PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO VIOLENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Case studies of Afghanistan, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, France, Germany, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, United Kingdom, United States and Yemen

December 2021
The Centre for Sustainable Development and Education in Africa (CSDEA) is an independent organization that seeks to address the challenges of violence and poor governance that are making sustainable development elusive in Africa.
Preventing and Responding to Violence in the 21st Century: Exploring Alternative Approaches

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PREFACE

In December 2015, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2250, urging member states to increase representation of youth in decision-making at all levels. The resolution was agreed upon recognizing the threat to stability and development posed by the rise of radicalization of young people. This ground-breaking resolution on Youth, Peace and Security recognizes that “young people play an important and positive role in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security”.

Earlier in 2015, The Sustainable Development Goals were adopted by UN Member States, as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which set out a 15-year plan to achieve the Goals.

It is against this background that the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding [CSPPS] provided support for underlying research. This study aims to inventorize key policy and programming considerations that are to be strongly considered when planning, implementing and evaluating programs aimed at preventing and responding to violence.

The study was coordinated and implemented by the Centre for Sustainable Development and Education in Africa (CSDEA) in Nigeria. In embarking on this research, CSDEA has considered policy practice in multiple countries on the basis of which this report is now launched.

As a global network of civil society organizations supporting peacebuilding efforts in fragile & conflict affected settings, it is our hope that the recommendations as collected in this report will lead to improved and more inclusive policy making at both national and international levels.

CSPPS, December 2021
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section/Section of the Book</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Global Overview</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Definition of Violence</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Methodology</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Push and Pull Factors: A Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section 2. Why do people engage in violence?</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section 3. Conventional Approaches to Responding to Violence and their Critiques</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section 4. Case Studies from France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States</strong></td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section 5. Alternative Approaches to Preventing and Responding to Violence</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Ansar as-Sharia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJDC</td>
<td>Association for Central African Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFJC</td>
<td>Association of Female Lawyers</td>
</tr>
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<td>ADA</td>
<td>Austrian Development Agency</td>
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<td>CORDAID</td>
<td>Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDEA</td>
<td>Centre for Sustainable Development and Education in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSPPS</td>
<td>Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cJTF</td>
<td>Civilian Joint Task Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPES</td>
<td>Comité d’Organisation Pour la Paix dans les Etablissements Scolaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of the Sahel-Saharan States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Concerned Citizens for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Coordination of Azawad Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDIMUC</td>
<td>Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department for Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department for Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Development Partnership Arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Cross-border Peacekeeping Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Families Against Stress and Trauma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTO</td>
<td>Foreign Terrorist Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPPAC</td>
<td>Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
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<td>GPC</td>
<td>Gulf Protection Council</td>
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<td>HTC</td>
<td>Hadramaut Tribal Confederation</td>
</tr>
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<td>HHS</td>
<td>Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCPC</td>
<td>High Commission on Peace Consolidation</td>
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<td>HPC</td>
<td>High Peace Council</td>
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<td>HS</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
</tr>
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<td>HSC</td>
<td>Human Security Collective (HSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJA</td>
<td>Interim Juba Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Secretariat</td>
</tr>
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<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenyan Defence Forces</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>ATPIR</td>
<td>Project on Fighting against Violent Extremism and Radicalization of Former Terrorist Fighters and Victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPAIR</td>
<td>Rebuilding Peace through Actions with Inclusive Reach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAVE</td>
<td>Society Against Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFS</td>
<td>Somali Family Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYLI</td>
<td>Somali Youth Learners Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somalia National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status-of-Forces-Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Supporting Transitional Awareness and Reconciliation Techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAVE</td>
<td>Teachers Against Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Trans-Afghan Pipeline</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCI</td>
<td>Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative</td>
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<td>TSCTP</td>
<td>Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership</td>
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<td>MNJ</td>
<td>Tuareg Niger Movement for Justice</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNCCT</td>
<td>United Nations Counter-terrorism Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integration Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>YAR</td>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The pre-independence and post-colonial configurations, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 2001 twin bombing of the World Trade Center and the resultant War on Terror have all contributed to define violence worldwide, whether localized or transnational in nature. The inability of global and local actors to engage in inclusive peacebuilding and statebuilding that considers every stakeholder and community as part of the solution and opt for win-win solutions has further exacerbated violence in the countries examined. The use of military force by both foreign and regional powers, and national governments has resulted in further violence, loss of lives and properties. This trend must be reversed because of the long-lasting human, political, economic and social costs leading to further inequalities, deprivation and reverse development.

The role of citizens in government as embedded in the social contract must be prioritized to ensure for check and balances between the governing class and the governed. The issue of marginalization and competition between groups within a setting can only be resolved if there is inclusivity, active participation and transparency on all sides. National governments and their foreign counterparts must promote and enforce the protection of fundamental human rights of citizens and the rule of law to lay a solid foundation for sustainable peace and security.
The aim of this study is to inform policy makers, the UN, the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, donor governments, national and local governments, international and regional organizations, civil society, youth groups, and the private sector of key policy and programming considerations to strongly consider while planning, implementing and evaluating programs aimed at preventing and responding to violence.

This research paper highlights some of the localised drivers of violence and violent groups, the shortcomings of conventional approaches, and documents evidence of viable alternatives to preventing and countering violence. It also highlights the policies adopted by some OECD countries for addressing violence and radicalization in their own territory for comparative purposes. The study concludes with the following key recommendations to reduce violence and ensure sustainable peace and security in fragile and conflict affected countries, and globally:

1. The international community and national governments alike should ensure that strategies to prevent and respond to violence are not limited to programmes at the individual, family, community, and local level, but also take into account the structural causes of violence. These programmes should seek the integration of the entire society by engaging the political, cultural, economic, social, and external forces at work within a given context, including those actors that have not participated in the violence for win-win solutions. This will ensure that the roots of grievances leading to violence are addressed holistically. This study reveals that armed actors are more comfortable with amnesty from crimes committed during a conflict than criminal justice. The conventional approach of military bombardments, drones and surgical strikes have led to resentment among local populations and serve as a great source of propaganda for recruitment by violent groups.

2. The United Nations, Governments and Civil Society should reaffirm that the protection and promotion of human rights is at the core of any effective policy to prevent and respond to violence by putting an emphasis on preventive efforts,
legislation, and oversight rather than focusing on repressive measures only to respond to violence. The police and security institutions must imbibe professionalism, accountability, human rights and the rule of law for them to be successful in delivering on their mandate and have public support. The United Nations and relevant stakeholders should urgently address the role of external and internal state actors in starting and sustaining violence by legitimising impunity and human rights violations, in the guise of geopolitics and competition for access to and control over natural resources, and state power. Impunity and human rights violations by the foreign powers and interests, national governments and security agencies leads to more grievances and violence, no matter the well-thought out interventions that are implemented.

3. Donors, national governments and relevant stakeholder should promote local content in peacebuilding, reintegration and rehabilitation programs as opposed to imported ideas as has been revealed in this study. Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes should be structured in a way to enable inputs and participation from former fighters. These individuals can help provide a nuanced, empathetic understanding of the radicalisation and de-radicalisation process. They can also offer first-hand accounts of their experiences and provide powerful narratives in prisons and communities. Again, the study reveals that modest allowances should be disbursed to amnesty recipients to ensure that amnesty programs do not become cash cows resulting in breeding ground for more recruits and other unintended consequences.

4. The FAO and the WFP should intensify efforts to give strategic support to the agricultural sector which is the primary occupation of majority of the citizens in the Global South countries under review in this study. This will boost food and livestock production and sustainability, and reduce violence. However, shocks such as droughts, election related violence, and violent extremism might reverse gains. This calls for a holistic planning of agricultural interventions that examines possible risk factors with strategies to mitigate them. Long term reforms and programmes to address environmental shocks will be required to support stability in several fragile and conflict affected states including Afghanistan, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Drought and severe weather conditions have
hindered agricultural activities and disrupted the sources of livelihoods of millions of people in fragile and conflict affected states leading to food shortages, hunger, and starvation. This is exacerbating existing conflicts and creating new ones.

5. The international community should note that strategic and sustainable bilateral and regional security pacts that promote soft approaches between neighbouring countries to protect the borders and monitor the movement of people and goods across their borders will be essential to support peace. These pacts can incorporate peer exchanges for sharing best practices. At the same time, citizens tend to have more faith in solutions led by regional and sub-regional organisations which in most cases have neighbouring countries as members and are supported by multilateral stakeholders led by the UN, than solutions that are led by foreign actors.

6. National and local governments must ensure comprehensive data and sustainable regulation of religious institutions and Madrassas to ensure that they are not used as spaces for radicalisation. The content of education in Quranic schools which is a dominant form of education in most of the conflict affected countries in this study should be harmonised. It is presently in disarray with its various teachings. There are allegations of widespread misinterpretation of the content of the Quran so as to indoctrinate unsuspecting students leading to violence. Additionally, there is the urgent need to strengthen the capacities of religious leaders in promoting non-violence and tolerance in support of peaceful societies.

7. National governments and Civil Society should develop and strengthen their action plans to incorporate comprehensive and alternative narratives to violence. Alternative narratives in responding to violence coming from local religious leaders can be a source of civic education to the youth and the general population. These alternative messages to violence can also be shared through peace education curriculums and mass media. Findings from this research underscore the power of storytelling using mass media to educate young men and women to prevent them from joining violent groups.
8. Development assistance aimed at preventing and responding to violence should not be securitised nor halted during violence, but instead it should embrace community and bottom-up perspectives so there can be trust between donors and recipient nations and communities leading to ownership and sustainability. Despite established linkages between development, peacebuilding and military strategy, funds allocated to preventing and responding to violence should not be diverted to military operations.

9. National and local governments should strengthen the weak justice systems that hinder the prosecution of offenders, and there is urgent need for comprehensive legal frameworks for prosecuting offenders. This study shows that human capacity development, respect for the rule of law, and the neutrality of the justice sector, so as not to been seen as an extension of the executive arm of government, are essential for confidence building among citizens globally. The Yemeni experience shows that transitional justice, human rights protection and institutional reforms must be prioritized in preventing and responding to violence as opposed to the protection of elitist interests.

10. Governments and stakeholders should ensure that there is an enabling policy environment that creates robust spaces for civil society engagement and participation at all levels. Civil society should be supported, funded adequately, and advocated for in hard-to-reach places or where the government is unwilling or unable to engage in programmes to prevent and counter violence, since civil society is the last hope of the common man in these contexts. At the same time, civil society actors should be seen as neutral from partisan politics. Additionally, there should be expansion of funding streams for Civil Society actors to develop evidence-based research on preventing and responding to violence. Civil Society which are often ignored should be active partners in the development, implementation and monitoring of security sector reform activities, improving the state's ability to conduct effective law enforcement and responding to violence measures.
11. The IDPS and other international actors should promote soft approach policies to preventing violence as opposed to the use of force. The IDPS should support safe spaces in fragile and conflict affected countries for continuous dialogue between communities, civil society, warlords, religious leaders, women groups, governments, as well as young people to ensure sustainable peace and development.

12. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected States that is championed by the IDPS has become a source of stability and recovery in g7+ countries like Somalia despite the shortcomings in implementation. As a result, it is advisable for the IDPS and relevant stakeholders to strengthen the implementation of the New Deal in all fragile and conflict affected states.

13. All actors should recognise the need for and engage in long term processes to preventing and responding to violence instead of the short term and reactive approaches that we have seen in most instances. Long term investments including targeting young people in primary and secondary schools, and the political will to ensure that prevention programmes as well as rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives make the desired impact should be embraced. The psycho-social support, legal aid, livelihoods, counselling and all other vital needs of victims, repentant violent offenders, as well as returning foreign fighters should be addressed.

14. Donors and national governments must work to eliminate state patronage and corruption in peacebuilding and statebuilding, so all citizens can enjoy equal rights and treatments under the law. Autocratic and repressive regimes have historically always faced collapse and as such, there should be zero support for such regimes by the international community. Plans should also be in place to ensure stability in those kinds of countries (i.e. Libya) when the regime finally collapses.

15. The United Nations should take the lead to incorporate the private sector into initiatives to prevent and respond to violence. The way some private sector actors
conduct business, for example the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and arms proliferation, have great impact on starting and sustaining violent conflict in several contexts. The private sector must comply with national and international laws in the conduct of business. At the same time, the private sector should be encouraged to fund efforts to prevent violence in fragile and conflict affected countries. This study revealed that there is little or no support from the private sector to peacebuilding initiatives in these countries. Funding from the private sector is vital to the sustainability of these kinds of programs.

16. Stakeholders should target youth in the informal sector who have been neglected in government programmes for integration since they are mostly enticed to participate in violent groups. Findings from the research shows that efforts should be made to empower hard to reach and disadvantaged youth including women in preventing and responding to violence. This will reduce their vulnerability to recruitment into violence. Integrated programmes that include civic education, peace skills, livelihoods, social inclusion, vocational training, and participation in community development projects should be encouraged.

17. The UNFPA should note that the rapid population growth and forced migration in most fragile and conflict affected countries is overstretching resources and social amenities, and thereby rendering interventions inadequate. Population control measures should be put in place in these countries to ensure the desired impact and sustainability of intervention programmes.

18. Stakeholders should ensure the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; and the UNSCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security across all peace functions. The inclusion of women and youth in peace processes will ensure longer lasting and sustainable solutions. The interventions from the WPS and YPS agendas are necessary in order to promote the inclusion of gender, women and youth perspectives in the development and implementation of peace and security measures that are in line with the principles of peacebuilding, human rights and development.
19. Stakeholders support for recreational activities, dialogue, volunteerism and media campaigns to create a national identity that is devoid of ethnic, cultural, tribal or racial barriers can be a good starting point for peaceful relations as is seen in this study. Additionally, engaging refugees and host communities through inter-communal and inter-faith dialogues including equipping them with non-violence skills can lead to long term peace.
In the last two decades, there has been a significant rise in violence across the world with the negative and destructive impact of violent groups such as al-Qaida, Taliban, the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” (ISIS) or “Daesh,” Boko Haram, Abu-Sayyaf and al-Shabaab, resulting in the loss of lives, properties and livelihoods. Most of these groups have been designated as terrorist groups by the United Nations (UN) and individual countries, yet have managed to stay violent, despite international efforts to counter them. These violent groups are in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Philippines, Yemen and Somalia, and have increasingly spread their activities to Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Mali in Sub Saharan Africa; Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in the Middle East and North Africa. Asia, Europe, North America, Russia and Australia have not been immune to the activities of these violent groups.

Available data shows that 103,500 violent attacks occurred globally between 2006 and 2014. In the same period, there was an increase in the number of violent groups. As at January 2016, 59 violent groups were in the United States Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTO) list. These figures show the breadth of the threat posed by the activities of violent groups, and how global efforts in tackling this problem seem inadequate.

This inadequacy is underscored by extreme strategic focus on the use of hard military power to stem religious radicalisation and violent tendencies within the overall Global War on Terror (GWOT) architecture which has proven to be counterproductive. As a result, the call for a paradigm shift towards the use of soft power is well pronounced. The upshot of this is an increase in the yearning for genuine global dialogue and well-crafted preventive steps to address the underlying conditions which drive individuals towards being radicalised by violent groups. The prevalence of radicalisation leads to more violence, which in turn erodes the possibility of sustainable peace.

However, evidence from countries like Burundi show the potency of ethnic supremacy
between the Tutsis and Hutus, in fuelling violent tendencies. In Somalia, a mix of clannism and anti-Western ideology form a point of coalescence in the recruitment drive of violent groups. In Mali, alleged political and socio-economic discrimination against the Tuaregs creates an opening for non-state groups that use violence. Also, the rise of violent groups in Central African Republic, Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, and Nigeria are all due to multiplicity of factors, which does not make sustainable peace impossible but indeed more complex, thus requiring a case-by-case approach by local contexts. Therefore, an open-minded debate and evidence-based policy initiatives on preventing and countering violence is required. Such initiatives should increase the potential for global dialogue and collaboration that are capable of addressing the root causes of violence. Of utmost importance, are steps taken to address the underlying issues that drive individuals towards religious radicalisation and violent groups, strengthen resilience of communities to radical religious and political views, clannism, and ethnicity. In addition, such initiatives should focus on structural drivers of violence like poverty, unemployment, poor governance, weak institutions, violation of human rights and the rule of law, youth and gender discrimination. So far, empirical evidence which connects these issues with violence are weak. Thus, this study addresses an urgent need to deepen and broaden existing knowledge on what drives radicalisation and violence in these countries, as well as examine alternative approaches.

In the OECD countries of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States under review in this study, most strategies employed have been counter-productive while a few have had some short-term successes. Despite their effectiveness in ensuring robust data gathering that support rapid response to violence, the engagement by government requires its institutions to become more strategic about communicating its message. OECD countries examined in this study must move from purely security, faith based and Islamic identity-driven interventions to the development of proactive and sustained engagement activities. These governments should move away from an Islamic faith-community-intervention approach and focus on individuals and groups who have demonstrated a clear and sustained interest in violent activities (irrespective of religion or race). The more their interventions can identify and target specific individuals and groups who have demonstrated sympathy for violent activities and groups, the more government will be able to generate public support and success.
This study was commissioned by the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS) in collaboration with the Centre for Sustainable Development and Education in Africa (CSDEA), to identify the localised drivers of violence and violent groups, shortcomings of conventional approaches, and document evidence of viable alternatives to preventing and countering violence from relevant g7+ countries, for example Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, Chad, Somalia, and Yemen. It also entails various strategies employed in other conflict affected states including Cameroon, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Niger, and Pakistan. The range of policies studied includes those used by OECD/INCAF donors (France, Germany, UK, and USA) in developing countries, and makes reference to policies for addressing radicalisation in their own territory for comparative purposes.

**Definition of Violence**

There is no one definition of violence since it is a complex issue that could be physical, psychological or emotional with varying drivers and can be context specific in several instances. However, our respondents for this research have defined violence as political, ethnic or religious expression by organised groups or radicalised individuals against targets of interest. Violent groups or initiatives can be local, nationalistic, or transnational in nature. Violence is a way of expressing disaffection with what political systems and institutions have failed to address. This could include lack of space for equal and representative participation, lack of social services, government repression, parallel external interests, economic marginalisation, and other unmet needs. Most individuals or groups involved in violence lack a platform in society or have been suppressed over time and decide to do something abnormal to get attention. The actions of violent groups and individuals always go beyond acceptable legal and societal laws and norms. Violent groups and individuals use indiscriminate and disproportionate force against targets which creates insecurity and fear. In considering the role of external interests in beginning and sustaining violence, some respondents defined violence as the invasion of their territories by foreigners and all forms of mistreatment of their people: physical violence, rape, forced labor, deportations, denial of medical care, torture and killing as a warning to captives who refuse to comply.
In many cases, violence becomes business instead of a security challenge as it creates markets for arms through cash payments and exchange for commodities such as oil, gas, gold and diamonds.

**Methodology**

This work combined desk study to review existing literature, and field work to collect empirical data on the localised drivers of violent groups and individuals, shortcomings of conventional approaches, and society-led alternatives to preventing and countering violence. Field work was conducted in Cameroun, Chad, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. Twelve (12) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and eighteen (18) Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted in each of the countries we visited. Participants included youth and women leaders, military and security officials, youth vigilante groups, traditional and religious leaders, civil society organisations (CSOs), government officials, and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). A total of 48 percent of field work participants are females while 75 percent represented youth between the ages of 18 and 35 years.

**Push and Pull Factors: A Theoretical Framework**

This study partly relies on the proposition that Push and Pull factors are responsible for violence. Push factors are the negative social, cultural, and political features of one's societal environment that aid in “pushing” vulnerable individuals and especially youth onto the path of violence. Push factors are commonly seen as “underlying/root causes” such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, injustice, and political/economical marginalisation. On the other hand, pull factors are the positive characteristics and benefits of a violent organisation that “pull” vulnerable individuals to join. These include the group's ideology (e.g., emphasis on changing one's condition through violence rather than “apathetic” and “passive” democratic means), strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialisation benefits.

