

Issue Brief

Busan and Beyond: Implementing the “New Deal” for Fragile States

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This issue brief was drafted by Rachel Locke, then a visiting fellow at the International Peace Institute (IPI), and Vanessa Wyeth, then a research fellow at IPI. It provides an overview of the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”—a landmark agreement on aid effectiveness in fragile states. After exploring the development of the New Deal, the brief looks at the challenges and dilemmas the agreement raises, prospects for its implementation, and the role of the UN.

The views expressed in this paper represent those of the authors and not necessarily the views of IPI. The International Peace Institute welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs.

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Amid much fanfare, the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was endorsed by forty-one countries and multilateral organizations at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, on November 30, 2011. The culmination of two years of work by members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the New Deal was hailed as a major breakthrough in efforts to seek a new approach to development assistance to fragile states. By agreeing to the New Deal, donors belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) effectively joined with a coalition of seventeen conflict-affected and fragile states calling themselves the “g7+” to shine a spotlight on the need to apply a different development paradigm to these most challenging of contexts. However, the proof of any international agreement is in its implementation. This issue brief provides an overview of the history preceding Busan, the meaning of the agreement reached in South Korea, and prospects for implementation of the New Deal moving forward, with a particular focus on the role of the United Nations.

From Rome to Monrovia

Globally, 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by violent conflict. International aid to fragile and conflict-affected states accounts for 30 percent of global official development assistance (ODA) flows. However, no low-income, fragile, or conflict-affected country has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG). These countries lag approximately 40–60 percent behind other low-income states in MDG progress. Despite significant international and domestic investment, results have been elusive, and demonstrating value for money remains a continuous challenge.

In recent years, thinking on fragility has evolved among a range of bilateral and multilateral security and development actors. Last year alone saw the launch of several landmark policy reports, from the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility* to the World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*.¹ Both are the culmination of years of academic and practical investigation into how international actors need to amend their practices to address the unique challenges posed by conflict and state fragility.

These findings were carried forward into Busan, where roughly 2,000 heads of state, ministers, parliamentarians, civil society representatives, and private

¹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris, 2011); World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, DC, 2011).

sector leaders gathered from November 29 to December 1, 2011, for the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4). Among the dignitaries were UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Korean President Lee Myung-bak, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. The forum was organized around a set of eight “building blocks,” or thematic areas. One building block focused specifically on conflict and fragility, marking the first time the issue had been centrally placed on the agenda of a global forum for aid effectiveness. The outcome of this building block was the New Deal.

To understand the implications of the New Deal, it is important to take a step back and see how far we have come. The first High-Level Forum (HLF) was held in Rome in 2003, motivated by a desire among donors to better understand why their aid money was not delivering hoped-for results and to increase efforts to deliver on the Millennium Development Goals. Two years later, delegates gathered in Paris at the second HLF. By including recipient countries, Paris expanded the dialogue beyond aid donors, with leaders committing to concrete steps to improve ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability of aid. While the resulting Paris Declaration was generally hailed as a critical step forward for international aid effectiveness, it also sparked a collective stock taking of whether and how these commitments would apply in states experiencing ongoing or recurrent violent conflict, states with severe government capacity deficits, and states where the linkage between the state and its citizens is so weak as to be effectively nonexistent.² The Paris commitments reflected assumptions about state capacity and legitimacy that simply did not exist in many conflict-affected and fragile states.

Responding to these challenges, OECD donors in 2007 endorsed a set of ten “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations” (the “Fragile States Principles”) to guide aid to fragile states.³ However, despite the good thinking that underpinned them, the Fragile States Principles were created by donors, for donors. Much like the Washington Consensus which

governed development policy in the 1980s, the early discourse on aid effectiveness largely consisted of outsiders diagnosing the problem, prescribing the solution, and assuming responsibility for carrying out the treatment.

Three years after Paris, the third HLF moved from Europe to Accra, Ghana, and the tent was opened even further to include civil society groups. Accra was an opportunity to demonstrate renewed commitment to the Paris Declaration as well as to deepen investment in three areas in particular: ownership, partnership, and results. HLF-3 in Accra occurred a year after the signing of the Fragile States Principles and prior to the release of any monitoring data, meaning there was no empirical evidence to demonstrate whether donors were adhering to the principles and whether such adherence was making any difference. Despite the lack of evidence, however, there was a recognition that donors needed to join forces with partner governments in fragile states if real changes were to take place. At Accra, donors and fragile state governments committed to launch an “International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.”

