will be critically important that 'national ownership', 'nationally-led', 'national capacities' etc. do not become a pretext for the de facto exclusion of other state and non-state actors. There are two strategic reasons for not doing so: In these particular contexts the government typically still faces the challenge of gaining and maintaining the trust of the population at large, and the task is so immense that even a determined and well-resourced government can't do it alone. The constructive energies and efforts of all actors in society are required and need to be mobilized. Worth mentioning here is

the fairly systematic absence in the process of the IDPS and in these key declarations, of parliament and of local government – two state institutions that typically should be closer to the people than a central government executive branch.

The Busan Outcome Document is more explicit in its recognition of civil society organisations (CSOs) as legitimate actors. It holds that “*Civil society organisations play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation. (...) Recognising this, we will*

*a) Implement fully our respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximizes the contribution of CSOs to development;*

*b) Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability and their contribution to development effectiveness, guided by the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.” (paragraph 22)*

It also more explicitly acknowledges the critical roles that parliaments and local governments can or should be playing “*in linking citizens with government to ensure broad-based and democratic ownership of countries’ development agendas.*” (paragraph 21)

The Declarations from the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, and the Busan Outcome Document therefore are again partially reinforcing but also should be taken as complementary in certain areas.

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<sup>i</sup> Dili Declaration in English : <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/30/44927821.pdf>), and in French <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/22/45066696.pdf> // Monrovia Roadmap in English: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/24/48345560.pdf>; Feuille de route de Monrovia en français: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/7/48346026.pdf> // New Deal English and French versions: [http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en\\_21571361\\_43407692\\_49151766\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_49151766_1_1_1_1,00.html)

<sup>ii</sup> The ‘g7+’ is a somewhat ambiguous label. The Annex to the Dili Declaration already explicitly names 10 countries considered ‘fragile’ while by the time of the ‘New Deal’ there are 19 members.

<sup>iii</sup> What in the Dili Declaration were ‘peacebuilding and statebuilding goals’, in the Monrovia Roadmap became ‘peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives’, to revert to being ‘goals’ in the ‘New Deal’ declaration.

<sup>iv</sup> What used to be discussed by a thematic working group as ‘political dialogue’ has transformed in the Monrovia Roadmap into ‘legitimate politics’.

<sup>v</sup> Civil society participants in the IDPS have cautioned against the use of ‘citizens’ as this is a legal-political construct that can in practice be used to exclude people that are not considered ‘citizens’ or cannot obtain the documentation to establish their ‘citizenship’.

<sup>vi</sup> Nor would it be factually correct to assume that parliamentarians or government officials provide effective political representation and participation for the population at large, simply because they have been elected.