While the description of the Push and Pull factors theoretical framework is relevant to this study, it is important to note that the causes of violence as examined in this work also include the impact of external actors and their geopolitical and geostrategic interests. These external
The description of violence as a complex mix of factors which includes ideology, religion, politics, external interests, governance, economics, and demographics that is shaped by systemic malaise that includes weak and underdeveloped governance institutions, maximisation of rents instead of efficient representation, economic mismanagement, and chronic underdevelopment in building up the nation's base of human capital, is reminiscent across fragile and conflict-affected states. This trend has perpetuated deep inequalities and assisted in the alienation of large segments of the population as corruption, service politics, nepotism and favouritism, powerbrokers, entrenched feudal interests add to the melee.

This section offers insight into the drivers of violence in 13 countries namely: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.

**Afghanistan**

The history of Afghanistan has been marred by violent internal struggles over the control of state, and foreign power meddling. The Cold War era that pitched the Soviet Union against the United States saw these major powers backing various factions and governments by supplying them with arms, cash, and training of state and non-state actors. Afghanistan continued to experience civil war after the end of the Cold War and Soviet withdrawal until it entered a new phase of conflict after the 2001 US-led war on terror that followed the attack by al-Qaeda on the World Trade Centre in New York.

The discussion around violence in Afghanistan falls into four key categories namely: political, economic, socio-cultural, and religious. Political factors underlying violence includes poor governance with the ruling elites ignoring the plight of the masses. A second political factor is secession demands by residents of the North who would prefer to form their own Islamic state governed in line with Taliban's religious ideas.

Massive growth in militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area interacts with...
internalised threats where instability has multiple causes and centres of gravity. The situation is not a problem in Afghanistan alone but has a regional scope since the war in Afghanistan has spill over effects in Pakistan through the Taliban-Haqqani network and other allied non-state actors who use violence. In turn, Pakistan's involvement in cross-border incursions in pursuit of its own militia and assistance to foreign forces has generated resentment within Afghanistan. This trend provides unemployed youth and others reason to engage in activities that are detrimental to the security and stability of the country.\(^5\)

The economics of Afghanistan's strategic position between Europe and Asia and its continued supply of opium to the international drug trade has been of vital interest to Western and regional powers.\(^6\) Other factors include acute underdevelopment, inadequate supply of basic needs, and unemployment.

Identity issues have also become very common in Afghanistan as youth and fighters are forced to identify with those groups that entrench their identities. Thus, Pashtuns join fellow Pashtuns, Uzbeks support an Uzbek leader.\(^7\) Likewise, religion is used by the Taliban in secession claims to enable them to form an Islamic state following Sharia Law and of course consolidate hold over most of the country.

Afghanistan shows a history of civil wars, agitation for secession, violent extremism, militancy, resource control, and great regional powers meddling. This trend has destabilized Afghanistan for decades and set the country on a part of continuous violence, trauma and underdevelopment.

**Burundi**

The conflict in Burundi presents a situation of how discrimination and unequal access to scarce resources along ethnic lines lead to conflict. It also demonstrates how superimposition of social cleavages, with fault lines in political power, economic wealth, and ethnicity reinforce each other.\(^8\)

The pre-colonial era in Burundi saw the Hutu which consists between 85 and 90 percent,
Tutsi with composition of between 10 and 14 percent and Twa with 1 percent live together. However, the extensive integration of these different groups by the colonisers to ensure that there was a unified kingdom that spoke the same language, believed in the same God, shared the same culture, and lived side by side promoted conflict as education was largely restricted to the Tutsi. During this period, political, social, and economic relations were unequal and biased against the Hutu.

In post-colonial Burundi, the Tutsi held on to power with the support of the army leading to a repressive and authoritarian state that discriminated against the Hutu in all facets of life. The Tutsi minority held onto the structures of the single political party. They dominated the hierarchy of the military, police, security services and the justice system from the 1960's until the end of the 1980's when there was a noticeable increase in the number of Hutu in the former economy and public sector. The ruling Tutsi elites in Burundi represent a narrow social base and cannot use an ethnic-social discourse to guarantee their legitimacy. Instead, they used very repressive means to stay in power as the majority Hutu often challenged their legitimacy violently.

The democratisation program and the subsequent government of National Unity that was formed by President Mboya in 1988 did not do much to stop ethnic and political violence in Burundi. The democratisation program promoted intense propaganda on the concept of national ethnic unity, a reconciliation effort with official reports on the history of the country, and an equal distribution of visible political positions between Hutu and Tutsi. Non-governmental human rights organisations were also allowed to operate.

The 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi that led to cessation of hostilities ushered in peace after a long period of civil war that killed over 300,000 civilians and displaced around 1.2 million people. The Arusha agreement also led to a referendum in 2005 that endorsed a power-sharing constitution resulting in the election of Pierre Nkurunziza as Burundi’s first post-war President. Nkurunziza subsequently won a second term in 2010 through popular vote, despite widespread allegations of irregularities during the poll including corrupt and autocratic tendencies that have characterised his presidency.
In 2015, President Nkurunziza was nominated for a third term in office against the Arusha agreement which prescribed a maximum of two terms in office. The Constitutional Court further dashed the hopes of the opposition as it ruled in favour of Nkurunziza's nomination. This ruling triggered large scale violence with the government accused of distributing arms and uniforms to the youth wing of the ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD).\textsuperscript{15}

Nkurunziza secured a third term in office on the 21\textsuperscript{st} of July 2015 through an election that was boycotted by the opposition triggering further protests and violence. A wave of assassinations targeting politicians of all parties, military officers and human rights defenders have defined Bujumbura and environs. There are also widespread reports of arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, and torture of those suspected to be in the opposition. The African Union, European Union, United States, Germany, and Belgium have continuously condemned the Burundian government for gross human rights abuses and impunities. These donors further suspended their aid packages which represented around half of the Burundian government's budget.\textsuperscript{16} This trend has further strengthened poverty and underdevelopment in Burundi.

Unknown armed men have also launched attacks on the police and security forces in the provinces of Chibitoke, Gitega and Mwamo fuelling suspicion of a new wave of insurgency. The freedom of movement and work for civil society, and the limited number of humanitarian actors and programs has also become limited resulting in less accurate data and lack of support systems in most cases.\textsuperscript{17}

Again, the ethnic and political conflict in Burundi cannot be viewed independently as the Hutu/Tutsi challenge embraces the whole of the Great Lakes region and greater East Africa with refugees camping in Tanzania and Kenya. Thus, the problems facing the Hutu or Tutsi in DRC and Rwanda have implications for their counterparts in Burundi.

The case of Burundi demonstrates the role of colonial masters in dividing the various ethnic groups in the country and how those divisions continued after independence. The new
indigenous leaders in the post-colonial engaged in political and economic marginalization, continuous violence, trauma and underdevelopment as winner takes it all.

**Cameroon**

The political drivers of violence in Cameroon can be linked to the lack of an effective and sustainable centrally controlled governance structure that is due to the centralisation agenda that marginalised the regions and communities. This resulted in inequitable distribution of resources among regions, concentration of power in the capital, a government controlled judiciary system, and disparities in public investment. Young people are frustrated and excluded from political life, finding it difficult to gain access to high positions as the government is dominated by older people. The government's failure to take into account the demands of the population and the low level of investment in extremely vulnerable regions such as the Far North has greatly facilitated access to the extremist group Boko Haram, which has relied on the vulnerability of the population.

The failure of decentralisation attempts further compounded the situation. In a bid to re-assert its authority, the government downplays dialogue, promotes impunity and human rights violation, resists political opposition and encourages state violence. This has led to ungoverned spaces that easily serve as recruitment and operational bases for non-state actors like Boko Haram who use violence.

The centralisation agenda of exclusion also promoted corruption, poverty and unemployment. Our field work revealed that young people are the most affected and are highly vulnerable to resort to violent behaviour, and also become easy recruits for violent groups. This is observed mostly in the region of the Far North, where the youth is not educated and there are high unemployment rates due to lack of opportunities.

The relative linkages between the economy and violence in Cameroon can be traced to the failure of the liberalisation agendas of Presidents Ahidjo and Biya that distributed wealth based on loyalty and access to the central government. This model was not sustainable as it was tied to state revenues from the export of natural resources and agricultural products to the neglect of the productive sectors of the economy. We were informed by some respondents in our FGDs in Cameroon that the traditional rulers in the North of the
country own all the wealth with a lot of poor people around them. This inequality, in addition to the poor access to education and other social facilities, makes most Northern Cameroonian youth more vulnerable to join violent extremist groups than their Southern counterparts with a better economic outlook.

Stable employment opportunities have been on the decline and most young people struggle to get themselves engaged in the informal sector. On the other hand, the number of rich people is on the increase. This growing class divide and the general notion that wealth does not depend on hard work or talent but on political connections and luck has encouraged laziness and youth restiveness.\(^{20}\) This context has created a situation where unemployed young people become easily vulnerable to engaging in violent activities.

The socio-cultural context has also been a major driver of violent extremism in Cameroon. Ethnic divisions over the division of labour have impacted the social fabric of Cameroon lacking of any tangible incentives from the government.\(^ {21}\) This communal view of the division of labour can be located in how Cameroon in governed. The marginalised groups in this process are vulnerable to engage in violent activities.

Our interviews with stakeholders in Cameroon also indicated that the misuse and misinterpretation of the Quran by teachers, religious leaders, family members and other actors are major motivations to join violent groups. The content of the Quranic education in the far North of Cameroon was identified as a major concern because most of these teachers and leaders cannot read and interpret the Quran properly. Hence, the perception of life and values come to many illiterate youths from the content of a misinterpreted Quran.

**Central African Republic**

Some respondents at our FGDs also narrated how the spill over of conflict from the CAR between Seleca and anti-Baleka is another major driver of violence in Cameroon. Rebels from the CAR crisis maintain violence in the eastern part of the country, which hosts a large number of CAR refugees. The rebels are responsible for hostage-taking, cattle rustling, and regular inter-community clashes. The spill over conflict pitches the Bororos against the Bayas on the
Cameroonian side of the border. Those frustrated in refugee camps due to this conflict are also easily recruited into violent groups in Cameroon. The strong presence of refugees in Cameroon puts pressure on natural resources and limits access to land, water, and wood for heating, which leads to regular conflicts.

The continuous drought and the depleting resources of the Lake Chad Basin as a result of climate change is a causal factor behind recruitment into violent groups. As resources get scarce, the families of ethnic Arab Shuas, Kotokos and Fulanis on both sides of the borders with Nigeria, Niger and Chad are forced to move across the border. This struggle for survival makes these nomadic groups easy recruits for the simple reason of earning a living and providing for their families.

Despite the fact that Boko Haram promotes its activities as religious in Northern Cameroon, there is a popular argument among moderate Muslims that the activities of the sect are un-Islamic and should be ignored and resisted. Boko Haram continues to promise enormous wealth and respect within the Islamic community as they propagate their messages of indoctrination to recruit young people into the group. The Christian and Muslim communities in Cameroon reject the notion that violence in their country is religiously driven and instead believe that it is an ideology driven by some groups of conflict entrepreneurs in the name of Islam. This is evident in the way Christians have mobilised to watch over mosques and in return, Muslims have also formed vigilante groups to guard churches against a common enemy.

The situation in Cameroon shows the failure of a government with concentration of power at the centre to the neglect of the periphery. The neglect of communities in governance led to disenfranchisement, violent groups and secessionists filled the vacuum. Again religion has also been misinterpreted to radicalise young people in Cameroon, with some religious and traditional leaders being accused of exploiting the masses to gain wealth and thereby entrenching poverty. Interreligious dialogues and engagements are proving to be successful to some extent.

There are multiple factors at the root of the conflict namely: CAR’s pre-colonial history of
slave raiding by northern and Muslim groups, resentment among the northerners and Muslims who perceive neglect, discrimination, and denial of full citizenship. Muslims dominate the trade market, the majority of Seleka fighters are foreign mercenaries whose alliance is fluid and thus commit atrocities on local population and disappear to other countries. Northerners are denied citizenship rights including identity cards, clashes between predominantly Muslim Seleka group and Muslim nomadic herder groups occur in the north, sexual abuse by local, and foreign troops belonging to the AU and UN commands, and subsequent cover-up by various authorities are also issues. Unstable post-independence governments marked by numerous coups define the political scene in CAR.

External actors including Chad, China, France, South Africa, and Sudan are only interested in self-enrichment and entrenchment. The northerners have found themselves at the periphery for many decades, a situation the Seleka rebel group decided was not agreeable. They took up arms to seek a share of the national treasury and resources for themselves. The March 2003 Seleka power grab marked a reversal of traditional political landscapes since 1960. Their action saw a Muslim from the North-East take power in the country. The ensuing clashes generated strong inter-communal tension, instrumentalisation of religion, social fractures, and collective fears. The South realised that under the rule of Muslims from the North, the country is making an open invitation to interference by the Islamic nations in the near and far neighbourhood. CAR being on the borderline of northern African Islamists, could very easily attract Islamic governments to assist them to gain control of their gas and oil reserves.

There is acute poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment and unfair division of resources and wealth in the CAR. The disparity between the north and south contribute to instability. The northern population is marginalised and many join the rebel movements to survive. Lack of opportunities pushes youth to get conscripted into rebel groups in order to gain access to sources of finance. Recruiters promise earnings and shares of national resources with dreams of controlling those resources so that the fighters would have access to much more when their turn to run the government comes. Nepotism and favouritism in employment and allocation of positions and opportunities also contributes to
marginalisation. Seleka fighters are unpaid and thus loot from the population they are meant to protect.  

Membership to the rebel movements in the country is determined by ethnicity where the Seleka group comprises majority Muslims while the Anti-balaka group comprises majority Christians and animists. It results in the conflict dynamics being categorised either as Muslim Seleka fighters or Christian anti-balaka group. Armed groups control 80 percent of the territory in the CAR.  

Identity is a key issue as Muslims whose origins are traced back to Chad feel rejected by the Christians. Denial of citizenship rights and identity cards by respective governments leads them to feel side-lined as if they are not citizens of the country. The fact that the discrimination is at the hands of the government gives them enough reason to engage in fighting or to join rebel movements.  

CAR enjoyed a period of relative peace after the 2013-2014 civil war. However, conflict between the armed groups started again at the end of 2016 leading to another phase of violent attacks. Another peace deal was agreed to by warring factions in February 2019 in Khartoum under the auspices of the African Union. This deal was greeted with cautious optimism since this is the eighth peace deal since 2012. There have also emerged new causes for concern as there are reports of fighting in Basse Koso between Seleka and anti-balaka militias.  

The conflict in the CAR is traceable to the role of foreign and regional powers in dividing the population in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras, and rooted in identity politics that pitches what literature refers to as settlers which are predominantly in the North against indigenes which are mostly found in the south. This has led to marginalization and discrimination as the North which comprises mostly Muslims has accused the South which is mostly Christians and animists of disenfranchisement and exclusion. This has led to both sides establishing and sustaining militia groups that control most of the territory in the CAR leading to more violence, rape, and underdevelopment.
Chad

There are both internal and external political drivers of violence in Chad. The internal drivers are inherent in the authoritarian rule of previous and present leaders of Chad that encourages political exclusion and marginalisation. The external drivers are associated with the meddling of regional powers such as Libya and Sudan and global powers such as France and the United States in the internal affairs of Chad. Another external driver is the scourge of Boko Haram that emanated in North-East Nigeria and has now become a major security and development challenge in the Lake Chad Basin region.

The regional dimensions are also key to understanding the political drivers of violence in Chad. In a bid to control the affairs in Chad, Libya and Sudan have in one time or the other trained and equipped violent groups with the intention of taking control of the capital Ndjamena. Some regional and Western powers have also supported whichever faction that emerges in power at the centre without questioning the process or its legitimacy. The abundance of readily available insurgent groups in the vastly ungoverned territory of Chad has also supported Boko Haram to access easy and cheap recruits which they have mobilised to attack communities in Nigeria. Chadian militants have also been recruited to fight in
The lack of functioning institutions and clientelist nature of state affairs in Chad has led to economic hardship for the majority of Chadians who do not have access to the central government. This trend ensures that the ethnic group that emerges at the centre has more access to economic resources to the neglect of other groups leading to sustained violence in the quest for power. Economic marginalisation and inability of the productive sector of the economy to take off has resulted in large numbers of unemployed youth. The most lucrative ways to get a job for these young people is either to be part of the governing group or to join a rebellion. Other employment opportunities include arms trade or migration opportunities from Chad to Darfur that in most cases is necessitated by drought or civil war in the former. This migration trend has contributed to conflict over land ownership in Darfur. The discovery of oil in Chad has also contributed to violence as most military members of the ruling elite switched sides to join militia groups.²⁶

The cultural heritage as embedded in the Sultanate of Wadai (Eastern Chad) was characterised by constant competition over allegiance, land, slaves, and the control of trade routes with its neighbour- the Sultanate of Darfur (Sudan). This trend continued even after independence. The discovery that the social identity of armed militias in Chad depends on their status as combatants is another factor sustaining violence in that country as fighters and most especially young people often find a sense of belonging in rebellion in the absence of alternatives.²⁷

Chad's pre-colonial and post-independence times is rooted in competition and identity politics. While religious differences between Muslims and Christians persist, they cannot necessarily be referred to as drivers of violence in Chad.

The autocratic tendencies and winner takes it all mentality of the ruling elites in Chad has also compounded the situation giving way to the formation and sustenance of ethnic militias leading to continuous violence. The tacit support of foreign and regional powers to the competing ethnic groups and their struggle over power and natural resources has further contributed to marginalization, unemployment and underdevelopment, making Chad a breeding ground for terrorist recruits and fighters.
Perceived and real marginalisation has propelled radical Jihadist ideology among Muslims. Jihadist movements have exploited these grievances to spread radical Islamic teachings and galvanise people towards violence. Schools, mosques and poor neighbourhoods like Eastleigh in Nairobi, populated by Muslims are targeted for recruitment of young and vulnerable Muslims. The Kenyan Madrasas have also been exploited to recruit vulnerable and poor Muslims. Segregation which is well pronounced along ethnic and cultural lines also created a loophole for non-State actors who use violence. Many Muslims in the coastal region have stronger ties with the Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula than other Kenyans in the interior.

Kenya's governance challenges in key areas like the criminal justice system, border security, and provision of essential services have increased the country's vulnerability to violence. Endemic corrupt practices, porous and unguarded borders, ill-equipped and ineffective security services are critical factors that make violent groups to operate often unhindered and establish safe havens among the population. A weak and corrupt judicial system also makes the trial and conviction of suspected violent individuals and groups difficult.
Preventing and Responding to Violence in the 21st Century: Exploring Alternative Approaches

Kenya's geographical closeness to security-challenged countries like Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia is constantly exploited by violent groups. The porous borders between Kenya and these countries ease the movement of violent groups. For instance, Al-Shabaab militants' movement between the Kenyan-Somali borders is practically unchecked. The availability of several illegal border crossing points, coupled with ineffective and inadequate border security personnel contributes to this complicity. Since ethnic Somalis populate the region, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate who is Kenyan or Somali among those that legally move between both countries. More so, the instability and subsequent collapse of Somalia has allowed Al-Shabaab to grow and use the country as a base for cross border attacks.

Kenya's unemployment outlook is impacted by the youth bulge across Africa. Young people, especially those under 35 years account for 70 percent of the unemployed and around over 65 percent of Kenya's population. The structural imbalance in Kenya also makes the unemployment rate among Muslims higher than other social groups. The absence of equal job opportunities is a factor in Muslims' grievances against the state. Muslim populated areas have highest youth unemployment rate, as well the highest unemployment levels across all demographic groups. Successive governments' failure to ensure economic development of these areas has been identified as the main reason for high unemployment rates among Muslims. Also, Muslims are discriminated against in public sector employment. Many Muslims are treated as foreigners. For example, Kenyan Muslims with Arab or Asian ancestry must present their grandfather's birth certificate to obtain or renew their passport. This requirement is not applicable to other Kenyans. Many young Muslims seek work in places like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states where the pay is good with minimal education.