At the country level, donors and developing countries will work and agree on a set of realistic peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women. This process will be informed by an international dialogue between partners and donors on these objectives as prerequisites for development.⁴

Within six months, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was born. Its participants include OECD donors; nontraditional donors (such as Brazil and China); international and regional organizations (including the UN, the World Bank, the African Union, and the African Development Bank); representatives of civil society; and, most importantly, representatives of conflict-affected and fragile states.

Extensive consultations were carried out in 2009 and 2010 in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. These

2 OECD, “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability,” Paris, March 2005.

3 OECD, “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,” Paris, April 2007.

4 OECD, “Accra Agenda for Action,” Accra, September 2008, para. 21.

consultations informed the first formal meeting of what became known as the International Dialogue, which was held in Dili, Timor-Leste, in April 2010.

A small group of countries affected by conflict and fragility were deeply engaged throughout this process. Led by the finance minister of Timor-Leste, Emilia Pires, and the planning minister for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Olivier Kamitatu Etsu, the group—initially consisting of Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste—dubbed itself the “g7.” With more countries expressing interest, the group expanded and changed its name to the “g7+.” The g7+ countries met officially for the first time on the day before the opening of the International Dialogue meeting in Dili, issuing a formal statement declaring their intention to work together as a coalition and to develop national strategies within their own countries for addressing crucial governance, economic, social development, and security priorities.

In their statement, the g7+ countries delivered a challenge to donors: work with us, not against us. “We recognise that ownership comes with a responsibility to define our needs and be accountable for delivery,” they claimed, but “we must give ourselves a transitional period to reinforce our capabilities and systems and not have complex and slow procedural requirements and conditions imposed upon us.”⁵ The Dili Declaration—the outcome document of the meeting—echoed these themes and committed donors and fragile states alike to work together to develop an International Action Plan on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding to present in Busan.

The g7+ (which has since expanded to include seventeen countries, with a total population of more than 350 million) has made a splash. Its formation represents the first time that a group of the world’s most fragile and conflict-ridden countries have come together in a coalition around a common purpose in any forum. The most active members of the g7+—Timor-Leste, Liberia, DRC, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, among others—

have used it as an opportunity to learn from one another and to engage constructively and collectively in pushing for change in their interaction with donors.

Following Dili, the International Dialogue process moved from consultations at the national level to a series of regular dialogues on thematic issues (capacity development, planning processes, political dialogue, and aid instruments). These discussions in turn formed much of the substance of the second global meeting of the dialogue, which was held in Monrovia, Liberia, in June 2011. In Monrovia, participants reached a landmark agreement on five interim peacebuilding and statebuilding goals as preconditions for working toward the MDGs in fragile and conflict-affected states: legitimate politics, security, economic foundations, justice, and revenue and services.⁶ The so-called Monrovia Roadmap, therefore, was a product of national dialogue that included a broad array of domestic actors and thematic dialogues between donors and aid recipient governments. The New Deal, in turn, was born from the Monrovia Roadmap.

The New Deal: What, Who, and How

The three-pronged breakdown of the New Deal is intended to bring focus to the what, who, and how of a new approach. The peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs) provide the *what*: a framework for focusing assistance and government action in fragile and conflict-affected societies. Years of analysis have demonstrated that neither the MDGs nor humanitarian assistance target the underlying challenges of fragility or conflict and therefore are insufficient in helping countries move toward greater stability and societal cohesion. The PSGs are an attempt to find an interim framework to replace the existing MDG and humanitarian paradigms with something more effectively targeted at the priority challenges of fragile states.

The New Deal also outlines the *who*. The PSGs will have to be contextualized for each setting through a country-owned and country-led process.

5 “Statement by the g7+,” in International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “Dili Declaration: A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” April 2010, Annex.

6 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “The Monrovia Roadmap on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” July 2011.