While the lack of economic opportunities is linked directly to high crime rates, inter-communal conflicts, and contestation over scarce resources across Kenya, it is also premise...
for increased radicalisation of Muslim youth over the last decade. Al-Shabaab and other radical groups have used the issue of unemployment and economic marginalisation in their recruitment drives. Vulnerable youths are paid to work or fight in these groups. Some young Muslims that travelled overseas for work came back economically empowered.  

The available space for Muslim participation in Kenyan politics is narrow and restrictive. Muslims in politics are limited to some Members of Parliament (MPs) and a few political appointees. Since the country attained political independence, Christians have been the dominant force in Kenyan politics. Islamic incursion into the political space is heavily restricted and regulated when allowed. With limited political power, Muslims have limited opportunities to advocate the needs of their communities in critical areas like education and inclusive socio-economic development. This lack of legitimate political path to address grievances made some Muslims join violent groups with the intention to effect change.

Some foreign policy decisions on issues like security and cooperation with countries such as the United States and Israel on the GWOT have caused disaffection among Muslims. For example, after the 1998 embassy bombing, the US exerted pressure on the Kenyan government to pass anti-terror legislation and put in place other measures which prevent violent extremists and radical Islamic groups from operating in the country. Kenya allowed the US access to its territory to support Ethiopia's military operations in Somalia in 2006. Kenya has also cooperated with the US in tracking al-Qaeda operatives among refugees in the country. Also, Kenya has been involved in on-going military operations in Somalia under the auspices of the African Union (AU) since 2011. However, Kenya's cooperation with foreign powers and other foreign policy decisions have contributed to further radicalisation of Muslims who perceive the government's actions as anti-Islamic. It has also contributed to the exacerbation of violent attacks in the country. For instance, Kenya's involvement in military operations in Somalia has been cited by Al-Shabaab for attacking the country.
Libya

This work posits that the main driver of violent tendencies in Libya is the collapse of the state's governance structure. This is probably the most tragic of the unintended consequences of the 2011 revolution. The collapse of state structures created a vacuum in sensitive areas especially the economy and security.\textsuperscript{47} The internal security gaps created with the destruction of Gaddafi-era security institutions were automatically filled by violent groups, criminal gangs, and other perpetuators of illicit activities.\textsuperscript{48} The collapse of state structures is compounded by the fact that Libya is a tribal society. As such, strong tribal affinities and identities are being exploited by violent groups to build local support among disaffected tribal and ethnic groups.

The weak nature of successful post-revolution governments is an enabler for violence to thrive in Libya. Since 2011, the central government has been unable to project power and authority across Libya. As such, post-revolution governments have failed to provide law and order, mediate disputes, control borders, curb illicit activities, and take control over the drivers of Libya's economy.\textsuperscript{49} The weak government is compounded by political wrangling among political factions and their militia allies. Successful post-revolution governments have often deployed tactics that exacerbate Libya's insecurity, therefore deepening the foothold of violent groups in the country. An example is the outsourcing of security or mediation to non-state actors – militia brigades or tribal leaders, who are neither neutral nor acceptable to other interested parties. Such moves often result in additional sources of conflict in an already explosive environment.\textsuperscript{50}

The 2011 uprising gave a lot of people, especially youth and other young people, high hopes about Libya's socio-political and economic future. The post-Gaddafi era was expected to signal the beginning of a new Libya based on democracy, rule of law, equity, equal opportunities, economic prosperity, and freedom for all irrespective of age, tribe, religion, sex, and social status. Unfortunately, the new Libya has been continuously plagued by political instability, civil conflicts, sub-state violence, illicit activities, and other socio-economic vices. Opportunities are very limited if available at all. Over 33 percent of Libyans are poor, and the economy has recorded negative growth rate since 2013.\textsuperscript{51} The deplorable
state of the economy makes many Libyans sceptical of government and its officials. They believe that senior decision-makers in the capital remains at best uninterested in the needs of their respective communities and regions, or, worse, bent on their continued marginalisation. This state of affairs draws many Libyans to violent groups because these groups have considerable control over many drivers of the Libyan economy such as oil and gas.

The fall of Gaddafi opened Libya to Islamists and Jihadists who were brutally suppressed during his rule. Radical Islamists and preachers who promote violence now operate unhindered in Libya. Religious teachings often reflect the radical posture of preachers. Youths are also indoctrinated through social media networks like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. It is alarming that Islamists and Jihadists have established themselves as major players in Libya's political and economic landscape.

The end of the Gaddafi regime brought to the fall the tribal divisions and political marginalization in Libya. This has given rise to militia groups and alliances from foreign fighters leading to unprecedented violence.
Mali

Mali descended into chaos in 2012 when the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) expelled the Malian government out of the Northern region and demanded independence. The subsequent coup that was launched by a section of the Malian military to oust the central government due to perceived inability of the government to quash the Tuareg rebellion and defend the Malian military led to further conflict with allegations of impunity, human rights violations and extrajudicial killings on the part of the government. Peace agreements including the 2015 Algiers Accord which provided for increased autonomy in the North and the integration of select armed groups into civil service and the armed forces were stalled.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which emerged in the wake of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and was allowed by the Malian government to operate out of their porous borders beginning in 2006, is another driver of violence in Mali. The clashes between AQIM and the Malian government in 2009 after a three-year period of cooperation contributed tremendously to the violence in Mali. AQIM's fallout with the Malian government resulted in the assassination of a top Malian intelligence official, and subsequently led AQIM to join forces with the Tuareg rebels to fight the Malian military. AQIM and their collaborators including Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Unity of the Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) now control a large part of the territory in the North. Their success is partly attributed to the huge cache of arms that the Tuareg rebels brought back from fighting in Libya.

There is huge division among the various ethnic groups in Mali. This is compounded by the government's inability to provide effective security and the widespread acts of impunity against perpetrators of violence. This prevailing situation has left many in these conflict-affected regions in Northern and Central Mali to seek justice and security from non-State actors.

A group of Malian intellectuals and clerics including the renowned leader of Mali’s High
One major political driver of violence in Niger is ethnic marginalisation that neglects groups like the Tuareg Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) that states that it is fighting for greater autonomy and for a larger share of uranium revenues. Despite the present government’s pledge to address the issue of political and economic marginalisation and run an inclusive government that accommodates minority groups, tensions persist.

The history of Niger has also been characterised by coups and countercoups. Another coup against the present civilian government can ensure that the reforms to integrate minority groups and ensure development is reversed as a new government or the military junta might not be interested in continuing the same policies. Such a trend can result in another outbreak of armed violence and thus increase the potential for violence. The disproportionate use of force by government forces on Tuareg rebels and communities have left lasting wounds that

The youth, which constitute two-thirds of Mali’s population of over 18 million people, are under the age of 24 and are mostly impacted by the consequences of this conflict despite being the country's greatest source of hope. Literacy rates among young people between the ages of 15 and 24 years stands at 39 percent for girls and women, and 56 percent for boys and men. Many lack access to education and those who do graduate without the necessary skills and knowledge to secure decent employment. While many of these youth have filled the ranks of armed groups, a greater proportion of them have remained non-violent.

The ongoing depicts how identity politics embedded in ethnicity gave rise to underdevelopment, unemployment and marginalization in Mali leading to the rise of militia groups and their foreign allies, and sustaining rebellion and violence overtime.

Niger
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Our discussions with young people in Niger show that frustration and lack of opportunities for students that have completed schools either through Quranic or Western education have made these students susceptible to radicalisation in that country. Despite the fact that school dropouts are more attracted to violence, those that have finished school and cannot find jobs also feel frustrated and easily join violent groups.

The misuse and misinterpretation of the Quran by teachers, religious figures, family members and other actors have motivated many to join violent groups according to our respondents. The world view of many illiterate youth in Niger emanates from the content of a misinterpreted Quran. Some of the Quranic schools have been identified with teachers that have ties to violent groups, and therefore prepare students to join these groups through the misinterpretation of the Quran and the espousing of radical ideologies. During peace settlements, it is important to work with violent groups as well as resilient groups (i.e., youth and the elderly). In Diffa for example, we were informed that repentant Boko Haram members were rewarded handsomely to the dismay of the local population leading to violence.

The vastly uncontrolled territory of Niger is a major hotbed for training and recruitment for non-State actors who use violence despite the agreements between the Nigerien government and the United States and France to secure the borders. The rise of violence in Niger has also been attributed to this partnership with foreign powers to fight terror. Niger is a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI) and has finalised a Status-of-Forces-Agreement (SOFA) with the US government that allows the operation and stationing of a US drone base in Niger. Environmental shocks and religious jihad are other factors that can drive violence in Niger if not countered. About 80 percent of the population depend on agriculture and the desert environment makes it difficult.
The analysis of the violence in Niger shows that ethnic divisions and identity politics is a key driver. The lack of continuity of government policies and programs due to coups and countercoups also make it difficult for peacebuilding to take place. This has led to lack of opportunities, unemployment and disenfranchisement and giving rise to easy and cheap recruits into violent and terrorist groups. Some of these would be recruits into violent groups have been previously radicalised in Islamic schools.

**Nigeria**

While restraint should be shown to avoid a simplistic generalisation on the causes of violence in Nigeria, the drivers of violence in Nigeria can be broadly divided into four groups.

The harsh nature of state response to both violent activities, and peaceful protests has been identified as a major driver of violence. The Nigerian security and military forces deployed against Niger Delta militants, and Boko Haram have been criticised by an enraged local population, social commentators, opinion leaders, civil society organisations, and the media for their harsh tactics. Military operations against violent groups in Nigeria often result in the wanton destruction of lives and properties in local communities. Allegations made against security forces include unlawful killings, dragnet arrests, extortion, and intimidation. The brutal tactics deployed in military operations cause disaffection among the local population. In turn, people especially youth, who are the main targets in these operations, have deep rooted distrust for the military. The level of disaffection and distrust among young people for security forces has driven a lot of youths into the arms of violent groups.

Also, bad governance underscored by corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency is a causative factor for violence. The poor governance quality at all levels of government in Nigeria has caused endemic corruption among public officials and other custodians of the country's Commonwealth. As a result, Nigerians have been denied much needed social amenities, economic infrastructure and other public services such as adequate protection of lives and properties. Bad governance in the form of pervasive malfeasance, especially in the public
Nigeria's harsh economic condition and lack of education in some regions which is characterised by high poverty and unemployment rates, gender inequality, child/forced marriage, early pregnancies and diseases especially among young people drives violence. According to Yemi Osinbajo, Nigeria's vice president, about 110 million Nigerians live below the poverty line. Data from Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows that average national poverty ratio stands at 65 percent. This is, however, higher in the country's northern regions where the prevailing poverty ratio in the northwest and northeast is 76 and 77.7 percent respectively. Though poverty is not the only cause of violence, its endemic nature in areas where violent groups thrive shows their interconnectedness. Since people do resort to extreme measures to survive under difficult economic situations, poverty made the economically deprived people of northern Nigeria vulnerable to the antics of violent ideologues. In fact, poverty has been identified as a major factor that has stimulated Boko Haram's recruitment drive and the support it enjoyed among segments of the local community. For example, some previously detained relatives of suspected Boko Haram members have confessed to accepting payments of 5,000 Nigerian Naira (US$25) from militants to set fire on schools and spy on soldiers.

The dysfunctional social system which produces children with difficult upbringing in northern Nigeria is a source of recruitment for violent groups. The increasing number of street children, without proper parental guidance is a social condition that has contributed to violence in northern Nigeria. This problem is rooted in the Almajeri system which places premium on the learning of the Holy Quran ahead of acquiring formal education. The Almajeris is loosely used to describe children in Quranic schools and those who are destitute.
However, a common activity done by both groups of children is street begging. Most of these children are either orphans, from poor homes, raised in broken homes, abandoned, or live with relatives. The background in which they are brought up is fraught with extreme societal limitations. This creates multiple openings which violent groups easily capitalise on. The Almajeri children receive Quranic teachings that are based on radical ideologies. Some teachers in Almajeri Quranic schools often harbour radical views which are also passed on to their students. As such, students are often indoctrinated or psychologically prepared for the process of violence in these places.

Also, the literacy level among youths and other young people in northern Nigeria is low. This problem, which is due to falling educational standards and other socio-cultural values, makes young Nigerian illiterates easily susceptible to violence. Their inability to read and write, coupled with the absence of deep knowledge on true religious virtues, is a dangerous combination. These youths and other young Nigerians lack the ability to critically examine or question any ideological doctrine. They are mostly people with limited life ambitions and, therefore, prepared to carry out actions and activities which come with some level of authority, pecuniary returns, and spiritual satisfaction. While they might lack the technical knowhow to manufacture bombs, evidence suggests that the real armies of suicide bombers and foot soldiers for violent groups are illiterates or those with very limited education.

The indoctrination of people through religious and other rancorous processes which make them embrace violence and oppose peaceful co-existence with non-Muslims and vice versa is a major cause of violence. Such sermons mostly capitalise on general discontentment with the country's political authorities and economic system to recruit from the ranks of the marginalised or socially disaffected. But beyond social grievances, radicalisation has thrived because of the proliferation of sects and independent preachers in Nigeria. In what could be regarded as the liberalisation of the religious space, the fact that these sects and preachers operate outside of any regulated environment provides them with far-reaching independence over what they teach, and the methods used in teaching. What has been happening, as a result, is the gradual eroding of the fundamental principles and values propagated through religion to the detriment of narrowly construed agenda often based on
the mis-interpreted portions of the Quran. In most cases, it results in the indoctrinated being increasingly reliant on these preachers instead of the Quran for their spiritual guidance. But beyond this, the faith of those indoctrinated is also dependent on their lack of deep knowledge on true religious virtue. As such, distorted religious injunctions resonate with them when they come in contact with violent groups.

Pakistan
Mobilisation based on identity, which became prevalent when Pakistan was partitioned from British India, is a major driver of violence in Pakistan. Religious identity as a driver of violence is traceable to the era that preceded Pakistan's creation and the bitter struggle between the majority Hindu and the minority Muslims that led to violence and loss of lives. This period saw the reinforcement of Hinduism and Islam as the only accepted national identity by the Hindus and Muslims respectively. This was reinforced when the British colonialists publicly stated that the Muslims and Hindus were two separate people. This also implies that they were two separate nations culturally. After the creation of Pakistan, the population continued to be influenced by the religious narrative of Hindu-Muslim divide.

In the same trend, the division of Pashtun territory during partition has also created deep conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The ensuing competition between the various major actors (the military and Islamists) has also contributed to this trend. The military and security agents became so powerful that they undermined democratic institutions and practices, characterised by the use of excessive force and human rights violations. The state's authority has also been threatened by the Islamic establishment which has, since the founding of the state, pressured the state to establish sharia or Islamic law. Ethnicity, weak governance and state apparatus including ungoverned territories are other common factors that make Pakistan a breeding ground for violent groups.

Geopolitics which saw Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988 to support a 'Jihad' against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is another driver of violence in Pakistan. This policy increased the number and unionism of violent groups in Afghanistan and in their operational bases in Pakistan, increasing their influence in the...
region and globally over the decades. Pakistan's policy of silence and inaction to the multiple movements of radicalisation, including the Kashmir population under Indian occupation, make the situation even more challenging.  

The international community has constantly criticised the Pakistani military for supporting militants to promote its political objectives in Afghanistan and India. Wikileaks has also reported that Arabian Gulf states channel around US$100 million dollars annually to support radical madrasas in Southern Punjab, Pakistan. This underscores the complicity of state actors in establishing and sustaining violent groups.

The competition over natural resources by world and regional powers such as the United States, India, Russia, China and Iran is another driver of conflict in Pakistan. It is situated between the oil-rich Middle East and the natural gas-rich Central Asian countries. The Gwadar Port city in the Southern Pakistani province of Balochistan which was built by Chinese investments is a central hub in the pipeline politics between the competing pipeline projects of the Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP or TAPI), involving a pipeline bringing natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and into India; and the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI). The major issue here is that the TAPI pipeline cannot be built so long as Afghanistan is plunged into war, thus the project has been incessantly stalled. On the other hand, India has been wavering and moving out of the picture in the IPI pipeline due to its increasingly close relations with the United States, which has sought to dissuade Pakistan from building a pipeline with Iran. However, in 2010, Pakistan and Iran signed the agreement, and are willing to either allow India or China to be the beneficiary of the pipeline. This has led to different alignments and realignments including militarisation by competing powers which has also had a significant impact on the internal politics of Pakistan, leading to violence.

Contrary to the popular notion that poverty makes people more susceptible to the appeals of violent groups, or more likely to participate in violence, a recent research report shows
that Pakistan's urban poor who are exposed to the negative impacts of militancy and violence are less likely to support the activities of violent groups. Poor Pakistanis dislike militants more than middle-class citizens.\(^{93}\)

Shadow economies and the convergence of extremists with crime syndicates is another driver of violent extremism in Pakistan. Decades of violence and authoritarianism has led to grievances and weak state institutions further giving rise to the domination of elite state institutions that comprise the Pakistani military, intelligence and police functionaries who are supported by elements like political parties, criminal syndicates, and warlords. The criminal syndicates sustain violence to ensure that the legitimacy of the state, security and enforcement capabilities remain in a perpetual state of weakness. The fragility of the state's regulatory capacity enables these criminal syndicates to make huge profits from the sales of drugs, tax evasions, smuggling and sales of weapons amongst other malpractices.\(^{94}\)

The lack of social cohesion cause by the absence of safe spaces is another driver of violence in Pakistan. Weak social cohesion in Fata encourages the growth of radical thought that destroys social cohesion without which the fraternal tribal system is undermined. At present, the improvement of conflict resolution and revival of the weakened traditional system of social cohesion in Fata has reduced the levels of radicalisation and violence.\(^{95}\)

The increase in religious-sectarian consciousness is another major driver of violence in Pakistan and in the region. In 1940, the historical Pakistan Resolution declared religious nationalism as the unifying force for the foundation of an independent state, setting the groundwork for religious intolerance and sectarianism as to which sect is more conservative. There are an estimated 73 different religious sects in Pakistan with each one advocating that it is the correct Islam and that others are false and should be hated.\(^{96}\)

The sectarian proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran to promote their respective strategic dominance has had a huge influence on the escalation and de-escalation of religious
conflicts in Sunni-majority Pakistan. Saudi Arabia backed religious pragmatism and puritanism to promote the radical Wahhabi movement in South Asia played a role in rising religious tensions in Pakistan. The 1979 Iranian revolution strengthened the Shia community's resolve to strategically position for dominance in the region. This is evident in the 1981 siege of the parliament house in Islamabad by the Shiite community. To counter the siege and the minority Shia's rising profile, the state attempted to support the formation of Sipah-e-Sahaba, a pro-Sunni organisation.  

Somalia
The lack of a stable, representative, and functioning government since the overthrow of its central government in 1991 is a major driver of violence in Somalia. The protracted war that ensued allowed islamist fundamentalists, clan-based militias, warlords and other violent groups to take control of various parts of ungoverned Somalia and assume legitimacy of leadership. These oligopolies of violence are traceable to the high levels of corruption, repression and nepotism that defined the Somali State since the 1960's leading to the collapse of institutions and services. Various governments supported by international peace processes and external forces since 1991 have also failed to turn the tide as they continued to encourage corruption and state patronage giving competing non-state actors like al-Shabaab empirical evidence to convince the citizens of why they are better placed to run the country. Although, some have argued that al-Shabaab ensures its primacy through the ruthless use of coercion and outright violence and especially in parts of Somalia's territory where they have total control.

Attempts in 2012 to establish a federal system of government which was perceived to play a balancing role among the many competing centres of power in Somalia have also failed. This has been attributed to the inability of Somali actors to agree on a consistent definition of federalism, leading to conflict as clans wrestle to control their regions to capture political power and control resources.