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

We, the members of “the Dialogue,” endorse the “New Deal” and commit to undertake the necessary actions and reforms to implement it.

- We agree to use the **Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs)**, as an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGS to guide our work in fragile and conflict-affected states. By September 2012, a set of indicators for each goal will have been developed by fragile states and international partners, which will allow us to track progress at the global and the country level.
- We commit to **FOCUS** on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive **country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility** based on a country-led fragility assessment developed by the g7+ with the support of international partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the PSGs to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue.
- We commit to build mutual **TRUST** by providing **aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results**. We will enhance transparency, risk management to use country systems, strengthen national capacities and timeliness of aid, improving the speed and predictability of funding to achieve better results.

Source: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” 2011, p. 1.

Here, the New Deal puts national actors squarely in the driver’s seat. International actors will support national governments in developing country-led fragility assessments, which will then inform “one vision, one plan.” This national vision would in turn be the basis for a compact between a government and its international partners, in which the specifics of implementation would be laid out. This section of the New Deal is an attempt to ensure that the Paris commitments on ownership are retained, but more appropriately match the challenging environments of fragile and conflict-affected states.

Within this section lies one of the more potentially challenging aspects of the New Deal. It states that inclusive and participatory political dialogue will be a key component of the process of assessing fragility and developing a national vision. There is, however, no more specificity than that. Many are concerned that the process will be insufficient, that it may not reach out to marginalized groups, will not be organized in a way that people can easily participate, or will not be taken seriously by government officials. Civil society actors in particular have continued to raise these issues throughout the development of the New Deal as

well as in Busan.

Finally, the New Deal recognizes that a shift is needed in *how* international assistance is provided. By better managing risks, agreeing to increase the use of country systems, and increasing the predictability of aid, donors committed to helping fragile and conflict-affected states improve their ability to govern. Donors and governments of fragile states also committed to making development more responsive to the needs and concerns of citizens, by strengthening national capacities and improving transparency and accountability.

Challenges and Dilemmas

While the New Deal has been justifiably heralded as a success, there are also real concerns. These concerns are, for the most part, related to implementation and must continue to be taken into consideration in order to ensure that this new paradigm lives up to its potential. While this issue brief will not cover all concerns, a few key ones are laid out here.

Even a well-financed, organized, and coordinated focus on the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals

may not prove to be the answer to addressing conflict and fragility. Just as the MDGs have not been the solution to poverty in every country where they have been applied, the PSGs will not be the solution to conflict and fragility in all contexts. This is why the piloting and learning process will be so critical. It will also be critical for those involved to recognize when local conditions are not conducive to the framework laid out in the New Deal and not try to apply it in all contexts. Otherwise, members of the International Dialogue risk looking as though they are superimposing frameworks rather than focusing on effective, context-based solutions.

Another key concern centers on the development of a common vision. In contexts with significant societal cleavages, lack of trust between state and citizens, and highly contested governing mandates, the development of “one vision, one plan” will be a challenge. Government-led efforts in such contexts can be construed as threatening the interests of important stakeholders and run the risk of creating winners and losers. In order to be responsive to this reality, the process must be based upon inclusive dialogues between government and the population—dialogues that are well resourced and appropriately staffed. The New Deal leaves ample room for interpretation of what inclusive dialogue means and how to properly facilitate it. This is a particular area of concern for civil society, and likely one that will continue to face a high degree of scrutiny going forward.

In many contexts where the capacity of both state institutions and civil society is limited, these dialogues will also present real opportunity costs. To meaningfully engage a wide swath of the population in a conversation over a national vision will require a huge amount of time, resources, and planning. Reaching marginalized groups will require that conversations happen throughout the country, not only in capitals. Without real government commitment and sustained investment, the entire process will be rendered meaningless. In contexts with limited human and financial resources to invest in this kind of inclusive process, tradeoffs will inevitably be made, and expectations will have to be managed carefully.

A key concern for donors is whether fragile and conflict-affected states are committed to combating corruption. In environments where the formal economy is limited, where political and economic

power are deeply intertwined, and where rule of law is almost nonexistent, this commitment requires more than just political will. It requires a society that buys into the notion that corruption is worth fighting and something they can affect. Such long-term thinking and trust in the state’s ability to follow through on promises are generally weakest in fragile and conflict-affected environments; yet without popular support, anti-corruption efforts are likely to be undermined. The triangular relationship between society, state, and donors will need to be strengthened in order to demonstrate New Deal success.

Donors will also need to take more of a back seat to country-led processes. In many contexts this will be a painful separation, made easier only by mutual trust and sustained capacity development. Donors will also need to invest in staffing—and delegating authority to—their field missions, so that direct relationships can be formed and maintained with host-country counterparts. This will help to improve trust and goodwill, and can also enable the development of context-specific programs that work for both donors and recipient countries. All of this is challenged by the reduced aid budgets many donors are facing as a result of the global financial crisis. Investing in staff is a large financial burden that many donor governments may not be ready to stomach. Additionally, shifting to a country-led process will require donors to take on more risk than many of their governments may be willing to bear. Parliamentarians in donor countries may well balk at being asked to increase assistance flows through government channels in states notorious for corruption, conflict, and underdevelopment. Development agencies will need to work hard to overcome these barriers.

Finally, the role of emerging donors remains a real concern for the New Deal process. Although China and Brazil are nominally members of the International Dialogue, they have not engaged in any meaningful way in the discussions, and neither country sent a representative to Monrovia. The fact that the New Deal was endorsed in Busan, during what is ultimately seen as an OECD process, is a liability in this regard. Although China, India, and Brazil ultimately signed on to the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the meeting’s outcome document, they only did so after demanding the insertion of

language distancing non-OECD donors from concrete commitments. The final version of the partnership welcomed the New Deal in paragraph 26 and called for those who have endorsed the New Deal (primarily members of the International Dialogue) to take action to ensure its implementation. None of the emerging donors have endorsed the New Deal, and there is little indication that they intend to, at least in the near future. Will the lack of involvement by emerging donors have negative repercussions on the overall impact? What kinds of incentives could be created to encourage them to support the New Deal, both formally and in practice? As discussed below, all of this has important implications when it comes to the UN.

Implementing the New Deal

Implementation of the New Deal will happen at both the global and country level. In Busan, seven g7+ countries volunteered to pilot implementation of the New Deal: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. Many of these were joined by donors, who pledged to support implementation in specific countries: Australia announced a partnership with Timor-Leste to support the Timorese National Development Plan working with and through New Deal principles; the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands pledged their support to South Sudan in its efforts to align its national development plan with the New Deal; and the same three countries announced programs of support with Afghanistan based on New Deal principles. More recently, Sweden and the United States have pledged to support implementation of the New Deal in Liberia. In other countries, partnerships have not yet been announced but are anticipated.

Since the conclusion of Busan, little has been heard on the specifics of these processes, but it is likely this will change in the coming months as these partnerships begin to become more structured and better known. In the initial phases, donors will have to look for opportunities to align their existing aid programming with government priorities, using the PSGs as a framework. “Piloting” the New Deal is not a process that can happen overnight, nor is that the intention. The donor representatives who endorsed the agreement

in Busan also had some work to do in socializing their own agencies and governments on the significance of the agreement and launching internal discussions on the implications of implementing it. In many agencies, the New Deal was negotiated and endorsed by policy or thematic units dealing with conflict and fragility, while implementation will fall to the regional and operational bureaus and field-based staff. Different actors have different views of what implementation will look like, and it will also look different in each country. This is to be expected—and even appreciated—in a country-based and context-specific process, but the right balance will need to be struck between unique country processes and the global learning and advocacy process.

At the global level, the New Deal commits partners to develop, by September 2012, a set of indicators to track progress against the PSGs. The intention is to develop global indicators against which the international community can measure the PSGs as a useful paradigm. If the New Deal can demonstrate a new approach, it can provide a platform for advocacy efforts to ensure that issues of conflict and fragility are incorporated into the post-2015 global development framework, which will be negotiated to replace the MDGs.

Work on the indicators began last year and kicked into high gear with the creation of a working group within the International Dialogue. Given the challenges inherent in the process, efforts may need to further intensify to meet the September 2012 deadline, but so far the process seems to be on track to hit that target. There have been some signs of tension regarding how the indicators will inform the “fragility spectrum” that g7+ countries are developing and what this will represent internally and externally. The positive sign is that most actors seem keen to engage and are working hard to develop something that donors, fragile states, and civil society participants can agree to.