The protracted violence and humanitarian crisis in Somalia have made the country one of the poorest in the world. Young people below the age of 30 constitute 70 percent of the
In Somalia, identity as manipulated by ideology in the trappings of religion, as well as the perception of neglect, combine to drive youth to join al-Shabaab. Youth perceive joining al-Shabaab as a form of employment. According to them, joining al-Shabaab paid between US$50 and US$150 monthly, depending on the work, yet required little effort. The young people argue that all they had to do was carry around a gun and patrol the streets. They see joining a militia group like al-Shabaab as an easier job compared to other jobs such as construction work. They are happy to earn money and provide for their families instead of remaining idle with low-self-esteem. Many Somali youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for sustenance. This trend dampens their self-worth and prepares them to take advantage of any opportunity that will allow them to fend for themselves.

Societal pressures play a big role in Somali youth joining Al-Shabaab, as they carry the heavy weight of patriarchy on their shoulders. In fact, many worry about being seen as weak by their family and victimized by society at large. In those cases, joining the insurgency is a proof of young boys “maning up”. If an able-bodied youth living in an al-Shabaab controlled area did not join, they could be suspected of supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Some of the young people joined al-Shabaab to seek revenge as well as protection for themselves and their families. They accused the Peacekeeping forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the TFG military of wanton destruction of lives and property, as well as the molestation of their female family members.

Reputation and a sense of belonging is another reason why young people easily become recruits into violent groups in Somalia. They believe that walking the city with a gun as a member of al-Shabaab ensured everybody feared and respected you as a hero. They saw joining al-Shabaab as a platform that delivers them from irrelevance to prominence, and earns them the title of “defender of country and religion.” This explains why the youth feel
they are Muslim first and Somali second.  

Other reasons why young people join violent groups in Somalia include encouragement by family members and peers. Family members buy guns for them so they can be recruited into the group. Close relatives do this to maintain their culture, identity and religion from what they consider as foreign intervention. Religious leaders boost recruitment by delivering radical messages about jihad and urging the populace to join al-Shabaab.

Businessmen and companies in Somalia often support al-Shabaab in areas where the group is dominant since their businesses benefits from security and order. These businessmen encourage youth to join al-Shabaab to ensure ranks are well filled. Joining al-Shabaab also ensures an alternative career for idle youth who would otherwise turn to crime.

In conversations with Somalia based IIDA Women's Development Organisation, they shared additional reasons why children and youth are prone to recruitment by al-Shabaab. Firstly, family members surrender children and young people to local al-Shabaab representatives from their clans, especially where the family of the targeted children and young people have considerable material wealth (immovable assets) that ties them to that particular physical location and community. IIDA's study revealed that families that own and operate boreholes, shops and other businesses in fixed premises surrendered children to al-Shabaab to avoid harassment, while many families that consider themselves poor (with little or no immovable assets) ran away with their children from the villages near al-Shabaab camps at the first sign of impending recruitment of children by the militants. In situations where these children and youth are hidden away by families (for instance by sending them to far off towns and villages), other family members including the elderly are forcefully detained and abducted to put pressure on the families of interest to surrender the targeted children and youth as ransom.

Additionally, IIDA's work has also revealed that the abduction of children by al-Shabaab, especially children coming from schools (in urban areas) and Koranic schools (in rural areas) is another way of recruitment by the group. An analysis of Interview scripts with children
The influence of external actors including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Turkey, Qatar and the UAE in strengthening or undermining peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in Somalia is glaring. These actors engage in humanitarian, development, economic and political activities in Somalia. The proxy war that was fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia, and the subsequent sanctioning of Eritrea for supporting non-State actors that use violence have also shaped developments in Somalia. 

Yemen

The civil war between various groups in 1962 culminated in the formation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the North in 1968. During the same period, the South including Aden and the former Protectorate of South Arabia became a socialist independent government in 1967 before transforming into the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1970. The YAR witnessed internal divisions until the army took over control in 1974. This era of military rule was marred by coups and counter coups until in 1978 Ali Abdullah Saleh took over, centralised and consolidated power by appointing his close relatives, supportive tribesmen, and associates into influential positions. Saleh's strategy encouraged patronage networks, impunity and corruption leading to the dysfunction of state institutions and subsequent state collapse. The PDRY also witnessed internal divisions but enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union and China until the collapse of the USSR in 1989. Despite the rivalry between the YAR and the PDRY, they became a unified entity in 1990 and ratified a liberal constitution in 1991. Saleh consolidated his rule over a unified Yemen when he halted attempts by the South to secede in 1994. This trend ensured that power became heavily centralised and controlled by Saleh and his inner circle – which included the pre-eminent tribal Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar, and General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar.
The issue of marginalisation of the south and the inability of the central government to decentralise power and give the south a greater share of state welfare came up again in 2007 as expressed in widespread protests. However, the Saleh regime kept mute to reforms until Yemen's transitional crisis began in January 2011 with nationwide protests. Saleh responded to these protests forcefully leading to a revolt even within his inner circle. Other movements were quick to gain from the ensuing unrest. The Houthis took control of most of Sadah. AAS which is the domestic wing of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took territories in Lahj and Abyan provinces in the South. This uprising forced President Saleh to bow out in exchange for immunity under the Gulf Protection Council (GPC) in November 2011. This deal has been criticised for enabling Saleh to remain in Yemen and continue to play a key role in the descent of the country into a full-scale war.  

A coalition government was formed in February 2012 which produced President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. A National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was also set up to discuss the way forward for Yemen. The NDC set out to address marginalisation including Southern grievances. The final document outlined principles for a new constitution, a new six region and a decentralised federal structure. However, these proposals did not make it out of the NDC Working Groups, and the final NDC outcome document ended up protecting elitist interests and putting power back in the hands of the political parties to the neglect of transitional justice that Yemen so desired. Various sections of the population including the Houthis were not satisfied with this new federal structure and they felt further marginalised. Capitalizing on popular discontent with the Hadi regime in the midst of corruption and weak government the Houthis who are mostly in the North with support from former President Saleh overthrew the Hadi government and headed South in September 2014. Other groups such as the AAS and the Hadramaut Tribal Confederation (HTC) challenged security forces, controlled territory, airports, and seaports.  

The inability of the Hadi government to lead the various contending groups to agree on a political settlement including the failure of the NDC has led to a civil war in Yemen as forces loyal to the Hadi government battle the Houthis who have support from forces loyal to former President Saleh. In 2015, Saudi Arabia led an international coalition that includes
the United Arab Emirates, seven other Sunni Arab States, and backed by the United States, United Kingdom and France to intervene military against the Houthi uprising and reinforce the position of President Hadi and his government.\textsuperscript{116}

The Saudi led military intervention pushed back the Houthis from Sanaa and reinstated the Hadi government. It has also brought together several Sunni Islamists, Southern separatists, and tribal militia groups within Yemen who reject the Houthi/Saleh alliance and dominance but who have opposing views on the future of the country to support the Saudi led invasion. The Houthi/Saleh fighters have also been chased out of the Southern territories and restricted to their original domain in the Zaydi northern highlands.\textsuperscript{117}

Yemen has over the years earned the title of one of the most fragile country in the world as the elites are at war over the control of the state, which has almost completely crumbled and is no longer able to provide services and security to most of its citizens. The years of marginalisation suffered by the Zaydi community has metamorphosed into a civil war between the Houthis and the central government. The root causes of this conflict are embedded in political, justice, security and social-economic challenges. Sixty percent of the population is under 25 years with the majority of the population lacking access to essential services such as water, electricity, healthcare, and education. Security and justice institutions have failed to deliver as a result of decades of corruption and protection of elite interests. The complete failure of the state in Yemen is mostly due to a dysfunctional political system and culture that rewards patronage and distributes rents to a select elitist class who have the blessings of the Head of State. These elites have little or no incentives to address the drivers of conflict and instability in Yemen, as they benefit from the violence. The elites who control the security forces stage gun violence so that the private sector will hire security guards. Some of the army officers have served as judges so they can deliver judgements that serve the regime and the inner circle.\textsuperscript{118}

It is important to note that the unequal distribution of wealth and resources resulting in poverty is a major driver of violence in Yemen. In comparison to the neighbouring oil-rich Arab countries, Yemen lags behind in wealth creation and infrastructure development.
Violent groups exploit this gap to gain support by providing basic services. AQAP taxes and extorts both legal and illicit businesses to support development projects winning support from the local population.

Yemen is predominantly a Sunni Muslim state with a small percentage of Shia Muslims in the North-West of the country inhabited by the Zaydi Sect. The war against the Houthis has created a space for tribal and violent groups to operate. Sectarianism has increased as Houthis make inroads to Sunni dominated areas. Violent groups are able to take advantage of this rise in sectarianism to offer the Sunni population a means to take revenge and protect their territory. The hard approach of interventions and military bombardments carried out by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States against AQAP with its attendant devastating effect in terms of loss of lives and property often leads to negative perceptions among the population. AQAP capitalises on this trend for propaganda and recruitment.
This section examines the conventional response of both national and foreign governments to violence in the countries under discussion below. In summary, local elites have mostly used military bombardments and repression to quell violence in order to protect their interests and power. Regional and global powers are also complicit in the use of military might to protect their perceived interests and domination, including their support for corrupt and autocratic national elites. This trend has resulted in resentment, rebellion and further violence.

Afghanistan The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the efforts of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to train and arm militant groups to oust the Soviet occupation represents one of the earliest failures of conventional approaches and great power proxy wars in Afghanistan. Afghanistan continued to experience civil war after the end of the Cold War and Soviet withdrawal until it entered a new phase of conflict following the US-led coalition operation in Afghanistan. This operation started in 2001 after the twin bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York to eliminate al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It is perceived by most of the masses as purely US force that is meant to protect US interests in the country and region. This long international intervention has led to hatred among the population for foreign troops. Strong anti-Western sentiments lie at the bottom of most resistance to any form of intervention. The US-led intervention in Afghanistan has further created fear and insecurity.

Burundi The way Burundi was colonised through the divide and rule policy represents the first phase of the failure of conventional approaches in that country. The divide and rule policy discriminated against certain groups while favouring others. The subsequent support to autocratic and corrupt leaders by foreign powers further suggests a failed tactic in Burundi.
The UN and the African Union have shown lukewarm response to the crisis in the country. According to a confidential memo, “The UN is woefully unprepared to tackle the possibility of worsening bloodshed in Burundi”. Like neighbouring Rwanda, conventional approaches by both the UN and the AU have been minimal. Not much has been done with the bulk of intervention being left in the hands of other organisations and groups. The AU has been providing assistance, but it is viewed to be weak and financially incapable of intervention.

It has been reported that President Nkurunziza manipulated both the UN and AU to ensure his hold on the high office is not interfered with. The international community has been accused of watching helplessly as the citizens of Burundi are massacred.

Cameroon While it is important for the country to secure its porous borders and ungoverned spaces, the application of conventional approaches that takes military and intelligence-gathering activities as supreme to ensuring security will be counterproductive in the long term. Cameroon has cooperated with the United States under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and regional actors through the Multinational Joint Taskforce to fight Boko Haram to improve its security forces and counter militancy. However, these efforts are hindered by corruption and lack of coordination among security and law enforcement agents in Cameroon. The soft approach of social engagement and inclusive politics is also missing, coupled with high rates of unemployment and poverty.

As is the case with most countries where Western governments have supported authoritarian and corrupt elitist regimes in the guise of the war on terror, Cameroon might continue to witness an increase in violent extremism except the approach changes to that of human security, inclusivity, and transparency. For example, one of our respondents from Cameroon decried the influence of the Diaspora in fuelling the Anglophone separatist crisis, and the absence of a frank and inclusive dialogue with the real stakeholders to bring lasting solutions. Our respondent recalled that a major national dialogue bringing together key actors and leaders in the Anglophone conflict was held in October 2019, but that the
resolutions are slow to bear fruit. Again, Civil Society deplores the elitist choice of those who took part and the non-participation of legitimate actors on the ground.

Central Africa Republic The tradition in CAR was for those in control of power at the centre to seek foreign support and alliances to prop up their weak regimes. The French colonialists have offered such support at several times to autocratic and corrupt regimes in CAR since independence. The French offered support to the rule of Jean-Bedel Bokassa after he overthrew President David Dacko in 1965. Subsequently Bokassa was forcibly removed by the French military in 1979 and Dacko was restored to power.9

Again, when the French government abandoned President Ange-Felix Patasse to pave way for an African Peacekeeping Force to monitor and quell hostilities in 1996 after a series of violent protests and mutinies as a result of state patronage and corruption, Patasse turned to the Libyan government of Gaddafi for help. The Gaddafi sponsored Community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) got involved and provided a peacekeeping force for Patasse and his presidential guard. Additionally, Congolese Rebel group – Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo also lent support to the Patasse regime.10 This trend shows the failure of foreign powers and regional counter-balancing efforts.

The UN peacekeeping forces were accused of flagrant abuse in the CAR.11 This included sexual exploitation of women and rape. The UN was further accused of covering up the allegations12 and failure to take action against its own forces.13

Chad The European Union Cross-border Peacekeeping Forces (EUFOR) mission in Eastern Chad as mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1778 has been judged a failure due to its inability to engage in the political dimensions of the crisis. Peacekeepers were deployed for one year to use force if necessary to protect civilians but their contribution to peace in Chad was very limited. EUFOR could not respond to issues of law and order in Chad or see linkages with structural challenges of political
marginalisation and bad governance.\textsuperscript{14}

Subsequently, the proxy wars between regional powers to control Chad and the tacit support of authoritarian regimes by foreign powers were another failure of a conventional approach in Chad leading to the strengthening and proliferation of violent groups. For example, in the late 1970s, the Libyan military supported by Oueddei’s rebel forces occupied parts of Northern Chad and used Darfur to launch in Eastern Chad. At the same period President Hissene Habre of Chad who tried to hold on to the Southern part of Chad including N’djamena was supported by Sudan and received military aid from the United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt who sought to counter Libya’s ambitious expansion agenda.\textsuperscript{15}

Kenya Perhaps, the most apparent approach towards violence in Kenya is the use of force. Expectedly, hard military power is often deployed in response to attacks by violent groups as in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa. Also, Kenya has cooperated with foreign countries such as the United States and Ethiopia on counter terror operations. The United States, for instance, was allowed access to Kenyan soil to provide for Ethiopia’s military operations in Somalia in 2006.\textsuperscript{16}

While the conventional approaches have resulted in a degree of success, they are also limited in their capacity as sustainable strategies to prevent violence. For instance, the state’s counter-terrorism strategy is heavily skewed in favour of policy and border security instead of programmes designed to address why Kenyans get radicalised.\textsuperscript{17} Government’s need to police Kenyan borders cannot be overemphasised given the security situation of neighbouring countries. However, over reliance on hard power has resulted in missed opportunities at trust and resilience-building between the state and its Muslim population. The harsh military response to every terrorist attack is frequently underscored by religious and ethnic profiling and discrimination of Somalis and other Kenyan Muslims. Thus, most Kenyan Muslims are viewed as terrorists based on their ethnicity and religion.\textsuperscript{18}

For instance, the bank accounts of two Muslim civil society organisations working on religious de-radicalisation, Haki Africa and Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), were frozen by authorities on an alleged and baseless claim of having links to terror
organisations. Though a Mombasa court later lifted the ban, such a move by government further widens the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Also, Kenya's weak and corrupt governance system makes it difficult, if not impossible to arrest, prosecute, jail, and rehabilitate radical individuals and groups. Key governance challenges are related to the criminal justice system, border security and defence.

Libya

Any critic of approaches to prevent and counter violence in Libya should be properly contextualised. Doing so is expedient given the country's socio-political realities. Political failure, coupled with the breakdown of law and order, as well as state institutions create deep rooted structural problems which have led to a near collapse of the Libyan state. Therefore, expecting the state to articulate effective strategies and approaches to counter violence will require effective dialogue mechanisms that are inclusive and addresses the root causes of the conflict.

The intensive nature of the NATO-led bombardment during the uprising left Libya's infrastructure, especially its defence capability in total ruins. Not only were the country's defence institutions and mechanisms destroyed, the various armed militia groups that filled the void created by the absence of functional security apparatuses project interests along tribal and radical ideological lines in a manner that deepens already fragmented relationships among the various tribes in Libya. Western countries and institutions, including the European Union, The United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany are beginning to show greater concerns on the Libyan debacle. However, such concern can be gleaned from a bigger issue causing serious disaffection in Europe. Since Qaddafi's fall, Libya has become a hotspot for people smugglers and migrants eager to get to Europe. The presence of violent extremist organisations like al-Qaeda and IS close to European borders are enough reasons for the current panic among Europe's political leaders. There are reports that consideration is now being given to some form of military intervention.

Mali and allies, especially France, have mostly resorted to the use of force in quelling violence in Mali. Attempts by the Malian government to quash the Tuareg rebellion and defend the Malian territory have always been done with impunity leading to gross human
Niger's conventional approach involves deployment of border security systems and increasing its security forces along its vast under governed borders with Algeria, Mali, and Libya. It also involves military actions against Tuareg rebel groups. The use of military force to mitigate Tuareg and Islamist militant uprisings and the destruction of lives and property recorded in the process has resulted in grievances against the government by Tuareg communities.

The membership and active participation of Niger in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region also underscores its projection of hard power. Niger's partnership with Western governments to fight terror under the auspices of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI) and the Status-of-Forces-Agreement (SOFA) with the US government that allows the operation of military force in the Sahel region.

France's unilateral military action in Mali in 2013 after the ousting of a democratically elected government in 2012 by a group of officers from the Malian military reflects the use of force on the part of Mali's formal colonial masters. France continues to retain significant power in Mali. Bamako has long served as a logistics hub for French forces involved in a regional fight against Islamist militants. While two-thirds of French citizens supported the French invasion of Mali arguing it is to create safe spaces and support a transition via elections, Islamist militants back in Mali have disagreed with that viewpoint and argue that it is France's neo-colonial tendencies, and a campaign against Islam that is being implemented. After the 2015 Paris attacks, ISIS released a statement warning the French that the "smell of death will never leave their noses as long as they lead the convoy of the crusader campaign". Elections in Mali were held successfully and there is relative calm in most parts including the capital, Bamako. French troops have also been downsized from 4000 to 1000. However, Tuareg rebels and government troops are still at war, while militants continue to pool off isolated attacks against government and French troops, and the web of conflict actors grows more complex.

The onslaught on Islamist militants in Mali by French forces have led them to flee to Niger and Northern Nigeria, carrying out various degrees of attacks against civilian and military targets resulting in the escalation of conflict in the Sahel region.

Preventing and Responding to Violence in the 21st Century: Exploring Alternative Approaches
Nigeria Conventional approaches in Nigeria are underscored by the use of hard power. Ever since religious radicalisation and activities of non-state actors that use violence became a security challenge, the use of military power against violent groups has been an integral aspect of government's strategy. In the past, hard military power has been used to quell agitations for the control of oil resources in the Niger Delta, and violent religious uprisings such as the Maitatsine crisis. The on-going military campaign against Boko Haram, Operation Dole, is the most extensive domestic military operation in Nigeria's history after the civil war. Operation Dole has led to a drastic reduction in Boko Haram's capacity to operate within Nigeria's territory. However, it has been criticised to be marred by violations of human rights and impunity.

External backing comes in various ways like counterterrorism training for military personnel, logistical and operational assistance for military campaign, diplomatic support, regional and international cooperation within the GWOT framework. The classification of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation by the UN, the US$7 million bounty placed on its leader, Abubakar Shekau, by the United States, the establishment of the MNJTF, comprising of Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger are examples of external support in Nigeria.

The conventional approaches to countering violence in Nigeria are fraught with some disturbing limitations. State-led approaches can be counterproductive because of the harsh tactics deployed in their implementation. For instance, the manner hard military power is used often leads to isolation of inhabitants in communities where groups like Boko Haram operate from. Indiscriminate arrest, extra-judicial killings, and wanton destruction of property breed distrust and discontentment among locals against the state. An interesting case is the 2009 clampdown on Boko Haram which led to over 3000 deaths. Different accounts of local residents suggests that many people were summarily executed on mere suspicion of being affiliated to Boko Haram. As a result, many families lost their...
Pakistan's present policy approach leans more towards hard power than soft power. Analysts posit that the focus on counterterrorism is easier to prosecute since it can be implemented through better policing and enforcement by security agencies. However, prevention efforts and counter radicalisation strategies might be more difficult as it requires a whole-of-society approach that entails significant social, political, and economic reforms. It is argued that unless the whole-of-society approach is adopted, there will not be any major transformational change to challenge and replace radicalism and violence in Pakistan.\(^{34}\)

The United States foreign assistance to Pakistan rose from US$36.76 million in 2000 to US$4.5 billion dollars in 2010. However, a major proportion of these funds goes into military operations and expenditures since it is assumed this will bolster regional security and eliminate terrorism.\(^{35}\) The US has used Pakistan's territory for logistical supply lines for their intervention in Afghanistan. At the same time, the US questions the commitment of military and security leaders in Pakistan to end all support for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This suspicion made the US try to re-route its logistical supply lines through Central Asian countries. The US also decided to unilaterally launch drone strikes on al-Qaeda targets in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. This trend has led to resentment against the United States from Pakistani masses.\(^{36}\)

Somalia's conventional approaches to prevent and counter violence have always been militarised and often witness catastrophic failures. At best these approaches do only put a lid on the conflict without necessarily resolving them. Most analyses of countering violence, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts in Somalia reveal failure to prioritise freedom and human security.
The killing of 18 US Army Rangers that were deployed as part of the failed Operation Restore Hope in 1993 represents one of the earlier failures of conventional approaches by foreign powers in Somalia. Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in the US, Somalia was absorbed into the GWOT for suspicion of being a safe haven for al-Qaeda. This ensured strategic focus and military support to Somalia including targeted strikes on al-Shabaab elements. However, the involvement of the US and other international actors in Somalia has been described as akin to the imposition of external templates that lack public buy-in.37

The diversion of international military assistance by participating African countries in AMISON, and human rights abuses against civilians leading to more grievances, have also contributed to hinder peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. Ethiopia and Kenya are said to have benefitted from their sustained military presence in Somalia. With the international community paying for the costs at a monthly rate of US$822 per troop at approximately US$40 million dollar per year, Ethiopia maintains 4000 troops in Somalia.38

This assistance is reported to have enabled the Addis Ababa regime to tackle its domestic political opposition. The 'Liyu' police at the Ethiopian Somali border region who were trained with grants from the UK government carried out a brutal counter-terror campaign that was characterised by systematic human rights abuses against civilians. Kenya's involvement in Somalia has provided the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) with highly lucrative access to the illicit trade in sugar and charcoal through its presence in Kismayo.39 The approach by the Somali government and allies has failed to address the drivers of conflict. Instead, they reinforce them. This is evident in the charges of gross abuses and human rights violations reported against AMISOM forces.40 AMISOM and the Somalia National Army (SNA) are reported to have victimised large numbers of Somali civilians culminating in bitter enmity to their presence among victims. They are said to be involved in gang rape, sexual exploitation, indiscriminate attacks, and arbitrary killings of Somali civilians. For example, a military operation involving the SNA and US troops in Barire, Lower Shabelle in August 2017 led to the death of 10 civilians.41 These acts of impunity together with the high rates of civilian deaths from drone strikes have galvanised public support for al-Shabaab and
attracted angry recruits who previously had no reason to join a violent group.
The UNSCR 2568 (2021) reauthorized AMISOM to last until December 31, 2021, ahead of the phased handover of responsibilities to Somali security forces, planned for later in 2021. The Security Council took note of its request that the African Union Commission finalize its independent assessment and urged it to mandate, in May 2021, an AMISOM that “supports and enables” the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan, implementing the necessary steps to ensure continued delivery of support to Somali security efforts in 2022.42

Furthermore, Turkey, a historically strong ally of Somalia resumed strategic engagements with the country after the 2011 visit of the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This created a partnership that enabled Turkey to support Somalia with humanitarian aid in the health, education and security sectors. Turkey's vast and strategic aid at the peak of the 2011 famine has made many Somali people to view Turkey's intervention in their country positively. The Turkish government and organizations have built schools, constructed hospitals and infrastructure, and provided scholarships for Somalis to study in Turkey.43

Additionally, the Turkish government have trained and equipped the Somali police and military to build capacity and ensure security. Hundreds of Somali military personnel have benefitted from this training, with a target of around 15,000 Somali military officers expected to undergo this specialized training. Turkey also has its largest overseas military base in Somalia to enable them to have military leverage over conflict zones in the region.44

However, a recent plan by Turkey to send arms to Somalia has drawn widespread criticism from opposition political parties. Ankara planned to send 1,000 G3 assault rifles and 15,000 bullets to the government of Somalia's Harama'ad Police unit.45 In their reaction, leaders of opposition political parties have opposed the move asking Ankara to halt the shipment of the weapons as they fear they will be used by Special Police Forces such as the Harama'ad to control and rig forthcoming elections in a country that has been ravaged by war. The Harama'ad Police has been accused of violent suppression of peaceful protests, extrajudicial killings and gross human rights violations.46
Yemen has witnessed autocratic and corrupt regimes since the formation of the republic leading to the proliferation of militia groups that are allegedly supported by state actors including Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's support to consecutive Yemeni regimes namely the rule of President Saleh and Hadi respectively and their attendant corrupt and repressive styles of governance that reject decentralisation of power, and avoid providing the dividends of democracy to the masses, marked the beginning of failure of conventional approaches in Yemen.\textsuperscript{47}

The 2015 Saudi Arabia led international coalition that includes the United Arab Emirates, seven other Sunni Arab States, and is backed by the United States, United Kingdom and France to eliminate Houthi fighters and support President Hadi's regime has also been criticised,\textsuperscript{48} despite having the backing of the UN.\textsuperscript{49} Military intervention is always controversial with different schools of thought castigating its use. Yemen is no different.\textsuperscript{50} The result of their interference could only have a further effect on the political situation by consolidating their hold (especially Saudi Arabia) on the politics of the country.\textsuperscript{51} Amnesty International, amongst other international organisations, considers the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen as partisan\textsuperscript{52} and causing more devastation\textsuperscript{53} than is necessary.\textsuperscript{54} The devastating effect of these military bombardments in terms of loss of lives and property has led to negative perceptions among the population. AQAP and other violent groups capitalise on this trend for propaganda and recruitment.\textsuperscript{55}
SECTION 4

Case Studies from France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States

This section examines policies and programs on how developed countries that includes France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States address radicalisation in their own territory for comparative purposes. The aim of this section is to ensure that lessons learned from these Western nations can benefit the range of conflict affected and fragile countries from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia examined in this study. While these developed nations have better data gathering systems that enable them to quickly respond to violence, they have been criticized for stigmatizing and discriminating against certain individuals and religions based on race and ethnicity.

As early as December 2001, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) at its Ministerial Council Meeting had demanded that global terrorism be countered not only with military and intelligence means, but also by tackling the root causes of terrorism. Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and its alternative—Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)—found its way into political and diplomatic discourse. PVE or CVE refer to the “soft” side of counterterrorism strategies that tackle the drivers which lead people to engage in politically- or ideologically motivated violence. In practice, the current focus is on violent Islamist movements, but the term can also be applied to other violent groups.

The concept of PVE was introduced in Europe after the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) in response to the fear of home-grown Islamist terrorism. The UK government’s Prevent program is regarded as the first practical example to prevent violence. The EU’s counterterrorism strategy of 2005 relied on four pillars: To prevent, protect, pursue, and respond. The “prevent” element related to the societal conditions that led to individual radicalisation. The UN’s global anti-terrorism approach in 2006 also called for a holistic strategy that encompassed the conditions conducive to terrorism. Australia, Canada, and the US all adopted national CVE strategies of their own in 2011. Albania, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Lebanon, Maldives, Montenegro, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom have since also drafted national strategies to combat terrorism with a particular focus on the prevention of violence and the resilience of their societies in the face of terrorism.

The influence of CVE/PVE is also growing in the field of development aid and international cooperation, particularly in US and European policy. But it is worth stressing that CVE/PVE does not represent a comprehensive solution to the challenges of extremism and radicalisation in Muslim communities. There is however a clear link between prevention and extremism; any successful solutions to prevention are likely to reduce the problems associated with the extremism and radicalisation. As PVE/CVE importance grows, summaries from case studies in France, Germany, UK and the US are highlighted in this study, as they represent one of a myriad of areas which governments and civil society should consider when attempting preventing and responding to violence programs, to understand the challenges and lessons learned from these countries.

**France**

France launched its “Stop-Djihadisme” (Stop Jihadism) campaign in late January 2015, in an effort to counter the threat of Islamic extremism throughout French society. Following the January 2015 attacks, the country's Ministry of Education has adopted a series of measures to counter radicalisation and promote secular values in France's schools. In September 2016, the government also opened the first of 12 scheduled de-radicalisation centres throughout the country which had to close a year later due to multiple factors including lack of communication and support from the government, discontentment from the population who felt in danger, and unreal “voluntary basis” as jihadists do not recognize themselves as such. The launch is part of a US$45.5 million-dollar plan announced by former Prime Minister Manuel Valls in May 2016 to address the danger posed by France's radicalised population. According to Valls, these centres would house—and seek to rehabilitate—individuals who “have repented and who we will test the sincerity and willingness to be reintegrated back into society for the long term.” The centres are also scheduled to house and rehabilitate individuals whom a French judge deems to be at-risk of radicalisation, and are run by the country's Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Radica...
In addition to countering extremism in France's school system, France is increasingly working to counter Islamic extremism in its prisons. Muslims make up a disproportionate percentage of the prison population in France. In 2008, an estimated 60-70 percent of the prison population in France were Muslim, though Muslims were estimated to comprise only 12 percent of the population. A report from October 2014 found that 60 percent of France's prison population comes from “Muslim origin or culture.” By 2016, nearly 1,400 inmates were believed to be radicalised, more than 300 of whom were incarcerated on terrorism charges. After the January 2015 attacks, France began to reorganise its prison system in order to isolate extremist inmates from the rest of the inmate population. The program—based on a 2014 experiment conducted in France's Fresnes prison—involves grouping together radicalised inmates in units that were isolated from the other inmates. France announced that it would end the program after concerns emerged that the effort was helping to deepen radicalisation networks within prisons. The greatest challenge to the French approach is that of negative perception of the government's motives by the Muslim community. These policies have been perceived by the Muslim community as stigmatising and discriminating against certain individuals based on characteristics such as religion, racial or ethnic origins. Such discrimination is not only a factor conducive to radicalisation but also a practical obstacle to the engagement of youth, as it risks undermining their interest and willingness to contribute to the prevention of violence.

**Germany**

HAYAT, which means “life” in Turkish and Arabic, is the first German counselling program for individuals, as well as relatives and friends of people involved in radical Islamist groups or on the path to violent jihadist radicalisation, including those who travel to Syria, Iraq and other war zones. HAYAT was established in 2011, tying in with the experiences of the first German de-radicalisation and disengagement program for highly radicalised neo-Nazis. EXIT-Germany developed methods and approaches to work with the relatives of radicalised persons to eventually prevent, decelerate and invert the radicalisation process. Transferring this unique knowledge and experience into the realm of Islamic extremism, HAYAT is now available to parents, siblings, friends, teachers, employers and anyone who has a relationship of Delinquency and Radicalisation.
with a person potentially on the path to violent radicalisation. HAYAT is working directly with radicalised people to demonstrate the prerequisites and possibilities of desistance from radical behaviour, ideologies and groups. Since January 2012, HAYAT has also partnered with the German Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), which established a national advisory centre on radicalisation (BeratungsstelleRadikalisierung). This hotline takes calls from relatives and other concerned persons, provides an initial assessment, and then redirects calls to local, nongovernmental partners like HAYAT. The program has been criticised as stigmatising and discriminating against the German Muslim Community, leading to fears of further radicalisation, and lack of support from young people and the Muslim Community in Germany.

United Kingdom

The UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) has four strands: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare, according to the latest four-year Prevent strategy released in June 2011. One of the core outcomes of the 2011 Prevent strategy was that Prevent should be refocused to make a clearer distinction between counter-terrorist work and integration strategy. There are two efforts that focus on PVE/CVE in women: a female intervention program and work with families of those convicted of terrorism-related offences to install a level of resilience and reduce isolation so that the family unit is not vulnerable to radicalisation, including when the family member returns from prison. Families Against Stress and Trauma (FAST), provides families with assistance such as language, sewing and IT classes, employment assistance, and more generally reduces social marginalisation of wives and children and seeks to educate on vulnerabilities to terrorism. The UK home office has reported that since 2012, over 1200 persons have been supported by Channel – a mentorship program that is part of the Prevent strategy. It is on record that 179 (45%) of the 394 people who received Channel support in 2017-2018 had been referred for concerns related to Islamist extremism, and 174 (44%) for concerns related to right-wing extremism. The head of the UK’s counter-terrorism policing, Neil Basu, stated that 18 plots to cause mass murder on British soil had been prevented since March 2017, and that 14 of these planned attacks were by Islamist extremists, with 4 of them allegedly planned by right-wing...
The Prevent policy has been criticised for profiling the Muslim community, compounded by how to measure the inputs, outputs, and particularly the outcomes, of counter-terrorism efforts. The program has been criticised as indoctrinating women as spies, consequently its focus has shifted from a gender centric to a gender neutral approach. The Prevent strategy has also been criticized for focusing on gathering intelligence than in supporting communities, and that it fosters discrimination against people of Muslim faith or background while hindering legitimate expression. This trend has resulted in the call for an independent review of the Prevent strategy, as the strategy in its present state is seen as further alienating and radicalising the British Muslim population. Ann-Lynn Dudenhoefer posits that what stands out as particularly controversial in the Prevent strategy is the statutory duty introduced in 2015 that requires 'specified authorities' to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. She further argues that the Prevent Duty which enforces the element of surveillance in classrooms in educational institutions (excluding higher education) not only has the potential to undermine inclusive safe spaces in schools but may also further alienate the Muslim population in Britain. This is as 67 percent of all Channel referrals from April 2007 to December 2010 were recorded as Muslims. Also, between April 2012 and January 2014, 57 percent of all referrals were Muslims.

**United States**

In 2011, the US government released its eight-page policy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, followed by its December 2011 strategic implementation plan to provide a “blueprint for how to build community resilience against violent extremism” domestically. The new policy makes clear that within the United States, the role of families, local communities, and institutions is promoted over that of the Federal government. Simultaneously, a whole-of-government approach is adopted, including non-security actors, such as the U.S. Department of Education (EDU) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Department of Justice has led domestic CVE efforts, which primarily consist of outreach to Muslim leaders to keep the community involved and encourage information sharing about vulnerable youth. The FBI and local law
enforcement routinely have held meetings with Muslim community leaders across the
country. Between 2012 and 2015, the FBI and local law enforcement convened more than
2,500 engagement events. According to the Department of Justice, the aim is to “foster
trust, improve awareness, and educate communities about violent risk factors in order to
stop radicalisation to violence before it starts.”\textsuperscript{15} In 2014, the US Department for
Homeland Security (DHS) and Department for Justice (DOJ) launched CVE pilot projects
in Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis. In September 2015, the DOJ announced the
launch of another CVE intervention tagged Strong Cities program that includes 26 cities
globally including Atlanta, Denver, Minneapolis and New York.\textsuperscript{16}

These CVE programs have been viewed by many to monitor people's speech and thoughts
and thereby threaten their constitutional rights. Opponents say this approach has failed to
prevent terrorism and risks further endangering public safety. This CVE strategy which
identifies controversial speech as a possible indicator for trouble, appears not to be treating
all controversial speeches equally, often targeting people based on race, religion and
ethnicity.\textsuperscript{17} Some analysts refer to this strategy as a plan to conscript teachers, social, and
mental health workers to monitor and give regular updates to law enforcement on children in
their care to support the hunt for Islamist extremists. A leaked National Counter-terrorism
guideline appears to direct teachers and social workers to monitor and evaluate students on a
five-point rating scale deploying factors such as the expression of hopelessness and futility;
perceived sense of being treated unjustly; and connection to group identity (nationality,
religion, race and ethnicity).\textsuperscript{18} A recurrent complaint is that the government does not do
outreach to white nationalist and far-right-wing Americans, despite the fact that there were
roughly the same number of domestic deaths as the result of terrorism by far-right wing
individuals compared to Muslims since 9/11.\textsuperscript{19}
SECTION 5

Alternative Approaches to Preventing and Responding to Violence

This section examines viable alternatives to preventing and responding to violence from relevant g7+ countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Somalia, and Yemen. It also entails various strategies employed in other conflict affected states including Cameroon, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Pakistan. The lessons learned from these countries can inform future planning of programs to prevent and respond to violence, including replication of best practices and scaling up of programs.

Afghanistan

Part of Afghanistan's initiative to counter violence involves strategic engagement with religious institutions. Over 90 percent of Afghan Mosques and Madrassas operated independently of government oversight. This trend allowed some of these communities to promote violent ideologies until the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs and the Department of Islamic Education at the Ministry of Education renewed efforts to register more Mosques and Madrassas with little success. This underscores the importance for comprehensive data and sustainable regulation of religious institutions and Madrassas to ensure that they are not used as spaces for radicalisation.

In 2010, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) was established to reintegrate Taliban fighters and violent groups back into their communities. This programme created space to resolve community grievances and stimulate community development, which has been perceived as a big success by some. The APRP reports that it has successfully reintegrated over six thousand ex-combatants including engaging them in community development projects to increase community resistance against insurgent influence. These figures have been disputed as other sources report that over nine thousand and five hundred ex-combatants were reintegrated. The APRP is implemented by the High Peace Council (HPC) and the Joint Secretariat (JS). The Taliban has continuously tried to discredit the HPC on the grounds that it is based on foreign ideas, and externally funded.
The Afghan government has failed to agree with international actors on a common model for preventing former combatants from supporting violent groups. Women's rights are also sidelined in this process as the HPC has only 9 women among its 79 members. This demonstrates the power of local content in peacebuilding, reintegration and rehabilitation programs as opposed to imported ideas. The role of girls and women in peacebuilding processes must also be promoted to ensure robust outcomes.

The establishment of the police training academy and the European Union (EU) continued focus on building the leadership capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has been described as a successful program in reforming the police in Afghanistan. However, the EU and international support to ensure professionalism and respect for human rights within the rank and file of the ANP has been criticised for lacking a coherent strategy. The policies still viewed by many to be corrupt and marred by human rights abuses. This trend questions the legitimacy of the ANP and undermines the state. For example, funds meant for the ANP have been allegedly diverted by highly placed police or government officials. Equipment provided to the police was reported to be sold and funds realised from sales diverted for personal gains. This analysis shows that police and security institutions must imbibe professionalism, accountability, human rights and the rule of law for them to be successful in delivering on their mandate and have public support.