It is also critical, however, to ensure that global indicators are matched by country-specific indicators tailored to individual country contexts. In both cases, there are bound to be contested visions for interpreting the PSGs. Using the stated goal of legitimate politics as an example, some prefer to see this captured through election-related indicators. Others prefer a more thorough consideration that takes into account the strength of opposition

parties, civil society, media, local conflict resolution mechanisms, etc. In the final negotiations of the text, donors were pushing to include a reference to public perception surveys as a basis for measuring progress; g7+ countries pushed back on this, and the New Deal itself makes vague reference to soliciting “citizens’ views.” As with all things, the devil is in the details, and the process of developing indicators is already bringing those details to the fore.

It also remains to be seen how this conversation incorporates the wider community of concerned actors. So far, the International Dialogue has been primarily composed of donor-agency representatives together with counterparts from ministries of finance or planning in fragile states. However, in order to achieve progress on the New Deal, actors working on issues of trade, defense, peacekeeping, and diplomacy will all need to be involved in the implementation. In Afghanistan, for example, it would be misguided to discuss security without including NATO. Similarly, discussions in Liberia or DRC will require the active participation of the UN peacekeeping missions deployed there.

The New Deal cannot be implemented if the conversation remains only in ministries that handle donor engagement. Line ministries that have domestic responsibility for the areas of New Deal prioritization must also be actively engaged, including those with purview over domestic safety and security, justice, and economic growth. To accomplish this, the New Deal will continue to require socialization in those communities not already familiar with its scope and purpose. In other words, both donors and fragile states still have a long way to go to achieve a “whole of government” approach to implementation.

The Role of the UN

The UN will be an important venue for moving this agenda forward in 2012 at the intergovernmental political level, policy level, and country level. The New Deal explicitly calls for full consideration of the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals in the post-MDG development framework beyond 2015. This conversation is just starting with the appointment of the three co-chairs (Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and British Prime Minister

David Cameron) to the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Post-2015 Development Planning. The UN is just starting to coordinate meetings at the working level focusing on the post-2015 development framework. In theory at least, President Sirleaf’s inclusion on the panel bodes well for New Deal advocates, given the leadership role Liberia has played within the g7+ and the International Dialogue.

The New Deal also calls for consideration of the goals by the 2012 UN General Assembly. Until mid-April, the g7+ indicated that it was strongly in favor of seeking endorsement in the form of a UN General Assembly resolution. However, UN staff, member states, and affiliated experts expressed strong concern regarding the risks of seeking General Assembly endorsement, and the g7+ has more recently indicated that it will not seek formal endorsement and will instead focus on planning a high-profile side event during General Assembly. In particular, experts warned of the risk of getting bogged down in negotiations that could jeopardize broader aims of ensuring that conflict and fragility issues are included in a post-2015 development framework. General Assembly politics are complex. If the endorsement of the General Assembly is sought too soon, without a better sense of UN member state politics, the effort could backfire and risk derailing the broader agenda. There is also some indication that the Group of 77 (G-77) is not predisposed to support any efforts to seek General Assembly endorsement of the PSGs. In recent debates within the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the C-34), an effort by the EU to insert a mention of the New Deal into the C-34 report met with stiff resistance by some prominent G-77 member states and Russia. Donors are also sensitive to concerns that the New Deal is viewed as an OECD product, and efforts by OECD countries to push it in New York risk reinforcing this perception and undermining the overall agenda.

Any attempt to seek support and endorsement by a broader UN membership will depend on whether the permanent missions of the g7+ countries themselves are willing to lead the effort. However, capacity within the g7+ missions is extremely limited, and there simply may not be any incentives for fragile states to form a bloc at the UN that challenges the unity of the G-77. Thus far, it is not

clear to what extent the g7+ missions have either the inclination or the capacity to play a leadership role in New York, with a handful of exceptions (particularly Liberia and Afghanistan). The g7+ is still considering options for setting up a secretariat presence in New York, but it will require support from the g7+ ambassadors if it is to be effective.

Member state politics aside, the United Nations played a significant role within the International Dialogue and at Busan, including the head of United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Jordan Ryan, as INCAF co-chair; UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Judy Cheng-Hopkins; and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon himself. The New Deal was endorsed by UNDP's Helen Clark on behalf of the UN Development Group (UNDG) but has not been formally endorsed by Secretary-General Ban on behalf of the entire UN system.

At the country level, the UN will clearly play a central role in New Deal implementation. All seven of the pilot countries host Security Council-mandated missions (the missions in Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste are led by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations; the special political missions in CAR and Sierra Leone are led by the UN's Department of Political Affairs). Three of the New Deal pilot countries are on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (CAR, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). Moreover, the UN itself has made significant efforts over recent years to reform approaches to countries emerging from conflict, including implementation of the 2009 Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict, the 2010 review of the Peacebuilding Commission, and the 2011 review of civilian capacities. Much of the UN's own reform efforts are consistent with the principles in the New Deal.

Despite the lack of formal UN endorsement thus far, the UN system is taking the New Deal very seriously, and there is an impressive amount of work going on:

- In March 2012, Helen Clark, as chair of the UNDG, and Valerie Amos, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, sent a joint message to all UN resident and humanitarian coordinators in g7+ countries, urging the UN country teams to give active support to New Deal implementation. A similar joint message by the heads of the Department of Political Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Department of Field Support was also sent to Executive and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in all New Deal pilot countries.
- The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is playing a very active role in helping convene g7+ missions in New York, and sees the Peacebuilding Commission itself as a potential "soft landing" for the New Deal in New York: a sympathetic forum in which to introduce the PSGs and begin socializing UN member states on the substance. The PBSO is also active in the International Dialogue steering group, particularly in work on indicators and interagency UN work on the post-2015 development framework.
- The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as chair of the UN integration steering group, has started convening special meetings of the integrated mission task forces in pilot countries with DPKO-led missions to discuss implications for New Deal implementation.
- The Secretary-General explicitly referenced supporting transition compacts, a key component of the New Deal, as one of his priorities in his five-year action agenda for his second term.
- Different departments, agencies, funds, and programs are looking at the implications of implementing the New Deal for their own programming, particularly UNDP and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).
- In June 2012, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee formally decided that the UN would strongly support follow-up to and implementation of the New Deal at country and global levels, including: support to the g7+, continued engagement in the International Dialogue, support to implementation at the country level, advocacy for allocation of resources to support implementation, assistance in developing indicators, alignment between any country compacts that are developed and the UN Peacebuilding Commission's instruments of engagement, and a commitment to exploring how challenges of conflict and fragility can be reflected in the post-2015 UN development framework.

Conclusion

The real work of implementing the New Deal is only just beginning. Having specific commitments helps. But the institutional inertia and antipathy toward reform that prevent change from taking place in large bureaucracies will not be inconsequential. The most recent monitoring report on the Fragile States Principles has shown that donors are off track in the areas of linking security, politics, and development; instituting practical donor-coordination mechanisms; contextualizing their programs; and ensuring the centrality of statebuilding principles. All of these are relevant to New Deal implementation. A redoubling of efforts is needed to ensure that the next round of monitoring on adherence to New Deal implementation doesn't demonstrate similarly lackluster results.

Finally, it would be an oversight to ignore the fact that much of the progress in getting to this point is due to the strength and organization of the g7+. They have changed the debate on fragility by defining it in their own terms, based on their reading of their own context, and ensuring that conversations about development in fragile states also focus on the importance of security, justice, and legitimate political processes. It is tempting to see the g7+ as the solution to many asymmetries that plague decision making and engagement on conflict-affected and fragile states, but it is also important to recognize that the group, born in a specific context under specific leadership, is less than two years old. It will be important for them to continue to engage with one another through their own structures, and it is yet to be determined what shape this will take. The foundation is strong, but expectations are high—it may prove difficult to live up to them.

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777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017-3521, USA

TEL +1-212-687-4300 FAX +1-212-983-8246

Freyung 3, 1010 Vienna, Austria

TEL +43-1-533-8881 FAX +43-1-533-8881-11

www.ipinst.org