The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) concentrates on agriculture by addressing aspects related to drought, poverty and inadequate rainfall as key issues affecting food security. To better achieve its objectives, FAO established the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), which classifies the nature and scale of food insecurity in the country and, through improved analysis, enables a more needs-based, timely and strategic response. Around 80 percent of the Afghan population depends on agriculture as a means of livelihood. It is in this regard that FAO as co-lead of the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster in Afghanistan with the World Food Programme (WFP), is supporting the revival and growth of Afghanistan's agriculture sector by setting up and expanding community-based seed enterprises, providing vulnerable farmers with agricultural inputs in time for winter/spring planting season, providing veterinary health services and animal feed to rural
households. This has helped in repositioning the country for greater food security.\textsuperscript{6}

The Food and Agricultural Organisation has made some modest progress in recent times. Between May and November 2018, the FAO received contributions close to US$15.5 million from the governments of Belgium, France, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United States of America, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. This support has enabled FAO to provide emergency livestock support to 242,200 people, and emergency agriculture support to 170,730 people. Despite these interventions, the food security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating with 10.6 million people who represent around 30 percent of the population facing severe food insecurity and in need of urgent support.\textsuperscript{7}

The factors driving food insecurity in Afghanistan include large scale drought in 2018 representing the country's worst food crisis since the 2011 drought. Secondly, the protracted conflict which began since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to flush out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban after the attack on the World Trade Centre have impacted heavily on food insecurity in Afghanistan. In 2018, the Taliban made gains by taking over territory and targeting the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released figures which showed that the first half of 2018 was the deadliest for Afghan civilians since the mission started documenting casualties in 2009. There were 435 casualties during the parliamentary elections in October 2018. This figure is higher than those of four previous elections combined. Aid workers also suffered losses in the first half of 2018. A total of 23 aid workers were killed, 37 injured, and 74 abducted during this period.\textsuperscript{8}

The trend above shows that strategic support to the agricultural sector which is the primary occupation of majority of the citizens in the Global South countries under review in this study will boost food and livestock production and sustainability, and reduce violence. However, shocks such as droughts, election related violence, and violent extremism might reverse gains. This calls for a holistic planning of agricultural interventions that examines possible risk factors with strategies to mitigate them.
The Arusha Peace Accord in the year 2000 was seen as a great step towards peacebuilding in Burundi as it stabilised the country. However, it was devoid of most critical elements for peace. The agreement did not include civilians instead it focused on the elites and government leaders. This explains the continuous civil unrest in that country. Traditionally, citizen's engagement in conflict management is valued by both Hutu and Tutsi, hence it would have been advantageous if they were included in the agreement. Another failure of the Arusha agreement is that there was no measure of sustained aid to Burundi that would have supported implementing the whole agreement. By 2009, South Africa, who led the talks leading to the agreement, appeared to have relinquished control to the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the elected Burundi government to continue ensuring human security and democratisation. This hindered the implementation as there was reduction in regional involvement and change of leadership.

**Burundi**

The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) has been judged an effective conflict management strategy in Burundi. AMIB was deployed on 3rd March 2003 as instances of armed conflict were on the rise and UN peacekeeping forces were still awaited. AMIB was sent to Burundi to act as liaison between parties, monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement as contained in the Arusha negotiations, secure identified disengagement areas, facilitate and provide technical assistance to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) among other roles. Until 1st June 2004 when authority was transferred to the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB), the AMIB successfully reduced conflict and stabilised 95 percent of Burundi, thus paving the way for ONUB. However, it failed to implement Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as AU’s ambition was sometimes overshadowed by capacity limitations. AMIB succeeded in part because it was accepted by the people of Burundi since it had a regional support from the Great Lakes countries and the AU. The participation of both regional and international actors gave it some sort of legitimacy.

ONUB completed its mission in late 2006 and was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) that was authorised by UNSCR 1719. ONUB was
able to conduct the first successful democratic elections in Burundi after 12 years of no voting, installed a national government, and succeeded in disarming and demobilising 22,000 ex-combatants. This achievement was possible due to the support of the Burundian people, Great Lakes region countries and the international community.\textsuperscript{11}

The case of Burundi demonstrates that political, peacebuilding and statebuilding processes must be inclusive and supported by the citizens. The issues of capacities of actors to engage, and the acceptance of foreign stakeholders by citizens is crucial to success and in preventing further violence.

Cordaid has been doing some tremendous work in Burundi. Through its Security and Justice Program, the organisation is working to reverse the trend of shrinking space for civil society and ensure their rights to be alive and freely operate. Cordaid has been striving to improve healthcare in Burundi by setting up mobile clinics in refugee camps and rolling out medical programs in those clinics. Recently, the emphasis of Cordaid has shifted more towards providing technical support to the government and local organisations. It advocates the development of well-functioning public administration, justice, and law enforcement systems at local levels to prevent and respond to violence.\textsuperscript{12} This is realised, for instance, through the incorporation of women's participation in local administration organs and by training women to give them leadership skills. Cordaid is also working with the national government on the implementation of the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. In this plan, the government works to strengthen the role of women in mediation and negotiation during peace-building processes leading to less violence. Cordaid is also playing an active role in applying political pressure on the government through its lobby and advocacy work for the cessation of violence.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite the achievements recorded by Cordaid and other organisations in supporting peacebuilding in Burundi, the freedom of movement and work for civil society is still very limited resulting in less accurate data and lack of support systems in most cases. Gross human rights violations and assassinations persist with government and security officials being implicated in most instances since President Nkurunziza was sworn in for a 3\textsuperscript{rd} term in
office in 2015. The recent political and security crisis in Burundi coupled with the budget shortfall necessitated by the withdrawal of aid by foreign powers has resulted in failure to deliver critical social services. Many public health centres are reported to have stopped providing free healthcare as they lack funding. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has also reported significant declines in access to sexual and reproductive health services, particularly maternal health and essential treatments for diseases affecting children. This trend underscores the need for sustained aid in crisis situations to ensure that basic social amenities can be accessed by citizens.

**Cameroon**

The Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC) educates the masses on the dangers of violent extremism and promotes religious tolerance. This is carried out through engaging in strategic communication in mosques and places of worship. It also includes targeted messages at roundtable discussions, conferences and press releases. The CIDIMUC also works to improve the living conditions of Imams. In a move to prevent and counter violence, the Cameroonian government has partnered with local, traditional and religious leaders to monitor preaching in mosques and the nature of interaction in local administrative and religious gatherings. This shows the need to regulate religious institutions, including strengthening the capacities of religious leaders in promoting non-violence and tolerance leading to less violence and de-radicalisation.

In our field work in Cameroon, we found out that Rebuilding Peace through Actions with Inclusive Reach (REPAIR) creates avenues for dialogue and understanding among various groups (religious/ethnic), and trains peacebuilders. The African School for Peace trains school and street children on how to be Ambassadors for Peace through understanding their issues, solving them, and helping them to overcome their fears. Also, Women in Development works with mothers to build the self-esteem of their children and teach them peace tenets, and the Commonwealth Youth Peace Ambassadors Network work to build the capacity of young people on peace and commit them to be peace ambassadors by signing the peace pledge. There are several other initiatives led by local CSOs such as Rayons de Soleil working on gender-based violence, psychosocial support and trauma healing, rehabilitation of prisoners, young peoples role in DDR and research.
The foregoing shows the enormous capacities and interesting work that the Civil Society in Cameroon is doing to prevent violence by engaging communities, youth and women groups on a culture of non-violence and peace including providing psychosocial support. However, these civil society led approaches are facing funding shortfalls. They also face challenges associated with the lack of government policy that encourages dialogue and peacebuilding and therefore makes their work difficult. Instead, the present government's policy emphasises the use of force. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts are also politicised in Cameroon as party affiliations and identity disrupts efforts at preventing violence. Civic engagement is not seen as different from politics in Cameroon. The weak collaboration between the military and other actors slows down the process of dialogue and peacebuilding, as military action is still largely resorted to.

The Rapid Response for Enhancing Resilience and Conflict Prevention in Far North and East Regions of Cameroon is another project that has also recorded some level of success in the country. It is a joint venture project between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the FAO with funding from Japan. The aim of this radio project was to improve conflict prevention and inter-community dialogue between refugees and host communities and sensitise young girls and boys who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent groups. The four stations which included Échos des montagnes in Mokolo, Radio Sava from Mora, Radio Kousseri, and the regional station based in Maroua were trained in locally adapted programmes in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, mediation, reconciliation, intercultural and interfaith dialogue, and education for non-violence. Together, the four stations aired over 60 programmes with the aim of reaching out to various communities on a culture of peace. On air programming included live debates and discussions in national languages, magazines, local news, and micro programmes. On air, members from various communities discussed community inclusiveness and non-violent conflict resolution. These programmes also imparted on their audience's skills necessary to recognise and defuse potential conflicts, and actively promote and create a culture of peace. The programme which ran from March 2015 to March 2016 benefitted radio broadcasters, school children reached through school extracurricular activities, traditional rulers, religious
leaders, administrative and political authorities, and the general population. This intervention in Cameroon has demonstrated how engaging refugees and host communities through inter-communal and inter-faith dialogues including equipping them with non-violence skills can lead to long term peace.

Most of the interventions in Cameroon appear to focus more on the Far North and Eastern regions to prevent and counter the recruitment of young people into violent groups with some modest levels of success. However, the issue of the Anglophone separatists in the Northwest and Southwest regions, and especially their resurgence before and after the October 2018 general elections that brought President Paul Biya into office for a seventh term has not been addressed by key stakeholders like the Cameroonian government. The government has continued to crackdown on journalists and civil society leaders who criticise its policies of impunity, human rights violations, and marginalisation in the Anglophone region. This violence has led to high rates of civilian deaths and displacements. Freedom of assembly and political affiliation has also been restricted as opposition figures are indiscriminately arrested and jailed. The conflict in this part of the country has spiraled out of control, with daily atrocities committed on civilians by both the military and the separatists, with girls and women being mostly affected.

**Central African Republic**

There have been various international and regional efforts to enforce peace in the CAR. The Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation held from May 4 to 11, 2015 was a bold step by stakeholders in the CAR to ensure peacebuilding and statebuilding. The Bangui Forum brought together around 800 leaders from diverse groups within the country. These groups included transitional government, national political parties, civil society organisations, the main opposing Seleka and anti-Balaka armed groups, traditional chiefs, religious groups, and the private sector to define their collective vision for the future of CAR. At the end of the week-long meeting which was meant to develop concrete measures to ensure peace and security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic development, and good governance in the CAR, the following recommendations and agreements were made. Ten factions of the Seleka and anti-balaka militias signed a DDR agreement; leaders of the two major armed
The seemingly robust outcome of the Bangui Forum has been flawed with limitations leading to its failure. There is the issue of funding gap for DDR and the perceived inability of leaders of armed groups to exercise control over all of their members to disarm. In a statement by Interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, the CAR has held five national debates on Peace and Reconciliation since 1980 and then descended into crisis almost immediately. The anti-Balaka group staged walkout protests over their disagreement with the recommendations of the forum. Hundreds of both Seleka and anti-Balaka groups also staged protests outside the forum over the detention of their members and the likelihood that they will face criminal trials.

The armed groups wanted complete amnesty from criminal trials for crimes committed during the conflict by their members. They considered the establishment of a Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Reparation Commission as an alternative to criminal justice. However, the Bangui Forum stated that amnesty will not be granted for those responsible for and acting as accomplices in international crimes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has also opened an investigation into crimes committed since August 2012. The security situation in CAR continued to be fragile with reports of incidences of indiscriminate killings and rapes. The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) has also been accused of cross-border incursions and various other crimes. The role of the LRA in the CAR conflict shows that the role of regional and foreign actors (state and non-state) in starting, exacerbating, and sustaining violence, and also in bringing peace must be part of holistic packages to end violence and sustain peace.

The African Union-led and UN-supported African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic has been seen as a possibility for sustainable peace in the CAR. The subsequent Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic
Republic that was entered into by the CAR central government and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6th February, 2019 following the Khartoum, Sudan peace talks that took place from 24 January to 5 February 2019 has brought some hope to the resolution of the crisis. It represents the eighth peace deal since 2012, and this new deal has also been violated in March 2019 when Seleka and anti-Balaka groups where involved in deadly clashes in the Basse Kotto province. There are reports that this new peace agreement has become more acceptable to all warring parties because it is silent on justice for serious human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Most of the parties involved in armed violence prefer reconciliation as the solution and think that any attempt at prosecuting them will further exacerbate the conflict. The CAR experience calls to question if peacebuilding and statebuilding processes should prioritize criminal justice compared to political, economic and social settlements in attempts to stop violence and ensure sustainable peace.

To this end, and while reacting to the news of this new peace agreement, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reiterated the need to hold accountable those responsible for violating international humanitarian law, those who committed human rights abuses – including those committed against children, and sexual and gender-based violence. The UNSC also reemphasised that the fight against impunity should be addressed through the transitional justice mechanisms in ways that contribute towards sustainable national reconciliation.

Several non-governmental organisations are also working with partners to implement various programs aimed at peacebuilding in the CAR despite the crisis situation and low levels of security guarantees. The Human Rights Institute Clinic supports Centrafrique civil society in their efforts to investigate and seek accountability for war crimes in the country, to meet humanitarian needs, and to promote reconciliation. Association des Femmes Juriste de Centrafrique (AFJC) - The Association of Female Lawyers (AFJC) provides legal and psychological counselling support to survivors of violence (many of whom are women). This forms part of a comprehensive case management for individuals that addresses physical, emotional, psychological, and social violence issues.
Cordaid is at the forefront of delivering civil society engagements within the CAR by hosting inter-faith seminars where the community leaders and representatives have come together and agreed that it is possible to live harmoniously even though they do not share a religion. Cordaid also focuses on improving basic health services and providing humanitarian aid, shelter, food security, and protection for displaced persons and host communities. Additionally, Cordaid builds and supports safe spaces for children to learn and play. The role played by both local and international civil society in bringing peace to the CAR through the promotion of community and citizens dialogue, and the provision of basic social and humanitarian services demonstrates the enormous resources, skills and goodwill that is inherent in Civil Society and must be harnessed to bring an end to violence and ensure enduring peace.

**Chad**

In 2014, the Regional Forum on Interfaith Dialogue met three times to promote religious tolerance and counter propaganda by non-state actors who use violence. Representatives were drawn from the Evangelical churches, the Catholic Church and the Islamic community. The forum's fifth annual meeting that was tagged “National Day of Peace, Peaceful
Cohabitation, and National Concord” was presided over by President Deby. The annual meeting consisted of prayers and pardon for people of all faiths and to promote tolerance and eliminate all forms of violence. Muslim, Catholic and Evangelical leaders have also launched a program to teach values of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence for refugees and Chadian returnees from the Central African Republic (CAR). This demonstrates the vital role of interfaith dialogues in promoting peace.

As a member of the TSCTP, the Chadian government, led by President Idriss Deby, has supported capacity building for national civil society organisations, engaged in community and youth empowerment, promoted interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, and supported media campaigns. President Deby has a standing instruction to the High Council for Islamic Affairs to closely monitor religious activities in mosques as a way to prevent and counter violence. The President has also called for religious tolerance through public statements and outreach to religious leaders to preach peaceful coexistence to their audiences.

Despite these steps taken by the Chadian government to work with various stakeholders to reduce violence, there are allegations of lack of capacity and human rights violations on the part of security agencies leading to more violence. This is attributed to the way police and security chiefs are appointed and removed suddenly without explanation. Again, these security chiefs are appointed at times for political reasons and not for merit, which has limited their capacity to establish the right strategies, leading in several cases to tactics of brutality and impunity. The events in Chad further demonstrates that peace can only be achieved if government and security agencies respect human rights and the rule of law including imbibing professionalism in the discharge of their duties.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is supporting radio programs in Chad to harness the power of storytelling to prevent and counter violence. USAID’s Peace through Development II Project supports radio programs to use sketches, mini-dramas and soap operas to help listeners make meaning of their lives and change their world view. The dramas mirror listeners' hopes and struggles and describe how to resolve
conflict and overcome obstacles in their individual lives. USAID’s project focuses more on addressing the issues of young men and women who are at greater risk of being targeted or recruited into violent groups. This project by USAID in Chad underscores the power of storytelling using mass media to educate young men and women to prevent them from joining violent groups.

In the course of our field work in Chad, we found out that ATPIR (Project on Fighting against Violent Extremism and Radicalization of Former Terrorist Fighters and Victims) creates income-generating opportunities for young people in the Chadian communities of Kanem, Borkou, Ndjamen and Bar Elgazal. ATPIR empowers victims of violence with psycho-social support, while building the capacity of religious leaders in churches and mosques. Also, the Comité d’Organisation Pour la Paix dans les Etablissements Scolaires (COPES) work in schools to sensitize students to fight violence and educate their peers on the dangers of joining violent groups. COPES also works to educate teachers on a culture of peace and how they can impact students peacefully. The strategic role of civic society in providing economic opportunities and civic education to support peacebuilding processes is also evident in the case of Chad. These civil society-led interventions lack sufficient funding. There is also a lack of communication between government and civil society, including scarce information and data. Additionally, there is difficulty in collaborating with local authorities and especially in the Lake Chad region that has been marred by violence. Local authorities do not want to receive Civil Society without prior information and even if they do, they want bribes to grant approvals for such projects and engagements. The foregoing shows the urgent need to fund, protect and expand the space for Civil Society engagement, including support for transparency and accountability in peacebuilding processes.

Kenya

Teachers Against Violent Extremism (TAVE) is a Civil Society organization established by Ayub Mohamud, a Kenyan of ethnic Somali descent, who teaches business and Islamic studies at Eastleigh High School in Nairobi. The school is located in Eastleigh, a suburb identified as a major recruiting centre for al-Shabaab. Ayub is active in efforts to combat
violence and prevent radicalisation at the local and national levels. He believes teachers have a strong influence on their students and should play a key role in preventing their indoctrination by violent groups.  

Ayub has developed lesson plans which incorporate de-radicalisation messages into formal academic subjects. By so doing, he tends to leverage the safety of the classroom environment to engage students on issues of violence such as ideologies and propaganda used by violent groups in their recruitment drive. More importantly, he teaches his students the correct teachings of Islam and tolerance of other peoples' faith and culture. TAVE encourages young people from rural Kenya to attend school and equips students with the skills to become entrepreneurs. TAVE also leads initiatives against religious extremism and terrorism in schools and communities all over Kenya. The case study of TAVE demonstrates the urgent need to include de-radicalisation and a culture of peace messages into formal high school curriculum and if deemed necessary, into primary school curriculum. This should include building the capacity of teachers to support students to imbibe a culture of peace. The provision of entrepreneurial skills and economic opportunities will help young women and men to be engaged and not take to violence or be lured to join violent groups.

The Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) project which was created in the aftermath of the 2007 election violence in Kenya also offers some insights into dialogue and peacebuilding in Kenya. The CCP was created as a framework and platform to help the country transform violent conflict and reconstruct its social fabric. It also created a critical mass of people and organisations who worked at three strategic levels to bring about peace in Kenya. They include the upstream, midstream, and downstream levels. The upstream level supported the top-level mediation and dialogue process. The CCP created a small task team of 12 members to support this upstream process and to take their ideas forward. This team helped in analysing and making use of ideas to support the work of the National Mediation Process. Its activities included facilitating initial contacts with protagonists, supporting high level visits by mediators and former heads of states, interacting with and briefing high level mediators and former heads of state including Desmond Tutu and former President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa, discussions with other interveners including former United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and other members of the diplomatic and
The team also supported mediators in the form of briefing papers.  

The midstream supported mid-level public and private institutions and key individuals with links to the National Policy Framework. Key activities included mobilising the government and public institutions for peace. Education for Peace in School and First Aid for Trauma Healing for the school communities was introduced. Officials and students of secondary and tertiary institutions were mobilised for peace. The Ministries of Internal Security and Public Sector Reforms also held meetings with CCP for better cooperation in handling the crisis leading to peace and the establishment of a collaborative framework for dialogue and peacebuilding that is bottom up. The media actors and especially radio stations were also engaged through trainings for peace and dialogue which led to unanimous commitment from media stakeholders to promote peace.

The downstream supported local-level pragmatic actions by key individuals, groups and institutions to transform local violence, mobilise for change and offer practical support for confidence building and healing. Activities included the establishment of an Open Forum where Kenyan citizens met between 2 and 3 hours daily to contribute their thoughts and ideas towards the resolution of the conflict. The downstream also gave support to peace forums in provinces where the conflict was hard felt to reduce violence and ensure peace. In the Nairobi Province, it gave support to the Nairobi Peace Forum and its Peace Committees. Support was also given to mediation, dialogue, reconciliation and healing processes in Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces that also witnessed large scale violence. Finally, CCP through the downstream approach helped to mobilise resources and supported communities in Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru and Nairobi who otherwise have limited means in burying their dead in a decent and culturally accepted manner. This became a way of encouraging healing among families and communities.

The CCP project in Kenya shows how the role of mediation and dialogue at different levels of society with the active support of key local, national and international stakeholders can bring about peace and address grievances. It also demonstrates the need for trauma healing
Preventing and Responding to Violence in the 21st Century: Exploring Alternative Approaches

Libya

Even though Libya’s civil society was non-existent under Gaddafi, it has evolved since 2011 for victims, humanitarian support to those who are reeling from their losses and the active engagement of the media as part of a holistic package to transition from violence to relative peace.

We were also informed during our field visit to Kenya that the Governor of Mombasa has set up the Mombasa Interfaith Dialogue in collaboration with civil society. It includes Christians going to mosques to preach peace and unity while Muslims go to churches to do the same. Another component of it involves community policing. The Kenyan constitution now provides opportunities for communities to engage with government to jointly provide security. The experience from the Mombasa County government is a good example of how Civil Society and government can collaborate to support peacebuilding by creating safe spaces for interfaith dialogues, and community policing which are key to citizens engagement for peace. Also, the Family Resource Centre experimented with entrepreneurial and vocational programmes in Pumwani-Majengo engaging youth who are out of school but these were not as successful. Better to target youth earlier and mostly while in school. The case of Family Resource Centre shows the urgent need to target young people in primary and high schools with peace messages and other interventions aimed at peacebuilding to catch them young. The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has also sponsored women from Garrisa, Nairobi and Mombasa to take the lead in providing peer, family and community education to prevent violence. This underscores the vital role of women in bringing peace to families and communities. A major challenge to some of these interventions in Kenya, as reported by FGD participants, is the profiling of Muslims and violations of their human rights through forceful arrests and illegal detention, leading to sustained violence. The Kenya experience narrated here is reminiscent of the situation in the OECD countries studied above where discrimination and human rights violations based on nationality, ethnicity, race and region has hindered their efforts aimed at reducing violence. Again, the divisive language used by politicians to whip up ethnic and religious sentiments before, during and after elections has been responsible for post-election violence in Kenya. This trend demonstrates the urgent need to engage political leaders to address hate speech and election violence.

Libya

Even though Libya’s civil society was non-existent under Gaddafi, it has evolved since 2011...
to become the last bastion of hope, in the nearest future, for effective approaches to preventing and responding to violence. Civil society has helped in promoting national identity and social cohesion among Libyans. Being a tribal society, Libyans seems to have stronger allegiance to their tribes than country. A shared national identity as Libyans will bind people together through shared values, language, culture, history, and common future. Societal differences can, therefore, be addressed through a process of dialogue and other activities based on tolerance, pluralism, and inclusion.

A programme which has promoted the above through countless local and national campaigns is the “My City is Libya” initiative by Volunteer Libya, a CSO with a mission to promote Libya's unity through recreational activities, volunteerism, and media campaign. The initiative seeks a national definition of the Libyan identity which allows people to transcend political, religion and tribal factionalism to implement national policies. It also seeks to redefine Libya's social identity from a much broader and inclusive perspective; a national identity that overrides communal or structural allegiance to primordial affinities. The absence of a national identity has been a setback in post-2011 political relations. Perhaps this absence also informs Libya's inability to embrace a pluralistic and inclusive governance system which accommodates the ethnic, cultural, racial, family, and tribal differences of her citizens. Support for recreational activities, dialogue, volunteerism and media campaigns to create a national identity that is devoid of ethnic, cultural, tribal or racial barriers can be a good starting point for peaceful relations as is seen in the case of the “My City is Libya” initiative.

Also, No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) works for the promotion of human rights, transitional justice, rule of law and democracy in Libya. NPWJ works with civil society and other actors to provide information on transitional justice, research and analysis of public perceptions and expectations. It works to build the capacity of Libyan actors in incorporating transitional justice, accountability, human rights, and rule of law in the post-conflict reconstruction of Libya.

In February 2018, UNESCO launched a two-year project to prevent violent extremism in Libya through youth empowerment with support from the United Nations Counter-
terrorism Centre (UNCCT) and Canada. The project adopts an inclusive and multidimensional approach by combining issues such as youth, education, culture, communication, and information. More than 8000 young women and men will be trained on conflict sensitive reporting. The project will also entail capacity building programs for religious authorities to develop prevention of violence initiatives, countering online hate speech, and creating new media spaces to disseminate alternative narratives by and for young people.\textsuperscript{43} The UNESCO project in review further supports the vital role of religious leaders and institutions in preventing and responding to violent.

**Mali**

The 2015 Algiers Accords (Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation in Mali) brought some hope to peacebuilding in Mali. The accord provided for increased autonomy in Northern Mali, decentralisation of Mali’s eight regions into nineteen, an increase in local government's budgets, integration of select armed groups into civil service and the Malian military, and a DDR process. However, the agreement was breached and fighting continued mainly for two reasons. First, the Algiers peace process excluded Central Mali since it was experiencing relative peace when the accord was signed. Second, most violent groups were excluded from the negotiations and as such will not benefit from the peace agreement.\textsuperscript{44} The factors responsible for the failure of the 2015 Algiers Accord as listed above supports the tenet that all actors (warring parties, and those parties with peaceful disposition) within a conflict setting, including external stresses must be part of the solution in an inclusive process.

The Conference of National Understanding in March 2017 was perceived as a bold step to further discuss the hindrances to the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Accord and agree on a way forward in a holistic and inclusive manner. These high hopes have been dashed by a flawed preparation and lack of commitment to an inclusive process. In the preparatory stages for the conference, an article in Le Monde warned that the summit could become the “conference of national misunderstanding” if adequate preparations were not made. The Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Platform – the two signatory
coalitions of armed groups to the peace agreement, and other interested parties accused the
government of excluding them. The conference ended in a deadlock without any vital
decisions taken. The March 23rd, 2019 massacres in Mali at the same time while members
of the United Nations Security Council were on visit to the country to ascertain the extent
of implementation of the peace agreement in the North shows the level of fragility in the
country since the Algiers Accord. A total of 160 civilians were killed in the village of
Ogossagou in the central region during the attacks. This prompted calls for the
reconfiguration of the UN Multidimensional Integration Stabilisation Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA) to prioritise protection of civilians. The UN Security Council encouraged
the UN Peacekeeping Force to rebalance its presence in central Mali.

With support from the UN Peacebuilding Fund, UNESCO has developed a Training and
Activity Planning Manual called “Young Actors for Peace and National Reconciliation”.
The program aims to involve active young people in the implementation process of the
Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation in Mali. The Young Actors for Peace and
National Reconciliation manual has modules on conflict management, citizenship,
intercultural dialogue, democracy, gender, and Gender Based Violence (GBV), and cross-
border trafficking. The programme will last for 18 months and will be implemented in 25
municipalities in Segou and Mopti regions in favour of 3,400 direct beneficiaries, including
2500 young women and men, and 900 women. It is expected that the programme will
strengthen the commitment of young people and women as peace actors. This will further
support community dialogue, social cohesion, unity, and developing the potential of young
people. This program by UNESCO shows the need to target youth and women to secure
their support for peace and reconciliation processes.

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), The Global Partnership for the
Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the Human Security Collective (HSC) jointly
commenced a project on November 1, 2013 aimed at enhancing human security in Mali.
The project, entitled "Civil Society for a Human Security Strategy in Mali", and funded by
the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), seeks to facilitate the development of a
comprehensive human security approach by Malian civil society, to deal with the complex
Preventing and Responding to Violence in the 21 Century: Exploring Alternative Approaches

The Hague Institute for Global Justice, together with the West African Network for Peacebuilding in Mali (WANEP-Mali) and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) initiated a second project to review, monitor and evaluate the framework for Human Security (HS) in Mali. The project, 'Learning from Design in Mali: A Critical Review and M&E Framework for the CSO-led Human Security Strategy 2014-2015', is built on earlier consultations held by WANEP-Mali, GPPAC and HSC from 2013 and 2015. It seeks to contribute to better coordination amongst the different actors and their perspectives, which is key to sustainable peace and security in Mali. The product of this review is a monitoring and evaluation framework aimed at informing civil society on the extent to which the human security strategy and similar strategies are implemented over time by various policy makers and other civil society actors. The key findings included: higher results can be achieved if a variety of methods comprising focus groups, surveys, and consultations, while adapting to new methods are used to collect data; there was active involvement and input of communities and citizens; the samples collected represented Malian voices from all regions; NGOs in Bamako and in the regions did not feel pressure from the government or from donors to use a specific method for data collection; the NGOs and CSOs in Mali valued the importance of monitoring and evaluation in improving their work and roles and did not consider the reports as a potential threat to their work; and there is need for a robust coordination among NGOs and CSOs in sharing data and best practice on its collection, and the urgent need to strengthen collaborations between NGOs, CSOs, the Malian government, and international stakeholders. The foregoing shows the importance of a Human Security strategy that derives from communities and citizens, including a comprehensive evaluation follow up in countries that are experiencing violence.

**Niger**

The government of Niger has sought to prevent and counter violence by creating employment opportunities especially for fighters returning from Libya and freed prisoners, including prison de-radicalisation programmes. Niger also convened a conference on strategic communication to counter violence. The government of Niger has stepped up efforts to ensure inclusivity through political reforms and development of the Tuareg
communities in the North. Yet, marginalisation and political exclusion persist in Niger leading to more violence. This underscores the need for inclusive peacebuilding and statebuilding processes that considers everyone within a setting as a part of the solution.

USAID started the Niger Community Cohesion Initiative in 2014 to address the threats of violence emanating from social marginalisation and political exclusion. This program operates in vulnerable communities in the regions of Agadez and Diffa to promote resistance to violence among the youth population and encourage dialogue between local communities, authorities, and disenfranchised groups.

A June 2017 field visit to Niger shows that Eirene works through its Quranic Schools Project in Maradine to help young people read and understand the Quran. This helps prevent the wrong interpretation of the Quran that has been used for radicalisation purposes and passes on knowledge and communication with students in a non-violent way. Boko Haram strongholds of Differ and Tillabery are also benefitting from Eirene's Quranic Schools Project.

Field work data also shows that the National Youth Council (NYC) of Niger, with support from UNDP, trained 40 girls and boys in Diffa on peace and security skills leading them to become peace ambassadors in their communities. They work with the police to report suspicious activities, mediate conflicts, and influence their peers. The 40 young people trained also received funds to set up their own businesses for financial independence. The strategy deployed by the NYC of Niger demonstrates the need for a holistic strategy that combines peace skills and livelihoods to achieve sustainable youth, peace and security programs.

Also in an interview with the government of Niger, we were informed that the government through the High Commission on Peace Consolidation (HCPC) is working to promote faith and patriotism in the population. The HCPC is financing youth revenue generation activities in Diffa and Tillabery based on needs. Around 300 victims of violence have been reintegrated into society through the Social Reintegration Centres. The government of Niger also works with the NYC of Niger to resolve and mediate conflict in Diffa, Agadez, Zinder and Tillabery.
Nigeria

Nigeria's Countering Violence Program, a multi-stakeholder national strategy coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is an effort in the right direction if sustained and given its independence. The program seeks to stop violence by preventing susceptible Nigerians from joining radical groups. An encouraging aspect of the strategy is that it is vertical (involving three tiers of government, federal, state, and local) and horizontal (involving civil society, academics, traditional, religious and community leaders) dimension. It utilises existing structures within and outside government to deliver targeted programs and activities that further the overall goal of stemming the tide of radicalisation. Non-state structures such as families, communities, and faith-based organisations have been used to build resilience against violence. This trend further shows the vital role of families, communities and religious institutions in preventing and responding to violence.

Within this programme are initiatives like the Society Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) and Partnership Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) which were established as collaborative platforms between the state and CSOs to undertake activities to promote counter-radicalisation, as well as prevent, mitigate, and eradicate violence through community engagement, awareness campaigns and education-based projects. SAVE and PAVE both deliver programmes that reduce the wave of radicalisation. PAVE activities are decentralised and reflect the realities of communities prone to violence. Some of these initiatives include societal interaction in Chikun local government in Kaduna, community engagement for sustainable security in Nassarawa, inter-sect dialogue in Kaduna, and countering radicalisation through sports in Kano.

The concerted effort made by President Jonathan's administration to rehabilitate destitute children in the north by reforming the Almajeri educational system to encompass both Qur'anic and formal education through the Almajeri model schools is another great achievement in preventing violence in Nigeria. By so doing, millions of children are expected to be integrated into mainstream society. Despite this move, millions of children are still roaming the streets in northern Nigeria. This calls for scaling up of the Almajeri model schools system.
The agitation to control the vast oil resources in the Niger Delta region became intense after independence in 1960 leading to massive violence. The first major step to embark on peacebuilding in the region was the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 to replace the corrupt and discredited Petroleum Task Force (PTF) and the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADC). Subsequently, in 2004, former President Olusegun Obasanjo struck a deal with militants who turned over thousands of weapons in return for amnesty. This deal later broke down when some factions accused others of profiting from disarmament at their own expense leading to escalated conflict. The creation of the Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs by the late President Umaru Yar'Adua in 2008 is seen to have doused tensions as a result of the amnesty program that Yar'Adua started in early 2009 and was enforced by the Jonathan government.

In February 2011, the government Niger Delta amnesty program coordinator stated that 26,358 former militants have accepted amnesty, 20,192 have been reintegrated while 6,166 were yet to be rehabilitated.\(^{59}\) As of October 2009, crude production which has decreased by more than half to about 800,000 barrels a day, climbed once again to about 2.3 million barrels a day.\(^{60}\)

However, these interventions in the Niger Delta region under Presidents Obasanjo, Yar'Adua and Jonathan were not sufficient to address the issues holistically. Grievances persist because not all aspects of the dispute and most especially the revenue sharing formula in which the Niger Deltans are requesting 25 percent derivation fund instead of the 13 percent has been resolved. The conditions for amnesty including the living conditions at various rehabilitation camps and stipends to repentant militants remain a controversy, as repentant militants have on various occasions stormed the heart of Abuja to protest the non-payment of their allowances. The amnesty program has also been criticised for being solely run by the Federal Government and excluding other critical stakeholders including communities and multinational oil companies (MNCs).\(^{61}\) The issue of infrastructural development and employment creation which is at the centre of their grievances coupled with lack of political and economic integration are yet to be resolved.\(^{62}\)
The President Buhari government which came into power in 2015 has continued the Niger Delta amnesty program. At the end of 2018, the amnesty coordinator stated that 18,721 persons have been reintegrated out of the 30,000 enlisted in the programme. Again, Nigeria has also been able to meet the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota of 2.2 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2018. This the amnesty office attributed to the relative peace that currently exists in the Niger Delta region. However, the Federal Government has been criticised for underfunding the Niger Delta amnesty programme leading to their inability to reintegrate thousands of identified repentant militants. Only 5 billion naira was released to the amnesty office out of a total budget of 65 billion naira in 2018. This depicts the need for increased funding to programs aimed at preventing and responding to violence.

Interviews conducted in Nigeria indicated that the Adamawa State Peace Initiative through its Peacemakers Programme works with Gotel Communication to use Radio Gotel to reach out to young people and the public at large to create awareness on the need for a culture of peace. The program also works to build the capacity of religious leaders. The Radio Gotel has reached out to millions of Nigerians in local languages to transform their mindset and reposition them for national solidarity and non-violence. This program shows the role of mass media in preventing and responding to violence.

Also, the CSDEA works with girls and women who were raped or widowed in the North-East of Nigeria that have been affected by the activities of violent groups to empower them with psycho-social support, mentorship, and livelihoods. This program has empowered over 200 women with trauma healing and sustainable livelihoods by establishing businesses for them to support themselves and their families, and demonstrating how a holistic approach that combines psycho-social support and livelihoods can be effective in addressing the issues of trauma victims. The CSDEA also works with vigilantes who are also referred to as Civilian Joint Task Force (cJTF) in some circles to train them on a culture of peace and transform them into local peacebuilding organisations. Over 1000 vigilante members have passed through this programme leading to non-violence in their approach. Eight large vigilante groups representing eight local governments in the North-East are also being transformed into peacebuilding organisations.
Pakistan

The Pakistani civil society has been at the forefront of strategies and programmes that champion prevention and countering violence. Some of the most common activities include the organisation of anti-terror campaigns, public rallies, demonstrations, and conferences to mobilise popular support against the Taliban and other violent groups. The Istehkam-e Pakistan (Strengthening Pakistan) and the Save Pakistan Convention are examples of strategic and result oriented initiatives within this context.\(^{64}\) A 2015 Brookings Institution report concluded that the government of Pakistan has been unsuccessful in implementing programs to counter and prevent violence.\(^{65}\) While the report praised the role played by civil society to prevent and respond to violence, their work have been hindered by the lack of political, social and economic reforms that brings in the whole of society dimension.\(^{66}\) Civil society organisations implementing programs to prevent and respond to violence are often seen as pro-American groups coupled with the generally insecure environment in which they operate.\(^{67}\)

Young people have also been involved in taking initiatives to prevent and respond to violence in Pakistan. For example, Youth activist Syed Ali Abbas Zaidi has developed a campaign to counter radical narratives by painting messages promoting peace on Rickshaw – a platform popularly used by violent groups for recruitment.\(^{68}\) Women's organisations in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province such as PAIMAN teach mediation and conflict transformation skills to women and youth through the 'Lets Live in Peace Project'. The PAIMAN organisation has directly impacted 35,000 young people and 2000 women over the last 20 years.\(^{69}\) Civil Society groups and especially Muslim networks have also established radio stations to air programmes that counter radical narratives in Pakistan. One such successful programme is the now popular The Dawn and the Voice of Peace.\(^{70}\) Grassroots institutions and civil society groups such as the Qadims Lumier School and College in Peshawar and the CSO BaahnBeli in rural Sindh have developed peace education curriculum and grassroots development programmes that encourage diversity and religious tolerance.\(^{71}\) The activities of Civil Society in Pakistan demonstrates the effectiveness of mass media and peace education curriculum in preventing and responding to violence.
Cultural associations and faith-based organisations have also organised sit-ins across Pakistan to denounce militant attacks on civilians, places of worship and Pakistan's cultural heritage. The Pakistani situation demonstrates that faith-based organisations can capitalize on their credibility and popular support to denounce violence in culturally sensitive ways. The Dar ul-Uloom Ashraf al-Madaris Okara organises seminars on Qur'anic principles of peace and conflict resolution in Okara, the hometown of most of the 2008 Mumbai attackers. Religious scholars have issued dozens of anti-terror fatwas in Urdu and local languages. Most importantly, Dr. Tahir ul-Qadri's 600-page fatwa against terrorism and suicide bombing has become a rallying point for Pakistani religious scholars to denounce violence.\(^{72}\)

The government of Pakistan introduced the first integrated National Internal Security Policy in 2014 that acknowledges multi-stakeholder approaches to countering violence in Pakistan. This gave legal backing to the initiatives of civil society including faith based organisations and the international community in preventing and responding to violence in Pakistan. In a bid to ensure political inclusivity in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the home of the Taliban insurgency, the government extended the Political Parties Act to the region to integrate this historically isolated region into mainstream social and political activities of Pakistan.\(^{73}\)

Apart from military operations, the Pakistani military has also established de-radicalisation centres to rehabilitate repentant Taliban fighters in the Swat valley. The military works with civil society to operate the Sabaoon rehabilitation centre where radicalised youth are rehabilitated through education and counselling. The military also established a radio station – FM 96, to counter propaganda by violent groups in the Swat valley,\(^{74}\) further supporting the constructive role of mass media in preventing and responding to violence. The Office of Transitions Initiatives (OTI) of the USAID works with local partners in Pakistan to promote peace and democracy by establishing recreational facilities and vocational training centres to provide civic education on religious tolerance and respect for diversity. These pilot projects are meant to counter the social and political factors that help with the recruitment of youth into violent networks in Karachi and Southern Punjab. OTI
programmes in FATA support community identified projects that include the provision of vocational training, institutional capacity building, rehabilitation of schools, community-based development projects and infrastructure development, aimed to build trust between the communities and the government of Pakistan. The OTI program in Pakistan is another example of how governments and stakeholders can build trust with communities as a strategy to prevent and respond to violence.

The USIP works with Pakistan's civil society to fund research projects on the root causes of violence and mapping of youth trends. USIP has also published peace education textbooks for Pakistan in partnership with a CSO called Al-Noor. The Peacebuilding Across Borders is a programme of USIP that fosters Track II relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Other programmes by USIP in Pakistan include its Education and Training Centre that trains civil society leaders and parliamentarians in conflict resolution; facilitating Track II between India and Pakistan; engagement of Pakistani religious leaders in promoting Sunni-Shi’a dialogue; developing a peace curriculum for madrasa; education and cultural preservation programmes; and micro-grants for local civil society to pursue peacebuilding activities as part of its Peace Innovations Fund for Pakistan.

The US State Department through the US embassy in Pakistan has also supported media engagements and interfaith dialogue series in Rawalpindi. The embassy also supports programmes to counter propaganda by violent groups through public service announcements, radio programmes, college lecture series, theatre performances, and comic and animated television programs for youth. Other initiatives by the State Department in Pakistan include countering violence programmes in prisons and countering radical narratives online.

The United States has applied the strategy of engagement and disengagement in Somalia since the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991. However, since renewed efforts by the Obama Administration to strategically engage Somalia, there has been a steady increase in development assistance. From 2013 to 2014, USAID provided over US$355 million to Somalia. This was after providing US$260 million in humanitarian aid between 2009 and
Somalia has been listed as one of the three countries that portend 'high risk' to the United Kingdom in its official counter-terrorism document. This is because of the large Somali community residing in the United Kingdom, and the issue of the Somali piracy. In this regard, the UK has been seeking ways to support the establishment of a functional Somali state as embedded in the Somali New Deal Compact, leading to a focus on strengthening the role, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and interim country. A total of US$137.8 million was spent to promote peace, stability and strengthen governance in Somalia. It also included support to political processes, parliament, and government formation. During the 2013 Somalia New Deal Conference in Brussels, the US pledged US$69 million to endorse the Somali Compact. The US has since been engaged in the implementation Working Groups of each of the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs). Despite the US involvement in the implementation of the PSGs including being a co-Chair of the Working Group on PSG 4 on economic foundations, much of its development assistance continues to be disbursed outside the multi-partner trust funds established as part of the New Deal implementation. The US development assistance to Somalia has been criticised for strategically supporting US counter-terrorism efforts leading to the securitisation of aid, and ensuring that there is no distinction between development, peacebuilding, military strategy, and counterterrorism. While there is a relationship between development, peacebuilding and military strategy, funding that is directly budgeted for preventing and responding to violence must be used as planned so that it can be monitored and evaluated.

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administrations including the Interim Juba Administration (IJA). The UK's development assistance in Somalia focuses on governance and peacebuilding, human development, economic development, and humanitarian assistance. The UK promoted and endorsed the Somali New Deal Compact by pledging US$339.7 million. Part of these funds was used to support reforms in the security and justice sector of Somalia. The UK has provided US$47.25 million to invest in small infrastructure projects in Kismayo and Baidoa to further strengthen the FGS's capacity to provide services. The UK mobilised the international community to engage in Somalia to support a permanent governance structure as is evident in the February 2012 London Conference on Somalia, and the 2nd London Conference on Somalia in May 2013 that galvanised international support for the FGS's priorities on justice, political reconciliation, security, and public financial management, therefore laying the foundation for the Somali New Deal Compact. The UK also provided 37 million pounds to the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) to support the economic development of the country.80 The UK's support to Somalia has also been criticised for being securitised and focused on preventing terrorism on UK soil. This analysis demonstrates why funds for preventing and responding to violence should be unconditional so there can be trust between donors and recipient nations and communities.

The EU has always stated that it engages in Somalia to promote transition from a fragile country to peace, stability, and prosperity. To achieve this goal the EU has relied on political engagement to support the FGS and its predecessors. The EU hosted the September 2013 Brussels Conference on a New Deal for Somalia where over 1.8 billion Euros was raised. The European Commission contributed 650 million Euros to total figure raised at the Brussels Conference. Since 2008, the EU has contributed 1.2 billion Euros to security, statebuilding and peacebuilding processes in Somalia, making it the largest donor. The EU's development assistance to Somalia has been done through the European Development Fund (EDF) since 2000. From 2008 to 2013 and with a total budget of 425 million Euros, the EU has promoted good governance, statebuilding, education, economic development, and food security. Starting from 2014 to 2020 and with a budget of 286 million Euros, statebuilding, peacebuilding, education, food security and building of resilience have been prioritised. The EU has vowed to implement this new plan in a multi-stakeholder manner to engage non-
state actors including civil society, the private sector, and government administrations to support dialogue. The EU's engagement in Somalia has been link to an effort to eliminate terrorist threats by keen observers.

Interviews with Somalia government representatives and military officials show that the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected States has also supported the reconstruction and stability of Somalia. The New Deal fund is helping the country to develop its people, institutions, and infrastructure such as solar power buildings. New Deal pledges are also used to support microfinance, taxation, and public financial management in Somalia. However, there are questions about the sustainability of these projects, and especially human capacity as tax collectors are being targeted and killed by al-Shabaab. Interviews conducted in Somalia revealed that the Kenyan government under the auspices of the AU has built the capacities of Somalis to run the Somalia government. The Kenyan government has also supported Somalia with the construction of schools, clinics, and institutions for peacebuilding. The Kenyan government has helped Somalia with the construction of administrative buildings, and in keeping the territorial waters of Somalia peaceful. Livelihoods like fishing and tourism have returned and hijackings have been reduced to the barest minimum.

Some respondents during our FGDs indicated that the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations are funding defecting centres for amnesty recipients for their rehabilitation. They live there for between 4 and 6 months to earn livelihood and get fed. After rehabilitation, they join the Somali army or are united with their families. Some of the repentant militants are used for information gathering. The challenge, according to FGD respondents is that the funds distributed to some of the youth for rent and livelihood under this amnesty programme is making them arrogant with too much money. They then become easy targets and recruits for al-Shabaab. This trend demonstrates why modest allowances should be disbursed to amnesty recipients and why amnesty programs should not become cash cows resulting in breeding ground for more recruits and other unintended consequences.
Somali Family Services (SFS) leads discussions on encouraging respect for the human rights of the local populace and sensitising human rights defenders. Working with the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), SFS holds workshops on human rights bringing together traditional leaders, representatives from civil society, media, and government. Participants discuss how to better protect human rights in Puntland and concrete steps that should be taken towards this goal, including the establishment of an Office of Human Rights Defenders. In all of its work, SFS strives to build peace and demonstrate non-violent solutions. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has been supporting the Somali government towards the realisation of long-term stability with particular reference to issues of safety, reconciliation, economic recovery, governance, rule of law, and regional cooperation. ACCORD achieves this through institutional and capacity development to impart critical conflict management skills and expertise. The initiative conducts research while engaging with key civil society and government stakeholders. It also supports national and regional policy development, and advocates for dialogue as the best means to advance reconciliation.

In measuring the impact of Mercy Corps' Somali Youth Learners Initiative (SYLI), the organisation concluded that better education and vocational training combined with opportunities to take part in community and civic projects reduced youth participation in violence. Young people in conflict affected areas of Somalia who have access to secondary education are 48 percent less likely to support violent extremist groups than those that did not attend schools. Again, when structured and sustainable community engagement opportunities compliment access to education, they are 65 percent less likely to support violence. The SYLI which was funded by the USAID improved access and quality to more than 100,000 young people through the construction and rehabilitation of schools and improved teachers' training. The programme also created community engagement opportunities through student clubs and youth led community development initiatives.

The Peace and Human Rights Network is a rallying point for civil society engagement in Somalia. It brings together politicians, warlords, elders, militias, the business community,
media and civil society to engage in holistic dialogue and peacebuilding. The Centre for Human Rights monitors and records human rights violations so that perpetrators can be brought to justice. In 1997, IIDA Women's Development Organisation (IIDA) carried out the first DDR programme offering education, shelter, and alternative income generating opportunities for about 150 disarmed militias who turned in their weapons in Merka-Southern Somalia. This was the very first group of demobilized ex-combatants who thereafter became peace champions, and helped to sow the initial seeds for conflict resolution. IIDA is currently partnering with UNICEF to expand child-protection systems in Somalia, focusing on rehabilitating children in armed conflict and children formerly associated with armed forces and armed groups. The Women Pioneers for Peace and Life which was formed in 2003 by former female fighters organises peace campaigns and uses the respect they earned as former fighters to intervene with militants and warlords to diffuse tension.

Yemen

The Yemen National Dialogue Conference (NDC) which began in March 2013 started as a project of the Political Development Forum (PDF). It was supported by the Berghof Foundation to implement the National Dialogue Support Program (2012-2014) which served as a platform for trust-building, learning, reflection, and decision making among relevant national stakeholders (state and non-state) in Yemen. The project sought to develop a new social contract and create nationwide ownership by strengthening an inclusive Yemeni-led national dialogue with technical and process-related support. For example, the Berghof Foundation and the PDF jointly facilitated the meeting where the framework, agenda, basic principles, and mechanisms including transitional justice, restructuring of the army, statebuilding, constitution drafting, wealth distribution and power sharing of the National Dialogue Conference, were discussed and agreed upon. The NDC set out to address marginalisation, including Southern grievances. The final document outlined principles for a new constitution, a new sixth region and a decentralised federal structure. However, these proposals did not make it out of the NDC Working Groups, and the final NDC outcome document ended up protecting the interest of the elites and putting power back in the hands
of the political parties to the neglect of transitional justice that has served as the fuel for the conflict. The NDC was expected to provide guidance on institutional reforms and social justice concerns, that included gaps in the rule of law and basic rights protection; high levels of corruption; weak government institutions and poor governance; political patronage networks and co-option of state institutions; judicial competence and independence; and other social and human rights issues. The Yemeni experience shows that transitional justice, human rights protection and institutional reforms must be prioritized in preventing and responding to violence as opposed to the protection of elitist interests.

The United States economic support and development assistance to Yemen has also been credited for supporting peacebuilding in that country. Economic support including that of USAID to Yemen rose from US$5 million in 2003 to over US$128 million in 2014. US support was meant to mitigate the drivers of conflict by strategically engaging unstable areas. An example of this strategy is evident in the focus of its community livelihoods project in AQAP affected areas such as Amran, al-Jawf, Marib, Shabwah, Aden, Lahj, Abyan, and Al-Dhalae. The US approach in Yemen has been referred to by analysts as serving its own interests to fight terrorism and in the context of the GWOT. The United States interest in Yemen has also been reported to be economical, as between 3.5 and 4 percent of global oil passes through the Bab el Mandab strait in Yemen's waters. Protracted conflict in Yemen could therefore result in a global energy crisis.

While the UK has focused most of its efforts on countering the threat of terror in Yemen, it has also tried to streamline political, social, economic, and security dimensions. The UK's DFID established a presence in Yemen in 2004, and its budget for Yemen rose from 2 million pounds in 2003 to 81 million pounds in 2013-2014. However, the intense crisis that began again in 2015 coupled with military bombardments by coalition forces led to a decrease in the allocation which stood at 72 million pounds in 2015-2016. The increase in aid to Yemen has been attributed to the downward political and social trends that have grave implications for national and regional stability, and the application of a fragile states' lens to the country. DFID's 10 years Development Partnership Arrangement (DPA) with the Government of Yemen that was put in place in 2007 encompasses interventions that relate to the rule of law, education, health, water resources management, other social services, and technical support programmes that focus on public financial management and economic investment. DFID's
programme support to Yemen in 2014 aimed to respond to and manage conflict by addressing immediate and underlying humanitarian needs, build resilience and deliver basic services; tackle the drivers of instability by supporting political transition and reforms; support economic reforms to increase citizens' confidence in government and lay the groundwork for longer-term development. DFID's approach in Yemen has fallen short of donor coherence around conflict prevention, and ignored recommendations emanating from its own analytical work. This approach has also failed to incorporate government ownership and government's commitment to reforms. The UK's engagement in Yemen has also been linked to its own security and those of its allies, as its three core objectives in Yemen as of February 2015 were to disrupt al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, to address the urgent humanitarian crisis facing the poorest people in Yemen, and to support inclusive political systems that respect the rule of law in that country. The UK's support to Yemen underscores the need for national government ownership of programs for buy-in and sustainability. It also shows why donor funding must not be securitized or have conditions attached.

The EU's approach in Yemen aims at promoting good governance, human rights, rule of law, economic development, democracy, education, stability by means of political dialogues, and security sector reforms. Following the adoption of the Yemen Agenda for Change in 2011, The EU's assistance was scaled up with a focus on statebuilding, making the EU the largest donor in the governance sector in Yemen. The EU allocated 23 million Euros for its governance objective in its 2007 to 2013 strategy. It intended to support democracy through strengthening the parliament, to bolster the capacities of state institutions to implement national reform priorities, to strengthen the juvenile justice system, improve the law enforcement capacity of the police, increase respect for human rights, and modernise Yemen's public service. The EU country strategy for 2014-2015 was allocated 46 million Euros and revised to support the socio-economic and political reforms of the Transitional Programme for Stabilisation and Development. The EU's support to statebuilding in Yemen also witnessed a pledge of 172 million Euros to the NDC in 2011 to 2012 to support the agreement and an inclusive political transition in Yemen. In view of the 2015 political crisis in Yemen, the EU suspended support to state institutions and has been engaging civil society.
This new strategy has seen the EU support a project aimed at facilitating dialogue between the administration and civil society to create a multi-layered approach to governance in Yemen, especially in the security sector. Another EU call for proposal supported national civil society actors in dialogue, reconciliation, and mediation, as a way to prevent radicalisation and violence. The EU's strategy in Yemen is also tied to countering terrorism, and the realisation of the risk posed by violent groups in the region.\textsuperscript{93}

The UNDP Youth Economic Empowerment Programme in Yemen is an initiative that is contributing to peacebuilding in that country. Its goal is to socially and economically empower disadvantaged youth and women in market oriented technical, entrepreneurial and managerial skills. It also includes confidence-building and empowerment skills necessary to improve their access to productive resources and sustainable earnings through income generation activities.\textsuperscript{94} The UNDP Youth Economic Empowerment Programme in Yemen demonstrates while efforts should be made to empower hard to reach and disadvantaged youth including women in preventing and responding to violence. This will reduce their vulnerability to recruitment into violence. UNDP's Yemen Resilience Programme is another major project that is aimed at building resilience by supporting communities and key institutions to lay the foundation for recovery and statebuilding. The objectives of the program include the restoration of livelihoods, social cohesion, enhancement of community security, strengthening informal justice mechanisms, and community-based dialogue. This is intended to pave the way for stabilisation and recovery towards sustainable development pathways.\textsuperscript{95} These programmes have been hindered by prolonged conflict and insecurity.

Saferworld has been working with Yemeni civil society since 2010 in their efforts to build peace and help communities live peacefully. The organisation supports women to participate in peacebuilding processes by addressing gaps in knowledge about women's local activism, strengthening existing initiatives, and by promoting the essential role of women in conflict prevention and resolution. Saferworld works with youth led organisations in Yemen to support their peacebuilding work by assisting in the development and growth of local groups and organisations through the provision of small grants, training opportunities, amplifying local youth voices, and meetings to build bridges across conflict divides. Saferworld also supports communities in Yemen to identify and solve their own security
challenges by finding peaceful solutions to grievances.\textsuperscript{96}

The Supporting Transitional Awareness and Reconciliation Techniques (START) programme that is implemented by Partners-Yemen adopts a community-based approach to transitional justice in Yemen. It supports community reconciliation processes by exploring the intersection between informal, traditional, and formal justice mechanisms. Through local reconciliation mechanisms, START is ensuring that the grievances of all Yemenis including religious and tribal leaders, women and youth groups are listened to and addressed. Start empowers organisations in Abyan, Ta'izz, Aden, Lahij, and Ibb to handle reconciliation and resolution of grievances in a culturally sensitive and sustainable way. It also raises awareness of the national transitional justice process in Yemen. This project is limited by the deteriorating security and economic situation.\textsuperscript{97}
SECTION 6

Conclusion

This work shows that hard approaches to preventing or responding to violence by national governments and their military and security apparatuses have resulted in further violence or in suppressing grievances. The tactics of torture, rape, human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings have resulted in catastrophic outcomes, as aggrieved persons have reasons to be engaged in violence, leading to the proliferation of violent groups who claim to be seeking justice. Some of these groups who use violence have become regional or even global movements. This study has revealed that an autocratic and oppressive government that alienates some or most of its people never stand forever. The role of foreign and regional powers in the affairs of national governments and especially in the aspect of military intervention has also fuelled further violence, strengthening in some cases regional and global instability. Foreign military interventions since the era of independence in South-East Asia, Central Africa and the Sahel have further contributed to instability and violence in those regions and globally. The interventions of the global and regional powers have led to alignments and realignments by various religious and ethnic groups within a nation, and the proliferation of militia groups along ethnic and religious lines leading to violence. The deaths and human rights abuses arising from such foreign interventions create grievances which are used by violent groups for recruitment.

Efforts towards countering and preventing violence need to be properly conceptualised to reflect the socio-political, cultural, and economic realities on the ground in a bottom to top manner. More importantly, any approach to prevent violence should be holistic and devoid of foreign control and influence for it to be effective. The limitation of the use of military power must be recognised. The use of hard power has resulted in impunity, human rights abuses, and high numbers of civilian deaths leading to further grievances and the escalation of violence. To defeat violent groups, governments must undermine their support base by improving governance and social, economic, and political participation as well as addressing other root causes of violence. This reality must be factored into any strategy developed towards ensuring peace and stability.
These approaches should target the root causes of violence in a context specific way by addressing the concerns of religious and ethnic minorities, and other marginalised groups that have been deprived and could consider joining a rebellion, or violent groups. As such, concerns over unemployment, education, underdevelopment, frustration, lack of opportunities, segregation and discrimination should be properly addressed in an all-inclusive manner. In several fragile and conflict affected states, the civil society sector remains the last bastion of hope for any effective initiatives aimed at peacebuilding. These programmes should therefore focus on developing democratic culture among affected populations and building resilience at the individual, family, community, and institutional level. Political and business leaders must place national and citizen interests above other narrow, profit making, geopolitical and sectional ones. Preventing or responding to violence must not be seen as Islamist militancy but should be approached as a domestic political and socio-economic crisis that must evolve into integration of all aggrieved parties to result in a win-win solution.

OSCE evaluations in the OECD countries of France, Germany, the UK, and the US that were explored in this study have for instance shown that small group discussions are more effective methods of work in primary and secondary schools, especially with the participation of former violent individuals to share their experiences, as well as role-plays, films and discussions. On the contrary, computer-based methods and exhibitions appear to be less effective. However, the programs to counter violence in these OECD countries, apart from short term successes of preventing attacks and other forms of violence have been counter-productive. Grievances, especially from the Muslim communities in these countries, have been suppressed and might one day resurface. This calls for a review by these OECD countries to evolve people-centred approaches that combine dialogue and reconciliation. Overall, the OECD countries' approaches to preventing and countering violence cannot serve as examples of success stories for fragile and conflict affected states in the global South. Infact, the strategies of these OECD countries of profiling certain groups based on race, religion, ethnicity and creed is synonymous to the impunity and human rights abuses reported in the fragile and conflict-affected states that have been analysed in this study.
ENDNOTES

SECTION 1

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SECTION 2

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⁸ Uvin, Peter (1999), 'Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Parts to Mass Violence' Comparative Politics, volume 31, no. 3, pp 253-271
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¹⁰ Ibid
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See "Why people join Nigeria’s Boko Haram"
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SECTION 6

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